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CRIMINAL LAW
AUTUMN OF THE PATRIARCH: THE
]RNOCHET EXTRADITION DEBACLE AND
BEYOND-HUMAN RIGHTS CLAUSES
COMPARED TO TRADITIONAL




"Play with murder enough and it gets you one of two ways.
It makes you sick, or you get to like it." Dashiell Hammett, Red
Harvest 102 (1929).
A. GENERAL
This article will analyze human rights law to see whether it
plays any role in the protection of the individual in the face of
international extradition or other international cooperation in
criminal matters. I will consider two approaches to extradition
and human rights that seem to be vying for position in the
world arena and the tension between them. The first is to apply
the traditional statist exemptions to extradition, which some-
times have enabled a few human rights protections. This ap-
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proach is based on the concept that states are the only subjects
of international law. Thus, it is state's interests, rights, and obli-
gations that are to be vindicated. If a fugitive is to be protected,
it is because the state wills it so. The second approach considers
the individual, at least to a degree, to be a subject of interna-
tional law. It is the fugitive's interests and rights that are at issue
and that human rights law protects. Thus, extradition law (trea-
ties, custom, and domestic law) should include certain specific,
basic human rights clauses or rules, through which the fugitive,
if he obtains, will be exempt from extradition. These may in-
clude specific, wholesale human rights clauses in extradition
treaties and domestic extradition laws. It can be argued that,
even without a specific clause, established international human
rights rules are incorporated by reference.
The battle between these approaches illustrates the tension
between the value of protecting individual human rights in the
criminal justice arena and the need to provide effective interna-
tional law enforcement. Most recently, the process that lead to
the English decision not to extradite Augusto Pinochet to Spain
exemplified the tension between these values.
It is interesting to wonder about the apparent oddity that
many, though not all, human rights activists, who traditionally
have been quite vigorously libertarian in protecting rights of in-
dividuals facing criminal justice systems of various nations (and,
presumably still are in the run-of-the-mill cases), have become
pro-prosecution hawks and quite weak on the incorporation of
broad human rights protections for those brought before inter-
national tribunals or otherwise prosecuted for the more heinous
international crimes. Some of the reactions to the Pinochet de-
cision are representative. I will argue that if we are seriously go-
ing to try to end impunity for crimes against humanity and war
crimes, it must be done in a way that is consistent with the high-
est protection of human rights interests for those being prose-
cuted. Otherwise, the system will ultimately fall of its own
weight or become a tool of repression itself. If we are not scru-
pulous in protecting the accused from abuses and deprivation
of civil liberties and ensuring related human rights protections
for the accused during extradition, investigation, and trial, we
will ultimately condemn the viability of human rights and
criminal justice. As Justice Jackson warned in his opening state-
ment as Chief Prosecutor in the Nuremberg Trials:
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[B]efore I discuss the particulars of evidence, some general considera-
tions which may affect the credit of this trial in the eyes of the world
should be candidly faced. There is a dramatic disparity between the cir-
cumstances of the accusers and the accused that might discredit our
work if we should falter, in even minor matters, in being fair and tem-
perate.
Unfortunately, the nature of these crimes is such that both prosecution
and judgment must be by victor nations over vanquished foes.. .. ['] We
must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants is
the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these de-
fendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well. 'We must
summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this
Trial will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity's aspirations
to do justice.2
The very same principles obtain in any criminal justice sys-
tem, whether domestic or international. In fact, we have already
seen this in relation to the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ar-
ticle 10(2) (b) of the Statute for the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia provides that retrial may take place if the "na-
tional court proceedings were not impartial ...." This language
probably refers to a situation of the kind suggested by the next
phrase, which speaks of the accused being "shielded from inter-
national criminal responsibility." There may be situations where
the International Tribunal would be more protective of the
human rights of the accused than would be a national court,
which may not be "impartial" or "well-disposed." Examples are
plentiful. For example two Bosnian Serbs, sentenced to death
for war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina,' were convicted after
confessing, although their confessions were not corroborated,
'The problem has already arisen in relation to the conviction and issuance of
death sentences by a Bosnian military court of two Bosnian Serbs for war crimes.
2Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief Counsel for the Prosecution in the Nuremberg
Trials, Opening Statement delivered November 20. 1945, in TELFORD T.mi.OR. THE
ANATOMY OF THE NUREmBERG TRIALs: A PERSONAL MEIOIR 168 (1992); see elaboration
in Christopher L Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of an Permanent War Crimes Tnbu-
nal, 18 FLETcHE F. WORLD AR. 77 (1994); and in Christopher L Blakesley, Atrocity
& its Prosecution: The Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in THE LAW
OF WAR CRI Es: NATiONAL AND INTERNAnONAL APPROACHES 189 (Timothy LH.
McCormack & GerryJ. Simpson eds. 1997).
' See Bosnia Convicts and Sentences to Death 2 Serbs, 9 Int'l Eng. L Rptr. 147 (No. 9,
April 1993); John F. Bums, 2 Serbs to be Shot for Killings and Rapes, N.Y. TLI.IES, March
31, 1993, at A6; David B. Ottaway, Bosnia Contricts 2 Serbs in War Crimes Trial,
WASHNGTON POST, March 31, 1993, at A21.
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were withdrawn, and the defendants claimed that they had been
given under torture and repeated beatings. Scars and markings
found on their bodies were consistent with the claims of torture.
It is clear that Justice Jackson's warning is well-founded and is
one that we should bear constantly in mind.
I will look at these issues through the prism of international
extradition law and practice. Extradition is the traditional and
the legal method for one nation-state to return a fugitive to an-
other nation-state to face prosecution or to serve his or her sen-
tence.4 The traditional positivist approach to extradition is still
predominant on most issues. It prescribes that the state is the
subject of international law and that the individual is an object
to be extradited. It is the state, not the individual, that has
rights and obligations.5 Barriers to extradition, therefore, ob-
tain for the protection of the state and as the means for the state
to insist on protection for its nationals, or to insist on the limits
to which the requesting state must abide, upon prosecuting the
extradited fugitive. This is a matter of sovereignty. Thus, limita-
tions on and exemptions from extradition, like the double
criminality principle-the principle of speciality, ne bis in idem-
or the political offense exception apply at the prerogative and
benefit of the state. They are not exclusively, or even primarily,
aimed at protecting the fugitive, who, under this view, generally
does not even have standing to raise their violation. 6 Rather,
the fugitive's right to protection is derivative. The primary pur-
' CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
PROTECTION OF LIBERTY 171-173 (1992). For its history from antiquity, through the
Middle Ages, to the current time, see id., at 173-190.
See, e.g., R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte (Amnesty International and others intervening) (No. 3), 2 Eng. Rep. 97, 170
(H.L. 1999), [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827 (Lord Millett, stating- "[The classical theory of in-
ternational law] taught that states were the only actors on the international plane; the
rights of individuals were not the subject of international law..."); William J. Aceves,
Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship; The Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a
Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 131 (2000);
Otto Lagodny & Sigrun Reisner, Extradition Treaties, Human Rights and "Emergency-
Brake"Judgments-A Comparative European Survey, 65 REV. INT'L DR. PtlN. 543 (1994).
6 See supra notes 8, 36, and 142-276 and accompanying text. See alsoJohn Dugard &
Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights, 92 AMJ. INT'L
L 187, 189 (1998) (citing United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1533 (S.D.Fla.
1990) (noting "[a]s a general principle of international law, individuals have no
standing to challenge violations of international treaties in the absence of protest by
the sovereign involved.")); Sharon A. Williams, Human Rights Safeguards and Interna-
tional Cooperation in Extradition: Striking the Balance, 3 GRIM. L.F. 191, 222 (1992).
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pose of limitations to and exemptions from extradition is to
protect the sovereign interests of the state party or to allow the
state party to maintain its sovereignty by protecting the interests
of the person (object) whom they extradite. For example, the
political offense exception is applied to allow a state to protect
its nationals, to avoid participation in the prosecution of the
losers of a conflict over a cause,8 or to protect a person from be-
mg extradited to a place where he or she will be persecuted for
reasons of race, gender, ethnicity, religion, or politics." Tradi-
tionally, therefore, the state, not the individual, is to raise these
exemptions or limitations. The rule of non-inquiry is a classic
statist rule. It is applied by courts to avoid considering the pro-
priety of extradition, when questions about the fairness of the
requesting state's justice system are raised. The requested state
sees its interest in not embarrassing the requesting state as be-
ing stronger than the fugitive's interest injustice or fairness.'0
This means that, in sum, human rights protections in extra-
dition practice are only incremental and casuistic at best." In
addition, it will be shown that virtually all of the protections af-
7 SeeDugard &Van den Wyngaert, supra note 6, at 187-189. Note that Noriega was,
at least, a former head of state when he was found to have no immunity.
8 See my discussion of these issues in BLAxESLEY, supra note 5, chs. 2-4; Blakesley.
The Law of International Extradition: A Comparative Study, in INTE.R TOAL CRIMINAL
LAW & PROCEDURE 147 (Dugard & Van den Wyngaert eds. 1997); BLAKSI.y, The ndz-
vidual Facing Transnational Cooperation in Criminal Matters: US. Report (Max-Planck
Inst. 2001, at press).
'SeeBarapind v. Reno, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (citingQuinn v.
Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 787 (9th Cir. 1986)).
") See, generally, Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419. 430 (5th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997) (like many principles im-
pacting habeas corpus, the rule of non-inquiry is shaped by concerns about institu-
tional competence and separation of powers); Martin v. Warden, Atlanta Pen., 993
F.2d 824, 829 (11th Cir. 1993) (the rule of non inquiry is a very significant principle
which tightly limits the appropriate scope ofjudicial ananysis in extradition cases); In
re Extradition of Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1989) (explaining the rule of non-
inquiry); Barapind, 72 F. Supp 2d 1132. 1145 (E.D.Cal. 1999) (court cannot assess the
"political climate" in the requesting state); Lindstrom v. Gilkey, 1999 WL 342320, at
11 (N.D. Ill. 1999) ("[a]n extraditing court will generally not inquire into the proce-
dures or treatment which await a surrendered fugitive in the requesting country, be-
cause such determinations are to be made solely by the executive branch.") (ating
Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 1999)); John Quigley, The Rule of
Non-Inquirby and Human Rights Treaties, 45 CATH. U. L RE%. 1213 (1996); Jacques
Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquy in International
Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. RE,. 1198 (1991).
" See Dugard &Van den Wyngaert, supra note 6.
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forded to an accused person who is bound over for trial, already
quite minimal in the United States, have been eroded, especially
in relation to extradition proceedings. This article will consider
the problems relating to some of these traditional limitations
and protections and will compare them to the more interesting
approach that calls for adoption of express human rights pro-
tections in extradition.
B. IS THERE A NEED FOR A HUMANITARIAN EXCEPTION TO
EXTRADITION?-OR WORRISOME TENDENCIES
Whatever slight human rights protections obtain for indi-
viduals charged with crime in either the domestic or the inter-
national systems may be eroded even further by an ironic
partnership of anti-crime zealots and some human rights activ-
ists. Of course, it is most important to find a way to disestablish
impunity for perpetrators of all crimes, especially crimes against
humanity. A major theme of this article, however, is to warn
against a tendency into which we all sometimes stumble. We al-
low ourselves to believe that short-cuts to the processes of "find-
ing the truth" and eliminating impunity are appropriate in the
face of the more horrendous crimes committed. This tendency
is quite dangerous. It risks eroding human rights, especially
those related to fair investigation, prosecution, and trial. Once
a standard is set low or is lowered, it tends to remain low. It is
sadly interesting to me that many vigorous proponents of hu-
man rights, who, by instinct are also vigorous promoters of pro-
tections against police and prosecutorial abuses, are tempted to
seek shortcuts when it comes to fighting serious international
evil.' 3 This phenomenon reminds me of the tendencies of true-
believers in the "war on drugs," who believe that human rights
in one arena are expendable for those in another. Also, some
"freedom fighters" (demonized as terrorists by the other side-
sometimes justifiably) equally as sincerely and zealously believe
that their "war" is worth the erosion of civil liberty or human
12 See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 417, 437 (1976) (citing Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) for proposition that requiring a warrant for a public
arrest of a felon would "constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law en-
forcement .... " justice Powell, concurring, added: "a constitutional rule permitting
felony arrests only with a warrant or in exigent circumstances could severely hamper
effective law enforcement .... " See also discussion of this tension and balancing the
competing interests in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 6, at 188.
" Ofttimes, these individuals are non-lawyers.
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rights that it causes. 4 Finally, many who considered themselves
to be "conservative," but were and are simple ideologues have
recently "become" "born again" as "civil libertarians," as it suits
them in opposing the International Criminal Court, although
they formerly have tried to erode protections afforded to those
prosecuted for crime. National leaders often are exactly the
same, eroding human rights of their citizens for a "greater
good." Some use important ideas and ideals nefariously. These
are those who appropriate terms such as "terrorism," "the war
on drugs," "morality," "the rule of law," "law itself," "sover-
eignty," "self-determination," and even "human rights" for their
own ulterior purposes.' s All sides in ethnic, racial, class, and cul-
turally based "wars," use terms like "terrorist," "bandit," and
"criminal" to demonize their "enemies," to justify their promul-
gation of draconian policy or law or to justify taking extreme
measures that they consider necessary to "defeat evil." Those
who argue for diminution of the already way too scant protec-
tions for even the worst of criminals facing extradition are
stumbling down this very path.
If we are not careful, we may fall into the trap laid for all
those who are too certain about the righteousness of their in-
dignation. They become willing to do what is necessary to fulfill
their righteousness. Recently, for example, in discussion of the
eminently proper extradition of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, it was
argued that the procedural hurdles that had to be overcome be-
fore rendering Ntakirutimana to the International Criminal
Court for Rwanda (ICTR) were ".... unnecessary procedural
complexities of American Extradition law. .."'G There is no
doubt that criminals, including international criminals, will and
do "take advantage of" (in every sense of the term) any proce-
dural or substantive devices they have available to them. Abuse
occurs, but abuse occurs just as often by governments when they
prosecute or extradite. The answer for prosecuting or extradit-
ing the perpetrators of the worst of crimes is not to panic, be-
come vengeful, and eliminate the protections available, but to
"4 Most of the erosion of the 4th, 5th, and 6th amendments, including the idea of
probable cause, which I will discuss below, has been prompted by a zealous "war on
drugs." See, e.g., Blakesley, TERRoRIShi, DRUGS, supra note 4. at ch. 1.
'5 Blakesley, TERRORISh, DRUGS, supra note 4, at chs. 1, 3-4.
'6 Mary Coombs, International Decision: In re Surrender of Ntakiruaimana, 184 F.3d 419
U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circui Aug. 5, 1999, 94 A.I.J. INT'LL. 171. 178 (2000).
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insist on efficiency and fairness in policing, extradition, and
prosecution. Efficiency must include efficient and mandatory
compliance with the safeguards against official abuse in the
name of righteous elimination of crime (and impunity). I have
written about the tendency mentioned above, to backslide away
from important human rights values upon a belief that the
cause for which this is done makes the risk worth the candle. 7
We need to work toward developing a society in which the
rule of law may begin to compete more efficiently with violence
and terror.' Do international law and its intersection with do-
mestic law provide a means to stop atrocities caused by war
crimes and crimes against humanity and to prosecute the ac-
cused, consistently with international norms of justice? The
crimes against humanity and violations of human rights in the
former Yugoslavia prompted the U.N. Security Council's Reso-
lution 808: "There shall be established for the prosecution of
persons responsible serious violations of international humani-
tarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
since 1991."'9  It was done similarly for Rwanda.0  We have
watched the ICTY and the ICTR attempt to address the prob-
lem. The momentum from these modem tribunals gave rise to
,7 See, e.g., BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, supra note 4, at chs. 1, 3-4; Blakesley, Ob-
stacles, supra note 2, at 77; BLAIESLEY, Atrocity & Its Prosecution, supra note 2, at 189;
Christopher L. Blakesley, Observations on the Consolidated Text for the Statute for the Per-
manent International Criminal Court: Commentay & Critique of Parts 5 and 6 (Protectzons
for the Accused in the Investigation, Prosecution, & Trial (also, in Monograph, Nouvelles
Etudes P6nal, France, at 69) (1998); Christopher L. Blakesley, Jurisdiction, Definition of
Crimes, and Triggering Mechanisims in Symposium on Bosnia/Rwanda Tribunals and the
Proposed ICC, 25 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 233 (1997); Christopher L. Blakesley, Les
Systkmes dejustice Criminelle Face au Defi du Crime Organisi, 99 REV. INT'L DR. P-N. 35
(1999).
"' We have seen several indictments, including those of Mladic, Karadzic, and
Milosevic, and a few convictions, some quite important. To date some 66 individuals
have been publically indicted or convicted. Most of the indictees are still at large and
we obviously do not know how long the list of secret indictees is. See discussion in Kelly
D. Askin, Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribu-
nals: Current Status, 93 AM.J. INT'L L. 97 (1999). On July 6, 1999, the former Bosnian
Serb deputy prime minister, Radoslav Brdjanin was arrested for transfer to the Hague
to be prosecuted pursuant to a secret indictment for atrocities carried out in Bosnia.
Brdjanin was in control of an area of northwestern Bosnia where persecution and
"cleansing" of the Muslim and Croat population occurred. BBC radio broadcast, July
6,1999 at 10:36 GMT.
'9 U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/Res/808 (1993).
20 See U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg.,U.N.Doc. S/Res/955 (1994).
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the creation of the International Criminal Court.2' Recent suc-
cesses in these ad hoc tribunals and the potential we see in the
creation of an international criminal court, if it meets due proc-
ess standards, and some aspects of the Pinochet case may pro-
vide some hope.
Voltaire's "everyman" in Candide cynically assessed interna-
tional law and the laws of war, as consisting of righteous brutal-
ity on a grand scale and simple suffering on a human scale. 2
Voltaire's assessment of international law, terror, and our own
tendency to become barbaric can apply to our similar tendency
to confuse justice with vengeance. Exploitation of human
weakness by the few with power may be the actual and most
proximate culprit.24 Primo Levi drove himself to despair (per-
haps to suicide) over the issue of why common, every-day, "civi-
lized" people may fall into a miasma of evil.2' Sadly, many of us
tend to distrust, denigrate, and discriminate against those whom
we perceive as being different from us. This tendency is often
manipulated by "leaders" who appropriate our weakness for
their own nefarious purposes. We are made to believe that
those "who are different" are dangerous.
Herman Melville also beautifully communicates what hap-
pens to us when we let hatred of our perceived "enemies" fester
and well-up in us:
[a]U that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of things;
all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and cakes the brain;
all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil to crazy Ahab, were
visibly personified, and made practically assailable in Moby Dick. He
piled upon the whale's white hump the sum of all the general rage and
2, See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5(1), U.N. Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998).
VOLTAIRE, Candide 5 (Appelbaum ed, 1991) (Candide, ou l'optimisme, 1759),
cited in LR. Beres, Straightening the "Timber': Toward a New Paradigm of International
Law, 27 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 161, and fn. 7 (1994).
' See, BLAKESLEY, TERRORIsM, supra note 4, at ch. 1; P.D. JASIEs, Certain justice 8
(1997); Blakesley, Obstacles, supra note 2; Blakesley, Atrocity, supra note 2.
24 See, BLAXEsLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at chs. 1-2.
See, pRIMo LEVI, I SOmMERSI E I SALVATI (1986) (THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED)
(1988). See also, ALBERT CAMS, LEsJUsTEs (THEJUsT ASSASSINS) (1958); cf., ALBERT
CAmuS, LA PESrE (THE PLAGUE) (1947); Blakesley, TERRORIS.Mi, supra note 4, at ch. 1;
SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DIscoNTENTS (Strachey trans., College ed.
1961). For an interesting fictional musing on the subconscious, see IRVIN D. YALOM,
WHEN NIETzscHE WEPT. A STUDY OF OBSESSION (1992).
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hate felt by his whole race from Adam down; and then, as if his chest had
been a mortar, he burst his hot heart's shell upon it. Herman Melville,
Moby Dick.
Herman Melville's genius prompts us to address our own
tendencies through Captain Ahab. We sense the risk of our
own potential for destructive rage, hatred, and violence. Mel-
ville's insight penetrates to the core of what I would bet includes
all societies. Perhaps, if we are honest, there lurks in each of us
the potential for it. Today we must look at ourselves in the face
of what has become an omnipresent terroristic melodrama. Re-
read Moby Dick and be reminded that this is not new.26 Even
those not directly injured in actual depredations have probably
suffered moments of vicarious terror over the past few years.
We have watched accounts of mass slaughter, rape and torture,
terrorist attacks, and wars throughout much of the world. We
shudder to think of those who have suffered and continue to
suffer it directly. Most people in all countries and groups, I am
sure, are sickened by it.
Are these horrors and the responses to them all of one cloth
or, at least, do they risk becoming so? I will argue one way in
which they are indeed of one cloth. Simone Weill and Thomas
Merton were not far off in their belief that the monster, "the
great beast" is the urge to collective power, "the grimmest of all
the social realities of our time. 27 This lust for power is masked
by the symbols of "nationalism, fundamentalism, of capitalism,
fascism, racism, 2 8 and I would add, morality, anti-terrorism,
sovereignty, self-determination, and even democracy.2 Even
national security, which is "a chimerical state of things in which
one would keep for oneself alone the power to make war while
all other countries would be unable to do so . . belongs on
this list of dangerous ideologies.
We must, individually and in our groups, explode the myth
and defeat the beast. Every day it seems some institution, gov-
21 We U.S. citizens need only to consider our past that included slavery, genocide
of Native Americans, and racism.
' Thomas Merton, The Answer of Minerva: Pacifism and Resistance in Simone Weil, in
MERTON, THE ITERARARY ESSAYS OF THOMAS MERTON 134 (Brother Patrick Hart, ed.
1981).
28Id
Anything is vanity [and evil] if abused according to Biblical teachings.
" Merton, supra note 27, at 139 (quotingSimone Weill).
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erinent, or group uses innocent children, women, and men as
fodder in their "wars" against enemies; in their attempt to pro-
mote a perverted version of lex talionis. Some claim that the pu-
sillanimous carnage is in retaliation for the slaughter of
innocent children, women, and men aboard the Iranian Air Bus
blown out of the sky by American forces. Others suggest that it
was committed by those interested in thwarting prospects of
peace in the Middle East. The melodrama of terrorism, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity has penetrated each of our
lives. As we see carnage, rage becomes more part of us. Inno-
cent children, women, and men aboard Pan Am Flight 103 were
used as fodder in some "cause" or "war." Two Libyans were re-
cently prosecuted for their part in bringing down that flight.
But consider the innocents slaughtered aboard the Iranian Air
Bus, blown out of the sky by American forces. Perhaps the pusil-
lanimous carnage wrought on Pan Am 103 was in retaliation for
the slaughter of other innocent children, women, and men
aboard the Iranian Air Bus.
C. EMERGENCE OF PRO-ACTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS CLAUSES
The view that human rights for individuals are merely de-
rivative of states' rights is beginning to be broken by the ad hoc
tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and, we can
hope, by the Statute for the Permanent International Criminal
Court.3 ' The Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia stated in the Tadic Case that the de-
rivative nature of human rights interests has more impact on
domestic courts than in the international arena.
I will show that the vision of individuals being "subjects" of
international law (both as defendants and plaintiffs) is begin-
ning to develop in some domestic systems. Human rights are
protected directly and in increasing measure through enforce-
3' See YVES BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIM NALS (1999); MNART-A MINOW, BETWEvE
VENGENANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE
(1998); ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIES: BRUTALrrY, GENOCIDE, TERROR AND THE STRUGGLE
FORJUSTICE (1998); Blakesley, Atrocity, supra note 2, at ch. 8.
2 See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a "Dule," Opinion & Judgment,
<http://vw.un.org/icty/tadic/triac2/udgement-e/ad-
tj970507e.htm#_toc387417230>; In re Tadic, No. 15-94-1-T. 1j 2, 58-59 [Appeals De-
cision on Jurisdiction] (ICTY, June 23, 1995); Prosecutor v. Tadic, 105 INT. L REP.




ment in domestic litigation and through other domestic institu-
tions or mechanisms. Thus, I will focus on extradition as one
of the mechanisms for the potential development of human
rights in general, especially for rights related to criminal prose-
cution. 4 This development is natural and important because
extradition is at the intersection of international and domestic
law and practice. So, I will explore several aspects of the tradi-
tional versus the more proactive human rights approaches to
extradition.
Some nations, especially in Europe, are adopting the more
proactive human rights approach in their extradition law and
practice. Some are including new bars or limits to extradition
based on international and domestic human rights protections.
These include rights that arise not only from treaty and custom-
ary international law, but also from domestic legislation and
constitutional principles. Indeed, some scholars see interna-
tional norms protecting human rights as being of a constitu-
tional order or character!" Some nations are considering the
adoption of explicit human rights clauses into their extradition
laws and treaties to replace the traditional, derivative protec-
tions. German extradition treaties, in the future, for example,
will likely contain a clause reading something like: "extradition
will not be granted, if it is contrary to international and Consti-
INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS (Thomas M. Franck & Greg-
ory H. Fox eds., 1996). See alsoJoan Fitzpatrick, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing
International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE
242 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1999); Aceves, Liberalism, supra note 5, at 132, n. 16, citing
James A.R. Nafziger, International Foreign Law Right Here in River City, 34 WILLAMETrTE
L. REv. 1 (1998); Steven M. Schneebaum, Human Rights in the United States Courts: The
Role of Lawyers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 737 (1998); Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme
Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39 (1994);Jonathan Charney, Universal In-
ternational Law 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993).
3' See, e.g., Blakesley, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 281, et seq.; Otto Lagodny, Die
Rechtsstellung des Auszuliefernden in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 9 BErTRAGE UND
MATERIALIEN AUS DEM MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
STRAFRECHT, FREIBURG IM BREISGAU (1987); PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A NEW
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 489-689 (Albin Eser & Otto Lagodny eds., 1991).
" This may be considered to be part of the approach called "transnational law liti-
gation." See Aceves, Liberalism, supra note 5, at 132; Harold Hongiu Koh, Transna-
tional Public Law Litigation. 100 YALE. LJ. 2347 (1991); Harold Honjiu Koh, Civil
Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combating Terrorism Through Transnational Public Law Litiga-
tion, 22 TEx. INT'LL.J. 169 (1987).
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tutional Basic Rights. . .."Y Basic Rights in Germany include in-
ternational human rights. They have a constitutional character
in that they work like mandatory norms, which must inform
every interpretation of any relevant clause in an extradition
treaty or extradition law. This is a more aggressive human
rights approach, which requires human rights clauses to be in-
cluded explicitly in extradition treaties or, alternatively, to be
read into them.
Traditionally, at least since the Peace of Westphalia, sover-
eignty has been sacrosanct, an unassailable attribute, indeed,
the essence of, statehood . Sovereignty, however, has suffered
some erosion through progressive forces at work in democratic
societies, often prompted by the human rights movemente In
the international system and in many domestic legal systems, it
is arguable that an extradition treaty must be read to promote
basic human rights.SO Human rights norms inform and infuse
the treaty. Ambiguous terms must be interpreted to be consis-
tent with relevant human rights principles and gaps must be
filled so as to promote human rights."' Traditionally, however,
the opposite has been true; ambiguity was to be read in favor of
extradition.
In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords found a way to
apply a fairly rigid, statist, dualistic, and traditional rule of dou-
ble criminality to avoid extraditing Augusto Pinochet to Spain.
This article will apply this interesting combination of slouching
toward human rights protection and recognizing criminal pre-
See Christopher L. Blakesley & Otto Lagodny, Competing National Laws: Network or
Jungle, PR.NCIPLES & PROCEDURES FOR A NEW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL L-,w 47-100
(MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND NTERNATIONALES STRAPRECHT.
Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany, 1991).
SeeDugard &Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling; supra note 6, at n. 3.
Id.; see also Albin Eser, Common Goals & Different Ways in International Criminal
Law: Reflectionsfrom aEuropean Perspective; 31 HARV. INT'L LJ. 117 (1990).
" But see United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.CL 2188 (1992) (official abduc-
tion of accused, for purposes of prosecution in United States, although admittedly il-
legal under international law does not provide remedy of release, even upon protest
of nation from which defendant was abducted). See also United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
' This is similar to how public policy principles function in the United States judi-
cial system. Moreover, it is not that different in civilian or mixed jurisdictions, where
legislation is null if in violation of important public policy. See e.g. French Code Civil




scriptive jurisdiction over torture committed abroad by a former
head of state. The decision, while important in many ways, fit
clearly into the rank of traditional statist international law.
I will begin, therefore, with a discussion of traditional extra-
dition law as reflected in the House of Lords Pinochet decisions
and in Home Secretary Jack Straw's response to the Spanish re-
quest for Pinochet's extradition. I will then move to a broader
analysis of extradition, human rights clauses, and the traditional
means used by the United States to protect human rights, in-
cluding the rule of double criminality, the doctrine of speciality,
double jeopardy or ne bis in idem, and the political offense ex-
ception. These finally will be contrasted with the more aggres-
sive human rights approach in circumstances where the fugitive
may be extradited, formally or informally, to a nation that exer-
cises the death penalty, torture, cruel and inhuman treatment,
and the like.
A tension obviously exists between protecting a fugitive's ba-
sic human rights and protecting governmental interests in effi-
cient law enforcement and prosecution." This tension is really
no different from the tension between the protection of indi-
vidual civil liberties in the domestic criminal justice arena; rights
and protections always abut up against the interests in efficient
law enforcement.
II. HUMANITARIAN EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION?-PINOCHET NOT
COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL OR TO BE EXTRADITED?
Perfection, of a kind, was what he was after,
And the poetry he invented was easy to understand;
He knew human folly like the back of his hand,
And was greatly interested in armies and fleets;
When he laughed, respectable senators burst with laughter,
And when he cried the little children died in the streets.
W.H. Auden, Epitaph on a Tyrant?
2
" Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling, supra note 6, at 188-89 (arguing that a
balancing of these interests is required and a framework established to provide guid-
ance to states); Sharon A. Williams, Human Rights Safeguards and International Coopera-
tion in Extradition: Striking the Balance, 3 CRIM. L.F. 191, 222-23 (1992).
12 In my opinion, the best (Spanish) book on Pinochet is ANTONIO REMIRO, EL CASO
PINOCHET. Los LIMITES DE LA IMPUNIDAD. MADRID: POLrrlcA EXTERIOR (BIBLIOTECA
NUEVA, 1999. ISBN: 84-7030-725-8). Its author deals specifically with legal problems.
From a wider, more political point of view, we also have TITO DRAGO: EL RETORNO DE
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Extradition is an admixture of national and international
law. It presents an interesting tension between principles of
dualism and monism," between sovereignty and cooperation
and between comparative and international criminal law. Ex-
tradition is the process by which one sovereign renders a fugi-
tive to another for prosecution or to serve his sentence if
already convicted. Essentially, it is the international mechanism
for binding a person over for trial in another country. It would
not seem inappropriate, therefore, to provide the protections
generally available to an accused under domestic law at the
stage of binding over for trial. We will see, however, that this is
not the case under traditional extradition law and practice.
This section will consider some so-called "humanitarian"
exemptions from extradition, such as refusing to extradite on
the basis of the fugitive's physical infirmity or mental incompe-
tency. These were the grounds that informed the English gov-
ernment's decision not to extradite Augusto Pinochet to Spain.
The Spanish extradition request for Pinochet is quite well
known by now, as is the House of Lords' decision that Pinochet
did not enjoy former head of state immunity for acts of torture
that he or his government committed during his reign.4
LA ELUSION PINOCE1. EL FIN DE LA INMUNIDAD, (Barcelona: RBA, 1999). Lyonette
Louis-Jacques, University of Chicago Law School Faculty, recommended the
following: PINOCHET FACE A LA JUSTICE ESPAGNOLE (Paris: LHarmattan, 1999);
PINOCHET ANTE LAJUSTICIA ESPANOLA PERO L]LEGA: PINOCHET ANTE LAJUSTICIA ESPANOLA
(Santiago : LOM Ediciones : CODEPU, 1998); THE PINOctET CASE: A LEGAL AND
CONSTTEInoNAL ANALYSIS (Diana Woodhouse ed., Hart, forthcoming 2000); FALL
PINocHET(s) (Heiko Ahlbrecht/Kai Ambos (Hrsg); Baden-Baden : Nomos, (1999);
WHEiN TYRANTS TREmBLE: THE PINOCHE" CASE (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch,
1999).
' Dugard &Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling, supra note 6, at 189.
"See O'CoNNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (2d ed. 1970), where monism and dual-
ism are explained: "(Monism) is an emanation of Kantian philosophy which favours a
unitary conception of law. . .." At the apex of this one system of law is international
law, which predominates and controls domestic or national law. Dualism is associated
with Hegelianism and law is considered to be an act of sovereign will. National or
domestic law is different and separate from international law. These form two dis-
tinct spheres of legal action. Id. See also discussion in BLAEsLEY, Er AL, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTm: CASES & MATERIALS, ch. 18 (5th ed. 2000); JORD.AN J.
PAUST, ETAL., INTERNATIONAL LAW & LITIGATION INTHE U.S. 27-28 (2000).
For a presentation of the sequence of events leading up to the decision not to
extradite Augusto Pinochet, see Aceves, Liberalism, supra note 5, at 160-171, discussing
both the Spanish and the British proceedings.
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Perhaps it is also not inappropriate that extradition be re-
fused upon evidence of an individual's incompetence to stand
trial, as British Home Secretary Jack Straw did in the Pinochet
extradition case. First, Mr. Straw announced that he was
"minded" to refuse extradition on "compassionate grounds." 6
On March 2, 2000, he confirmed this "mindedness" and de-
cided to free Pinochet, who immediately returned to Chile."
Mr. Straw stated that either extradition or a trial in Britain,
however desirable, was simply no longer possible on medical
grounds. Pinochet was "unfit to stand trial and ... no signifi-
cant improvement in his condition could be expected." '48 The
evidence of Pinochet's incapacity and the decision not to let a
court make the judgment are hotly disputed.
Apparently in England, as in the United States, it is the pre-
rogative of the executive branch to apply humanitarian grounds
to refuse extradition. It appears that Pinochet would have
been extradited if Secretary Straw had found that he was com-
petent to stand trial. It would seem appropriate to require the
defense actually to prove his lack of competency. The test for
competency to stand trial is whether the accused is capable of
understanding the charges against him and to participate mean-
ingfully in his defense. Secretary Straw's decision not to extra-
dite was based mainly on his belief in Pinochet's mental
incapacity, although he also mentioned Pinochet's physical de-
"G David Graves, Judges to rule on Pinochet medical report next week, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Feb. 10, 2000. See also Amnesty International, Public Statement, Pinochet
Case: Reaction to the Reported Questions Raised by Countries Requesting Extradition,
AIINDEX:EUR 45/32/00, Feb. 23, 2000. Interestingly, in the United States, a deci-
sion to deny extradition on humanitarian grounds is a function of the Secretary of
State, not the judiciary. See Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 830, n. 10 (11th Cir.
1993); United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997); Sandhu v. Burke,
2000 WL 191707, at 7-8 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), (citing Extradition of Cheung, 963 F.Supp.
791, 798-799 (D.Conn. 1997)). But cf. Lindstrom v. Gilkey, 1999 WL 342320
(N.D.Il.1999). The issue of exemption from extradition for humanitarian reasons, as
well as for reasons based on human rights, is discussed below.
,7 Reed Brody, Human Rights Watch, Pinochet Case a Milestone, Report, March 2,
2000 <http://hrw.org/campaigns/chile98/precedent.htr>; Mara D. Bellaby, Ex-
Dictator Pinochet leaves for Chile, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, March 3, 2000, at A2.
"' See supra notes 46-47 and Appendix.
'9 In the United States, it is the prerogative of the Secretary of State. See Kin-Hong,
110 F.3d at 110; Martin, 993 F.2d at 830, n. 10; Sandhu, 2000 WL 191707, at 7-8 (citing
Extradition of Cheung, 963 F.Supp. at 798-799. But cf. Lindstrom, 1999 WL 342320.
The issue of exemption from extradition for humanitarian reasons, as well as for rea-
sons based on human rights, is discussed below.
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terioration. Mr. Straw must have realized that Pinochet's physi-
cal deterioration was not relevant unless it impacted his capacity
to enter a plea and to work with counsel. Certainly, an elderly
person's physical capacity to withstand travel or a trial is perti-
nent to humanitarian concerns, and may impact on sentencing,
but it is not sufficient to allow a court to deny extradition or
prosecution altogether.50
Pinochet's Medical Report, which was the basis for Mr.
Straw's decision to allow Pinochet to return to Chile, was leaked
to the Spanish press. It is presented, as leaked, in an appendix
to this article. The Medical Report was written by esteemed
British doctors and was reviewed by British chief medical officer
Dr. Liam Donaldson, who confirmed its quality and thorough-
ness.5' It is important to determine whether Pinochet feigned
the symptoms that allowed his apparent escape from earthlyjus-
tice. The doctors who examined Pinochet concluded that his
condition could not be feigned.52 Although Mr. Straw clearly
had the authority to make this decision, it would have been
preferable for an English court to decide, so that we could have
ajudicial review of the medical-legal issues.
One important human rights value, which is also a basic
criminal law principle, is that a person who does not have the
mental capacity or competence to grasp the purpose of his pun-
ishment, to understand the proceedings against him, or to assist
his counsel should not be prosecuted. All legal systems that
honor human rights must have a mechanism for protecting
those whom are not competent to stand trial. No doubt, some-
times even those people who have done the most evil things be-
come incompetent. Deciding not to extradite Pinochet may or
may not accommodate the important value of not trying people
who are beyond earthly sanction due to incompetence, because
5 See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994), which limits a court's authority to decide the exis-
tence of a treaty, the offense charged, and the quantum of the evidence offered. But
note my discussion below on the continental trend to consider humanitarian
grounds, including both mental and physical incapacity in relation to extradition.
Moreover, in the United States, the Secretary of State has the discretion to refuse to
extradite based on humanitarian grounds. See Kin.Hong, 110 F.3d at 110; Martin, 993
F.2d at 830, n. 10; Sandhu, 2000 WL 191707, at 7-8 (citing Extradition of Cheung, 963
F.Supp. at 798-799. But cf. Lindstrom, 1999 WL 342320.
"See supra note 46 and Appendix.
"See supra note 46 and Appendix.
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we do not know whether Pinochet is actually incompetent. 3 It is
ironic, of course, that a person charged with having violated the
most basic human rights of so many may be the beneficiary of
those human rights protections he mocked in a most heinous
way. Nevertheless, we must remain worthy of our human rights
principles. Even those who commit the most egregious evil
simply cannot stand trial or be punished once they have become
incompetent. If this is so, it would seem to follow that they can-
not be extradited to stand trial, although it could be debated
that the decision on competency to stand trial rests with the re-
questing state, not the requested state.
A. THE HOUSE OF LORDS' DECISIONS ON TORTURE AND IMPUNITY
The decision not to extradite Pinochet or to prosecute him
in Britain was a terrible blow to the survivors of his torture and
to the relatives of his victims, but some hope can be found in
the decision whether Pinochet was immune from extradition or
prosecution. Reed Brody, Advocacy Director for Human Rights
Watch, tried to put a nice face on the situation, stating that,
notwithstanding the non-extradition, the Pinochet case itself is a
milestone.54 Brody stated that, ". . .the very fact that [Pinochet]
was arrested, and that his claim of immunity was rejected, has
already changed the calculus of dictators around the world.
The Pinochet case signified the beginning of the end of their
impunity. 5 5 On February 3, 2000, for example, a Senegalese
judge indicted the former Chadian dictator, Hissein Habr6, on
charges of torture,56 and apparently former President of Indo-
nesia, Suharto, decided not to seek medical care abroad, be-
cause of the risk of prosecution. No doubt, then, some
impunity was dissipated simply by Pinochet's arrest. Brody
stated that, "a sea change is underway in how the world deals
with the worst abuses."51 In its attempt to make the best of the
bad situation in Pinochet's release, however, Human Rights
"' For discussion of current abuse of this value in the United States in relation to
imposing the death penalty, see infra notes 330-349 and accompanying text.
" Brody, supra note 47; Bellaby, supra note 47.
'2 Brody, supra note 47.
56 Id.
57 Id; Bellaby, supra note 47.
' Brody, supra note 47.
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Watch may have overstated the legal value of the House of
Lords' decision on impunity.
It is true that Pinochet's arrest, detention, and the House of
Lords' decision that he was not immune as a former head of
state from prosecution for torture, is very important-a mile-
stone eroding impunity a bit. Nevertheless, there is a "down-
side" to the House of Lords' decision. The Lords clearly
applied a straight-forward traditional, dualist position on
torture, as well as all the other horrible crimes with which
Pinochet was charged. The House of Lords majority actually
insisted on applying classic, rigid, traditional extradition law,
expounding a pedantic position on the "special use" of dual
criminality. I will discuss this in more detail below, but for now,
suffice it to say that the House of Lords held: (1) that for
extradition to be allowed, not only must the fugitive's conduct
be criminal in both states (Spain and England); in addition, (2)
a common theory of jurisdiction over the conduct must obtain.
This is the special use of double criminality that requires that
the jurisdictional theory as well as the conduct proscribed be
acceptable in the domestic law of the requested state.f" The
majority's view is, first, that torture was not a crime of universal
jurisdiction prior to the promulgation of The Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment,0 and that, even if it were, it was not
extraditable (or punishable) in England until promulgation of
the Criminal Justice Act of 1988."' They insisted that
jurisdiction be based on an explicit English "incorporation" of
torture as a crime. Thus, although the House of Lords held that
Pinochet was not immune from extradition or prosecution for
torture, this was only on the basis of the Torture Convention
and the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 ("Torture Convention"),
which incorporated it.62 This position is clearly antagonistic to
the idea of torture being a universal crime or a crime that allows
'9 For discussion of this, see infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text; see also
BLmAsE-Y, TEROmRISM, supra note 4, at 215-276; Michael Birnbaum, Pwethet and Dou-
ble Criminality, CRItM. L. REv. 127 (March 2000).
6' GA. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No.51. U.N.Doc. A/39/51.
61 Criminal Justice Act of 1988 § 134(1), (2) and (3). See both the Second and the
Third House of Lord's Decisions. David Turns, Proseuting Violations of International
Humanitarian Law: The Legal Position in the United Kingdom, 4J.OF AR..fED CoN'.ct L I
(1999).
62 SeeExPartePinochet, supra note 45; CRiMiNALJUSncEACt OF 1988 § 134(1) (2)(3j.
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universal jurisdiction. Thus, the House of Lords did not em-
brace customary international law on universality of jurisdiction
over heads of state and former heads of state for torture or
other crimes against humanity, such as those allegedly commit-
ted by Pinochet and his cronies.63
Professor David Turns recently argued that the third House
of Lords' decision in the Pinochet suite provides some hope for
British jurisprudence on customary international law, but that
the Majority, perhaps, could have and should have gone further.
Lord Millett's minority opinion maintained that torture was a
crime in the United Kingdom well before the incorporation of
the Torture Convention, and at least by the time Pinochet came
to power in 1973.6 Lord Millett was a minority of one in the
view that torture was a crime under customary international
law6 by that date, and that customary international law was part
of English common law. Adoption of his view, however, does
not appear likely in the near term.
Notwithstanding its limitations, even the majority opinion
does add some momentum to a broader acceptance of the
proposition that torture and all crimes against humanity violate
both treaty law and customary international law. Eventually, the
6 This customary international law is established by many treaties and by several
important judicial decisions. See e.g. London Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, (Charter attached as
Annex) art. 7, 59 Stat. 1544-1548, E.A.S. No. 472 (1945); and the Judgment of the In-
ternational Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 6 F.R.D. 69; reprinted at 41 AM.J. INT'L.
L. 172 (1947), especially the Doenitz decision, in which Admiral Doenitz was convicted
for conduct while head of the Nazi State for his very short tenure after replacing Hit-
ler. See also United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (General
Noriega was convicted, despite the fact that he was at least a former, if not a sitting,
head of state). This is a positive aspect of the Noriega decision, notwithstanding all the
negatives surrounding that case. See gen. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for
International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409 (2000).
64 See Pinochet, III, supra note 5; Turns, supra note 61. See also Trendtex Trading
Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 1 Q.B. 529, 553-554 (1977) (a civil case, but relating
to customary international law and sovereign immunity).
"' Customary international law is binding authority. It is "general [state] practice
accepted as law." STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE, Art. 38. Put an-
other way, customary international law derives from general and consistent practice
of states followed by them out of a sense of legal obligation. See RESTATEMENT THIRD
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987). See also The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). This is not unlike customary law in "Civil Law"
systems, which generally is as binding as judicial decisions. See Christopher L. Blakes-
ley, The Impact of a Mixed Jurisdiction on Legal Education, Scholarship & Law, ch. 3,
in LOUISIANA: MICROCOSM OFAMIXEDJURISDICTION (Vernon V. Palmer ed. 1999).
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House of Lords may accept that these offenses are subject to
universal jurisdiction, but that surely is for another day.
The English orthodox position on incorporation of custom-
ary international law, at least in theory, is that customary inter-
national law is automatically part of English law, as long as it is
not in conflict with any statute in force or any judicial decision
by an English appellate court.6 In reality, however, English
courts virtually never decide cases solely on the basis of custom-
ary international law, with a couple of limited exceptions. Ex-
ceptions of prize cases based on ancient Admiralty jurisdiction
and in the Royal Warrent of 1945 (now defunct in all but
name), which served for the prosecution of German, Italian,
and Japanese (and, by extension, others such as Koreans, Tai-
wanese and even one Hungarian who served for Japan) war
criminals after World War 11.67 The Royal Warrant was limited
to war crimes. It did not cover crimes against humanity, al-
though British military courts invariably held that crimes against
humanity committed in enemy-occupied territory or during the
conduct of military operations were subject to military law,
hence, were war crimes.0 These included: single unlawful kill-
ings, torture or other forms of maltreatment committed by civil-
ian labor contractors employed by the local Japanese Civil
6 ThePaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. at 677.
R. John Pritchard, Changes in Perception: British and Militan, Perspectives on War
Crimes Trials and their Legal Context (1942-1956), THE MIUTARY DIM NSION, 5 A HSTOrtw
OF ANGLO-JAPANESE REiArONS (Ian Gow & Hirama Yoichi, eds., Tokyo Univ. Press &
Macmillan, 2000) (copy of draft available in my office). David Turns, Prosecttrng 'ho-
lations, supra note 61. John Pritchard also notes that the Royal Warrant did not allow
prosecution of those who had owed allegiance to the Crown, but who fought for the
other side, such as some Sikhs who took oaths of allegiance to the Japanese Emperor.
R. John Pritchard, The Historical Experience of British War Crimes Courts in the Far East,
1946-1948, 6 INT'L RELATIONS 311 (May 1978). The issue of whether customary inter-
national law establishes universality ofjurisdiction is vigorously and adroitly disputed
by Alfred P. Rubin, at least in the absence of jurisdiction to adjudicate-or some na-
tional interest in the matter, such as the passive personality or the protective princi-
ple. See ALRED P. RUBIN, ETHICS AND AtTHORIY IN INTERNA-ONAL L.W 197. et seq.
(1997) and in his THE LAW OF PIRACY 384 (2d ed. 1998). For lengthy analysis of these
principles of jurisdiction, including their relationship to prescriptive, enforcement,
and adjudicative jurisdiction, see Christopher L. Blakesley, ExtraterrztonalJusdicton, rn
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURAL AND ENFORCF-MENT MECHANISMS 33-105
(2d ed. 1998).
' R.John Pritchard, The Historical ExperiencA supra note 67, at 319-20.
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Administration (itself subject to military law and oversight in
occupied territories).69
Jurisdiction to prosecute international conduct based on
customary international law where individual liberty is at stake
requires an act of Parliament in England and a statute in the
United States.7 ° This is quite appropriate, where to prosecute
under circumstances such as when the elements of the offense
are too vague, or where there is a question about ne bis in idem,
would be dangerous. Many treaties were drafted by diplomats
and non-criminal law specialists, so some "international crimes"
in them or that developed through customary international law
may be far too vague. Erosion of individual rights before the
criminal bar is a realistic thing to worry about, especially when
the perpetrator is charged with extremely heinous offenses.
This may be particularly true in the current zeal to prosecute
those who are charged with having committed crimes against
humanity. 71 If we allow erosion of protections for these, we
erode protections for us all.
The majority of the House of Lords did not even accept the
view that torture was a universal crime under customary interna-
tional law prior to the Torture Convention. Lord Millet said
that it was, but cited no settled authority specific to torture for
this. He did refer to several human rights instruments, includ-
ing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and even the
Genocide Convention. He also cited the Furundzija decision out
of the ICTY72 and Burgers & Danelius' Handbook on the Tor-
ture Convention.73
69 See id.
70 David Turns, Prosecuting Violations, supra note 61; R. John Pritchard, Changes in
Perception, supra note 67. Trenchant criticism in Britain ofJudge Cassese's decision in
the Tadic case stemmed from this notion extending jurisdiction over conduct that was
not covered by specific "legislation," in that it was said not to have been committed in
an international armed conflict. Turns, supra note 61.
"' See supra note 70.
72 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999) (citingFilartiga v. Pena-rala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), but holding that torture was a universal crime by 1998).
71 See Herman Burgers & Hans Danelius, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (1988). Again, thanks to
David Turns and R.John Pritchard for this.
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1. Torture: Actus Reus and Mens Rea
The position taken by Home Secretary Straw and the House
of Lords regarding the offense of torture is interesting. Straw
agreed with the House of Lords that the Torture Convention, as
incorporated into British Law in the Criminal Justice Act of
1988, section 134, requires intent to "[inflict] severe pain or suf-
fering on another in the performance or purported perform-
ance of... official duties.. ." whether the suffering is caused by
act or omission, and whether it is committed directly by the de-
fendant or by aiding, abetting, consent, or instigation by an offi-
cial or one acting on his behalf.7 The House of Lords held that
only those acts of torture attributable to Pinochet that occurred
after the promulgation of this Act were extraditable or justici-
able, if there were to be any prosecution in England.7 It seems
to me that the disappearances that continue to cause pain and
suffering to the desaparicidos families and loved ones constitutes
or should constitute a continuing offense of torture to those
families. 76 This should give a basis for any nation to prosecute
Pinochet (if he is competent) or his cronies. Nevertheless, the
Spanish request for Pinochet's extradition was refused by the
British Government (along with requests from the Belgians, the
French, and the Swiss). Amnesty International reported that all
four of these nations that sought Pinochet are unconvinced that
the medical report proves that Pinochet lacks the capacity to
stand tria.
III. PiNocHET's SITUATION IN CHILE
Now that Pinochet has been allowed to return to Chile, the
Chilean people and government have the obligation and bur-
den to determine his fate and to address the tension between
the human rights of the accused and those of his victims. Chil-
7' Cjm'ALJusIcE Acr § 134 (1) (2) (3) (1988).
Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, 2 W.LR. 827 (1999).
76 This seems to have been hinted at by the Belgian Elaborative Memorandum, to
which Home Secretary Straw refers in 41 of his Statement, reported in M2
PRESSWIRE M2 Communications, Ltd., March 2, 2000.
' Amnesty International, Public Statement, Pinochet Case: Reaction to the Re-
ported Questions Raised by Countries Requesting Extradition, AIINDEX:EUR
45/32/00, Feb. 23, 2000. The standard in the United States for competency to stand
trial is generally defined as having sufficient ability to consult with counsel with a rea-
sonable degree of rational understanding, and a rational as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings. See e.g. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
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ean authorities have taken significant steps to address this prob-
lem. The possibility of some sort of criminal action against Pi-
nochet in Chile appears more likely than when he first
returned. Pinochet faces at least eighty-three judicial com-
plaints filed against him in Chile, in connection with allegations
of his participation and ordering torture, executions, and dis-
appearances from 1973 to 1990.7"- A Chilean court of appeals in
Santiago held, on April 18, 2000, that it would not order former
dictator Pinochet to undergo medical or health testing ahead of
an April 26 hearing on whether to rescind his parliamentary
immunity.79 The hearing to consider stripping Pinochet's im-
munity was postponed pursuant to a request by Pinochet's
counsel, who claimed that they needed more time" and that Pi-
nochet was not well.81 For this purpose, Pinochet's attorneys
had filed a motion requesting the Court to order medical tests
for their client ahead of the April 26 hearing.2
Pursuant to this April 26 hearing, the Santiago Court of Ap-
peals decided that Pinochet's immunity should be lifted, so that
the complaints against him can be heard.83 The Appellate Court
decision was appealed to the Chilean Supreme Court,84 which
affirmed that Pinochet may be stripped of his immunity." Pino-
chet's counsel mounted a defense on grounds of Pinochet's in-
competence to stand trial and his infirmity, similar to the
defense raised successfully in England.8 6
Although the Supreme Court has eliminated Pinochet's
immunity, prosecution may still be problematic. As I have
noted, Pinochet's counsel are raising his incompetence to stand
78 Chile Court Refuses to Order Pinochet Medical Tests, AGENcE FRANCE-PRESSE, April 18,
2000, available at 2000 WL 2776693.
7' See id.; Chile Court Postpones Pinochet Immunity Hearing by One Week, AFX NEws,
April 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 18356680 (the hearing to strip Pinochet of his
parliamentary immunity is postponed from April 12 until April 26).
"o See Court Delays Hearing on Immunity for Pinochet, ORLANDO SENTINEL, April 18,
2000, at A6, available at 2000 WL 394967.
" See NEWS: Chile, THE TORONTO STAR, April 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL
19577412; Chile Court Refuses to Order Pinochet Medical Tests, supra note 78.
82 Id.
" I; Rafael Urbina, Pinochet Loses Immunity, Opponents Seek Justice, AGENcE FRANCE-
PRESS, June 5, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2808296.
84 Id.
See, Anthony Faiola, Chile Revokes Pinochet's Immunity; Ruling Opens Way for Historic
Trial, THE WASHINGTON POST, August 9, 2000, at Al.86 d.
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trial. The dissenting judges in the Court of Appeals decision to
lift the immunity addressed this point. They noted that Chilean
law allows Pinochet to avoid prosecution only if he is suffering
from mental incompetency, more specifically, limited to incom-
petency stemming from "dementia." The American Convention
on Human Rights, to which Chile is a party, provides that an ac-
cused person may not be prosecuted, unless he has the mental
capacity to understand the charges against him, to defend him-
self, and to be able to consult with and assist his counsel
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS AND EXTRADITION
A. SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS IN EXTRADITION PRACTICE--GENERAL
A "self-executing treaty" is one that needs no implementing
domestic legislation; it takes effect upon ratification67 It isaimed at the judiciary, not the legislature. In the United States,
if a treaty is not self-executing, or if Congress has not passed
enabling legislation, it does not create a cause of action or pro-
vide a remedy.m Non-self-executing treaties do not create ad-
judicative or enforcement jurisdiction in United States courts.8'
Thus, if a treaty is non-self-executing, it provides no specific le-
gal effect, although it may influence policy or legislation. Hu-
man rights conventions generally are not considered self-
executing in the United States."' In fact, to try to ensure this
result, the United States often includes non-self-executing
See e.g. United States v. Nai Fook Li, 206 F.3d 56 (Ist Cir. 2000).
8' See PAUST, ETAL, supra note 44 at 75. See also Sandhu v. Burke, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3584 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 10, 2000), as well as the discussion and authority in notes
126-143, infra, and accompanying text. But see Nai Fook Li, 206 F.3d at 56 (holding
that, "treaties do not generally create rights that are privately enforceable in the fed-
eral courts [as they are] primarily compacts between independent nations.); Charlton
v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 474 (1913); Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 306 (1829)
("The judiciary is not that department of the government to which the assertion of its
interest against foreign powers is confided."); Matta-Bellesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d
255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990). See also concurring opinion in Nai Fook Li. 206 F.3d 56
(Boudin and SelyaJJ., concurring).
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Company, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439, n. 16 (D. NJ. 1999).
' See gen. David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
ExecutingDeclarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L 129 (1999). See U.S.
CONST., art. VI, § 2; 18 USC. § 3181 (1994); WNHrr fAN, 6 DICEsT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 734 (1968); Head Money Cases, 112 US 580 (1884); Chew Heong v. United
States, 122 US 536, 540, 556 (1884). On the judicial provenance of self executing
treaties, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AN,. J.
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United States often includes non-self-executing declarations in
its ratification instruments.9' The principle of non-self-execut-
ing treaties in the United States, therefore, hampers human
rights protection generally and in relation to extradition spe-
cifically.
It can be argued that the entire idea of considering treaties,
duly entered and ratified, not to be self-executing is "unavoid-
ably unconstitutional," at least for purposes of supremacy.92 The
idea seems to be "inconsistent with the language, history, and
purpose" of Article VI, paragraph 2, of the U.S. Constitution.
9 3
The principle of non-self-executing treaties in the United
States hampers human rights protection in relation to extradi-
tion. Article VI, paragraph 2, of the U.S. Constitution, of
course, makes treaties that have received the "Advice and Con-
sent" of the Senate, the "Supreme Law of the Land."'94 On the
other hand, most courts and commentators allow that treaties
INT'L L. 695 (1995); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Sen-
ate Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI. KENT L. REV. 571
(1991); Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Brown, Can a U.S. Treaty Reservation Provide a
Sanctuaiy for thejuvenile Death Penalty, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 735, 762 (1998). On the other
hand, extradition treaties and other agreements on cooperation in criminal matters
are considered self-executing.
", Sloss, Domestication, infta note 92; supra notes 110-119 and accompanying text for
a discussion of U.S. ratification of and reservations from the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.
See, PAUST, ET AL., supra note 44, at 193-94. Jordan J. Paust, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 51, 55, 59, 63-64, 370-71 (1996); Malvina Halberstam,
United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 31 G.W.J. INTLL. & ECON. 49, 64, 67-69 (1997).
"' See Halberstam, supra note 92, at 64, 67-69 (1997);John Quigley, The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L.REV. 1287
(1993); William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: Is the U.S. Still a Party?, 21 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L L. 277 (1995); PAUST,
ET AL., supra note 44, at 192; Louis Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 198-204 (2d ed. 1996);Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J.
INT'L L. 760 (1988); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 697-700 (1995); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Self-Executing
Character of the Refugee Protocol's Nonrefoulement Obligation, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 39, 44-49
(1993);.Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLUM. L.REv. 1082, 1101-1010 (1992). See also and compare supra notes 122-143, and
accompanying text, as well as notes 144-155, infra, and accompanying text.
9, U.S. CONST., ART. II, SECTION 2, 2 (two-thirds vote of those Senators present).
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do not have the force of law in the United States, unless they are
self-executing95 or have been implemented by legislation.w
Self-executing treaties have been held to confer rights en-
forceable by private persons;97 they are fully operative without
95 See, T.W.A., Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (providing, '..
[t]he convention is [self-executing, thus] ... no domestic legislation is required to
give [it] the force of law in the United States. . ..") But see United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992) (suggesting in dictum that the issues of a treaty's
self-executing nature and its being "the Law of the Land" are separate). See also,
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Company, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439, n. 16 (D. N.J. 1999);Jama
v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D. N.J. 1998);
United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854, 858, n. 2 (N.D.Ill. 1999); Handel v. Ar-
tukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D.Cal. 1985); United States v. Thompson, 928
F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir.), cert. denie, 502 U.S. 897 (1991); Kwan v. United States,
84 F. Supp. 2d 613 (E.D.Pa. 2000); Sandhu v. Burke, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3584
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2000); United States v. Nai Fook Li, 206 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2000).
See supra notes 90-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of this.
9 See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Company, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439, n. 16 (D. N.J.
1999);Jama v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D. N.J.
1998) (noting that plaintiffs submitted treaties in support of their 'claim under the
law of nations or international law); United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854, 858,
n. 2 (N.D.Ill. 1999); United States v. Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d 236, 278-279 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (".... to provide for a private right of action, the treaty must be 'self-executing,*
that is, it must prescribe [... ] rules by which private rights may be determined") (cit-
ing Columbia Marine Services, Inc. v. Reffet Ltd., 861 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1988)).
Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D.Cal. 1985); United States v.
Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 897 (1991); Kwan v.
United States 84 F. Supp. 2d 613 (E.D.Pa. 2000); Sandhu v. Burke, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3584 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2000); United States v. Nai Fook i., 206 F.3d 56, 68-78
(1st Cir. 2000) (TorruellaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citig United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992), for its dictum: "if [an extradition
treaty] is self-executing, it would appear that a court must enforce it on behalf of an
individual"). But see Nai Fook Li, supra, at 68. The majority in Nam Fook La states that
"[t]he dissent relies on dictum from [Alvarez-Maahain] for the proposition that trea-
ties that are 'self-executing' in the usual sense are necessarily enforceable in domestic
courts at the behest of affected individuals. In that case, however, the nature of the
right being asserted (which arose out of a claimed violation of an extradition treaty)
was at least arguably personal, see U.S. v. Rausdier, 119 U.S. 404, 424, 430-31 (1886).
To enlarge the Court's cryptic dictum into a general rule, contrary to the well-
established principle[s] [that the self-executing character of a treaty does not by itself
establish that a treaty creates private rights], requires too great a stretch." Id.
See gen. United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 767, n. 6 (1st Cir. 1995) (discussing
the various views on this issue of whether self-executing treaties create private causes
of action or remedies); see also Saccoccia v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 2d. 297. 299, et
seq. (D. R.I. 1999) (habeas action claiming, inter aia, government interference in
causing defense counsel to be arrested in Austria, causing, in turn, ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, and interference in attorney client privilege. All claims were dis-
missed, except for the interference with attorney client privilege, for which an
evidentiary hearing was ordered). See also, John C. Yoo, Globalisin and the Constitution:
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY
implementing legislation.98 It is held that to provide a private
right of action, a treaty must be self-executing, "that is, 'it must
prescribe [ ] rules by which private rights may be deter-
mined." ' 99 The Ninth Circuit noted that "[o]n a general level,
the Supreme Court has recognized that treaties can in some cir-
cumstances create individually enforceable rights ... ."', The
proposition that self-executing treaties confer rights on private
parties is not undisputed, though.'0 '
Some courts and commentators argue that they give stand-
ing to individuals and create private causes of action and reme-
dies. Non-self-executing treaties, on the other hand, are
not enforced until legislation is passed incorporating or ena-
bling them.
A vigorous debate has arisen over whether the idea of non-
self-executing treaties is inconsistent with the Supremacy
Treaties, Non-Self-Execution and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955,
1978-1979 (1999);John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural
Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999). Professor Yoo is chal-
lenged by Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understand-
ing, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 CoLUM. L. REv. 2095 (1999) (finding
that history and the material available from the founding contradicts Professor Yoo's
position; confirms the opposite); Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Response, Laughing at Trea-
ties, 99 CoLum. L. REv. 2154, 2156, 2157 (1999) (finding Professor Yoo's position im-
plausible from the textual and doctrinal standpoints); PAUsr, ET AL., supra note 44, at
75.
, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Company, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439, n.16 (D. N.J. 1999).
9 United States v. Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d 236, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Colum-
bia Marine Services, Inc. v. Reffet Ltd., 861 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1988)).
"0 United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2000); (citing,
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 657, 659-60 (1992)); United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
... See United States v. Nai Fook Li, 206 F.3d 56 (holding that, "treaties do not gen-
erally create rights that are privately enforceable in the federal courts [as they are]
primarily compacts between independent nations...) (citingHead Money Cases, 112
U.S. 580, 598 (1884)); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 474 (1913); Foster v. Nielson,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 306 (1829) (stating that "the judiciary is not that department of
the government to which the assertion of its interest against foreign powers is con-
fided.") . . .. [E]ven where a treaty provides.., benefits to a national of a given state,
[that] individual's rights are derivative through the states.")
112 See PAUST, ETAL., supra note 44, at 75.
"' For analysis of the various meanings that have been applied to the term non-self-
executing treaties, see David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-
Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129 (1999).
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Clause.'0 Professor John Yoo argues that the British and colo-
nial approaches to treaty making and treaty enforcement, as
well as the experience under the Articles of the Confederation,
the debates at the Constitutional Convention, and the debates
in some of the state ratifying conventions do not provide con-
clusive or definitive support for the proposition that treaties
automatically become the law of the land upon ratification.' ' In
fact, claims Professor Yoo, some of this historical evidence sup-
ports the position that all, or at least most, treaties do not have
the force of law and, therefore, may be ignored by the courts,
the citizens, and other state or federal officials who enforce do-
mestic law. 6 Professor Carlos Manuel Vazquez counters, argu-
ing that the Supremacy Clause is more correctly read to call for
a "default rule," whereby a treaty automatically will be consid-
ered the law of the land, unless the treaty itself is entered with
an explicit reservation that clearly provides that the treaty is
considered non-self--executing.
07
,o See e.g. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 97; Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmalng, supra
note 97. Professor Yoo is challenged by Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?, supra note
97; Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Response, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 97.
10 SeeYoo, Globalism, supra note 97, at 1976 (discussed in Vasquez, Laughing at Trea-
ties, supra note 97, at 2155-2157).
106 SeeYoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 97. at 2227: Yoo, Globalusm. su.
pra note 97 (noted and challenged by Vasquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 97, at
2155, 2206-2217).
, Vasquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 97, at 2155, 2157-2158. Recent U.S.
ratifications appear to substantiate the "default rule" view-the government has felt it
necessary to include a specific non-self-executing reservation in its ratification. Not
clarifying the issue of the impact of self-executing treaties significantly, the United
States Supreme Court, in Breard v. Green, noted that, absent a clear and express
statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern implemen-
tation of the treaty in that State, but did note that the Vienna Convention on Consu-
lar Relations arguably confers a right to consular assistance following arrest. Breard v.
Green, 523 U.S. 371, 375-6 (1998). For further discussion of Breard v. Green and the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, see infra notes 373-389 and accompanying
text. The United States Government certainly invokes the Vienna Convention to pro-
test other nations' failure to provide United States nationals with proper notice or ac-
cess to consular officials. State v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7, 10 (Del. 1999); United States v.
Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676 n.3 (D.V.I. 1999) (citing United States condemna-
tion of the Islamic Republic of Iran for preventing U.S. diplomats from communicat-
ing with U.S. hostages in violation of the Vienna Convention). Sre also Andrew Selsky,
Ortega: American Prisoner will be Tried, AP, Oct. 11, 1986 (article noting that U.S. offi-
cials explicitly relied on the Convention to visit a U.S. national imprisoned in Nicara-




Given the current viability in the United States of the notion
of non-self-executing treaties, it may be wise, in order to pro-
tect individuals being extradited, to establish, either a specific
human rights clause barring extradition that would have to be
incorporated into each extradition treaty for each particular
human right considered appropriate or to expand the tradi-
tional exemptions to extradition to include more human rights
protections. The reality in United States extradition practice is
that no human rights clauses are being incorporated and the
traditional exemptions to extradition are being significantly
constricted, rather than expanded.
B. DETERMINING WHICH TREATIES ARE SELF-EXECUTING-MORE
ON THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS
To establish whether a given treaty is self-executing, courts
look to the intent of the signatory parties, as manifested by the
language of the instrument and, if the instrument is uncertain,
recourse must be had to the circumstances surrounding its exe-
cution. ' s
Treaties that condemn conduct as criminal are non-self-
executing.'09 It is accepted that the President and the Senate
will not make criminal law by treaty. I have noted that most
human rights treaties are also considered non-self-executing.
This is generally because the Senate, upon giving its Advice &
Consent so indicates. This was the case for The Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment,"0 and [tihe International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights."I The Torture Convention, in
article III, section 1, provides: "[N]o State Party shall expel,
return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture ,,12 The Torture
,"8 United States v. Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d 236, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Diggs
v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976)); Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) ("interpretation of a treaty must begin with the
language of the treaty itself, and the clear import of the language controls").
'"' This is based on the ancient principles: nulla poena sina lege (no punishment
without law) and nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law).
"10 GA. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No.51, U.N.Doc. A/39/51 (1989).
." GA. Res.2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp.No.16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. See discussion in Quigley, supra note 10, at 1235.
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jected to torture .. ."1 The Torture Convention, as noted, has
been held to be non-self--executing."' At the time the Conven-
tion was sent to the Senate for advice and consent, Secretary of
State George Schultz included a "Declaration Regarding the
Non-Self-Executing Nature of the Convention," which provided,
in part: "[t]he United States reserves that articles 1 through 16
of the Convention are not self-executing.""' Articles 1-16 are
the Convention's protective provisions, designed to protect in-
dividuals from the proscribed acts and, as indicated in Article 1,
quoted above, to ensure that no state party will send a fugitive,
by way of extradition or other means, to a place where these
depredations may well occur. Finally, to close the embarrassing
circle of U.S. action, Congress has not promulgated legislation
granting jurisdiction to federal courts to hear claims involving
the Torture Convention's protective provisions."5
On the other hand, the principle of non-self-executing
treaties was judicially created, so the issue of whether a given
treaty is or is not self-executing should be decided by the judi-
ciary.16 Moreover, some argue persuasively, at least in terms of
supremacy in contexts other than that of creating criminal sanc-
"2 The Convention Against Torture and Other Crue4 Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, at art. III § 1, GA Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No.51,
U.N.Doc. A/39/51. It received the Advice and Consent of the Senate on October 27,
1990, see, 135 Cong.Rec. S.17491.
"' See e.g. Barapind v. Reno, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1149 (E.D.Cal. 1999); Extradition
of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 803 n.17 (D. Conn. 1997).
,' Declaration adopted by the Senate, specifically incorporating this statement in
its Resolution of Advice and Consent to the Ratification of the Convention, 136
Cong.Rec. S17486 (Oct. 27, 1990). Articles 1-16 of the Convention that were consid-
ered non-self-executing, are the protective provisions of the Convention.
"' See e.g. Igartua De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10, n.1 (1st Cir. 1994);
Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 1999); White v.
Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1385-87 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Extradition of Cheung, 968 F.
Supp. 791, 803, n. 17 (D. Conn. 1997); Calderon v. Reno, 39 F. Supp. 2d 943, 956-7
(N.D.Ill.1998).
6 Quigley, Rule of Non-Inquiry, supra note 113, at 1237-1239. This is a judicially
created concept "that is patently inconsistent with express language in the Constitu-
tion ... [which provides] that 'a/!Treaties ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.'"
PAuST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1996) (citing, U.S.
CONST. ART. III, cm. 2; U.S. CONST. ARTIII, SEC. 2, Ct.. 1: "[T]hejudicial power shall ex-
tend to a/! Cases ... arising under ... Treaties ..." (emphasis added). See BLAKESt.F, ET.
AL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTem: CASES & MATERIALS 1087-88 (4th ed. 1995).
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tions, that the notion of non-self-executing treaties is anathema
and unavoidably unconstitutional."7
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit, in Gallina v. Fraser,"8 rec-
ognized in dicta a potential exception. The court noted that
there could be some "procedures or punishment so antipathetic
to a federal court's sense of decency as to require reexamina-
tion" of the exception to the principle of non-inquiry." 9 The
Ninth Circuit took up the gauntlet in 1999, noting that some ju-
risdictions "have discussed the possibility of a humanitarian ex-
ception to extradition, tracing the idea" from Gallina v. Fraser."0
Congress recently promulgated legislation implementing
Article 3 of the Torture Convention. This was part of the For-
eign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act [FARR Act] .12, Thus,
although the Torture Convention is not considered self-execut-
ing, Article 3 has been enabled. The FARR Act provides that it
is "the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or
otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a coun-
try in which there are substantial grounds for believing the per-
,0I22son would be in danger of being subjected to torture ....
Following the promulgation of the FARR Act, the Department
of State prescribed regulations to implement Article 3 of the
Torture Convention. These Regulations state:
[p]ursuant to [18 U.S.C. sections 3184 and 3186], the Secretary [of
State] is the U.S. official responsible for determining whether to surren-
der a fugitive to a foreign country by means of extradition .... [Incident
to the U.S. obligations under Article 3 of the Convention], the Depart-
ment [of State] considers the question of whether a person facing extra-
dition from the U.S. is 'more likely than not' to be tortured in [the
requesting state] ....""
The principle of non-self-executing treaties prevents any
impact that human rights might have on extradition or deporta-
tion, except insofar as these treaties allow courts to broaden the
"' See PAusT, ET AL., supra note 44, at 192, n.1; PAusT, supra note 118, at 51, 55, 59,
63-64, 370-371; Halberstam, United States Ratification, supra note 95, at 49, 64, 67-69.
... Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2nd Cir. 1960).
119 Id.
20 Cornejo-Barretto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000).
12' Foreign Affairs Reform & Restructuring Act [FARR Act], Pub.L. No. 105-277, §
2242, 822. See discussion in Cornejo-Barreto, 218 F.3d at 1004.
'22FARR Act, at § 2242(a).
i2 22 C.F.R. § 95.2 (2000).
[Vol. 91
EXTRADITION AD HUMAN RIGHTS
traditional exemptions from extradition as a disguised method
of applying human rights protections, or otherwise to so inter-
pret extradition treaties. Therefore, to protect individuals be-
ing extradited, either a specific human rights clause barring
extradition would have to be incorporated into each extradition
treaty or the traditional exemptions to extradition would have
to be expanded by interpretation to include more human rights
protections. United States practice has been, albeit meagerly
and reluctantly, to use the traditional, statist exemptions to ex-
tradition as repositories for human rights protections. The
quality of this protection has never been great and has been di-
minishing, along with other protections for those accused of
crime, over the past several years. No human rights clauses have
been incorporated and the traditional exemptions to extradi-
tion are being significantly constricted.
C. EXTRADITION PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES PRESENTS
SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS
Extradition and other international cooperation in criminal
matters present serious constitutional and human rights prob-
lems. Although extradition treaties usually state that extradition
will be allowed for extraditable offenses2 4 committed within the
requesting state's jurisdiction, extradition treaties provide that if
the offense also occurred within the territory of the requested
state, the requested state may prosecute first and extradite later.
Extradition treaties contain a ne bis in iden clause, but the im-
124 Extraditable offenses are of two types, depending on the treaty involved. These
are discussed in BLAmSLEY, TERRORiSM, supra note 4, at 212-217. The traditional
method was to enumerate specific offenses that were to be extraditable. If an offense
was not listed, it was not extraditable. Recently, most nations have moved to a 'no-
list" method, whereby the treaty will simply indicate that extradition is possible for
any offense which may receive a specified minimum amount of punishment in each
country (generally around one year). See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition Between the United
States and Italy, 35 UST 3023, Oct. 13, 1983,US-IT entered into force 1984, at art. II
(1) ("[A]n offense, however denominated, shall be an extraditable offense only if it is
punishable under the laws of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of liberty for a
period of more than one year or by more a severe penalty."). See also U.S.-Freneh Ex-
tradition Treaty, ofjan. 6, 1909, 37 Stat. 1526, as amended by Supplenentazy Convention of
Feb. 12, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 407. OnJuly 9, 1997, the President transmitted a new Extra-
dition Treaty with France to the Senate for its Advice & Consent, which has not yet
been forthcoming. Treaty Doc. 105-13, 105th Cong. 1st Session, Message from the Presi-
dent of the United States transmitting Extradition Treaty Betwen the U.S. & France,
signed at Paris, April 23, 1996. Article 2 of this treaty reads similarly to that with Italy
and most of our recent extradition treaties.
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pact of its protection is open to doubt. '2s Also, extradition trea-
ties require that the offense charged be one for which jurisdic-
tion obtains under the circumstances in both the requested
state and the requesting states. 26 U.S. courts have not allowed
many basic, minimal safeguards applicable to criminal proceed-
ings to apply to extradition. Documents of questionable
authenticity are tolerated and used in a manner that does not
allow the fugitive to confront the witnesses or to challenge evi-
dence against him. The fugitive does have the right to counsel,
but the exclusionary rule may not apply. Affirmative defenses,
like insanity or self-defense, may not be allowed.
2 7
A fugitive has the right to resist extradition through judicial
proceedings.128  He may adduce evidence countering the re-
questing country's claim of probable cause. He may also be al-
lowed some discovery to help defend against being extradited.29
Offenses must be extraditable 30 and many pre-World War II
treaties did not cover crimes such as drug trafficking, money
laundering,'' racketeering, mail fraud, wire fraud, and securi-
'2 E.g. United States v.Jurado-Rodriguez, 907 F. Supp. 568, 577-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(where defendant was convicted and punished in Luxembourg for money laundering
(a continuing narcotics trafficking offense) and then was extradited to the United
States upon a proviso that he not be prosecuted upon facts that had been used to
convict him in Luxembourg. The issue was what the term "facts" in the Luxembourg
extradition order meant.)
'2 See e.g. U.S. Italian Extradition Treaty, supra note 124.
27 These are presented in Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 CEO
L.J. 1441, 1443-1445 (1988).
'2 1& at 1456 (logging the types of'judicial challenges and actions are available to
the accused fugitive, in addition to defending against extradition in the hearing
proper).
'2 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 815 (9th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 197 S.Ct. 271
(1986) (abuse of discretion not to allow discovery).
13' See e.g. Hatfield v. Guay, 87 F.2d 358 (1st Cir. 1937), cert denied, 300 U.S. 678
(1937); Quinn, 783 F.2d at 691; Kester, Myths, supra note 127, at 1462.
.3 Kester, Myths, supra note 127, at 1463. Zagaris, Avoiding Criminal Liability in the
Conduct of International Business, 21 WM. MITC-. L. Rav. 749 (1996); Zagaris, Dollar Di-
plomacy: International Enforcement of Money Movement and Related Matters -A United States
Perspective, 22 G.W.J. INT'LL. & ECON. 465, 485 (1989); Amir Licht, Games Commissions
Play: 2X2 Games of International Securities Regulation, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 61, 128, n.176
(1999).
See also e.g. Task Force Adopts Proposals to Fight Drug-Money Laundering, 54 BNA
BANKING RrT. 312 (Feb. 19, 1990) (15 nation taskforce has undertaken to cooperate,
including exchange of information between the authorities in each country on laun-
dering methods and flows, suspects, inquiries, and judicial decisions, relating to ex-
tradition, freezing assets and confiscation of goods); Zagaris & Bornheim, Thrift Briefs,
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ties crimes-including insider trading.'12  This prompted the
Departments of State and Justice and their counterparts in
other countries to move away from treaties that had an exclusive
list of extraditable offenses to treaties utilizing broad, sweeping
no-list, dual criminality, extraditable offense clauses.' The in-
crease in sophisticated transnational crime has made extradi-
tion and cooperation more important than ever.'"' U.S.
legislation has tended to enhance penalties, making many more
crimes extraditable under the recent no-list treaties, although
the inclusion of the death penalty in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1988'm inhibits cooperation.
European nations sometimes provide even less protections
in extradition cases. However, they do attempt to protect hu-
man rights in the administrative context. Some have a parallel
system of administrative courts,'3s whose purpose is to protect
people from administrative abuse of rights or abuse of power
and other violations. The French Conseil d'Etat, the sophisti-
cated administrative court system, has imposed itself into the
arena of extradition in order to protect individual liberties and
human rights. This administrative court system is designed to
allow a form of appeal to its set of courts sensitive to civil liber-
ties. The Conseil d'Etat has drawn criticism for imposing itself
into the domain governed by the Code de Procedure Penal that
contains the Extradition Law. The regular criminal procedure
law does not give recourse to the judge-made law of that protec-
tive body.3 7 The French administrative law has developed in a
way that protects human rights and liberty from official abuse.
54 BNA BAEMNG RPT 115 (Jan. 22, 1990) (noting European engagement toward uni-
form action and broad cooperation in fields of extradition, mutual assistance, prose-
cution, and enforcement to combat drug abuse and trafficking, including money
laundering).
132 Insider Trading to Become Basis for U.K Extradzton, I BNA L,'rL SEC. REG. RP'.
(No. 6), at 4 (March 2, 1988) ("all insider trading offenders will be extraditable by the
end of this year..."). For example, Switzerland has promulgated a law criminalizing
insider trading. STGB, CP, CP. ART. 161 (entered into forceJuly 1, 1988).
"Kester, Myths, supra note 127, at 1463.
Bruce Zagaris, Dollar Diplomacy: International Enforcement of Money Movement and
Related Matters-A United States Perspective 22 G.W.J. INT'LL & ECON. 465, 466 (1989).
"s Pub.LNo. 100-690, § 7001, 102 Stat. 4181 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1970))
(see also broad enforcement measures in 1988 Act, to be codified in 31 U.S.C.
§5311); cited and discussed in Zagaris, Dollar Diplomacy, supra note 134. at 474, 548.
6 Id. at 429.
117 Id. at 430.
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U.S. law provides no direct appeal from a magistrate's decision
to certify him for extradition. ' m To make extradition adminis-
trative, as some have argued, would be a serious mistake, be-
cause we have not developed the administrative court structure
that could protect against abuse. The judiciary is required to
protect civil liberty.
D. EARLY HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS WERE REPOSITED IN
TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO EXTRADITION' 3'
Around 1853, a fugitive slave from Missouri, named John
Anderson, entered Canada on the underground railway to what
he hoped would be freedom. In 1860, however, proceedings
began for his extradition back to Missouri for the murder of Se-
neca T. Diggs. Anderson, indeed, had killed Diggs in Missouri
and was likely to be convicted of murder under Missouri law, as
the simple fact that he had killed a human being was sufficient
for probable cause. Normally, a fugitive is not allowed to posit
affirmative defenses, so, it appeared that Anderson was extradit-
able. Canada, however, recognized a specialized form of self-
defense (also applicable to extradition) based on the fact that
he had killed Diggs to escape from slavery. The Queens' Bench,
on habeas corpus, held that surrender should be forbidden
unless the offense charged was also punishable in Canada. '"
This was actually an application of the double criminality
provision as a "human rights" exception to extradition.
The result of the Anderson case is eminently proper, but we
have seen that this protection is unavailable in U.S. law. The
double criminality condition does not extend to any defenses
available at trial or even to those applicable to preliminary hear-
ings. Thus, a fugitive's claims of alibi or other defenses, such as
'm David v. Attorney General, 699 F.2d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1983); Ornelas v. Ruiz,
161 U.S. 502, 508 (1896).
"9 See gen., Dugard & Van Den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights,
92 AM.J. INT'L L. 187 (1998); BLAKEsLE, TERRORISM, supra note 4; Blakesley, The Law
of International Extradition: A Comparative Study, ch. 6 in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
& PROCEDURE (Dugard & Van den Wyngaert eds. 1996); BLAKESLEY, THE INDIVIDUAL
FACING TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS: U.S. REPORT (Max-Planck
Inst. 2000, at press).
"' Ex parteJohn Anderson, [1860] L.T. Rep. (N.S.) 622, (discussed in Ryan, Ex parte
John Anderson, 6 QUEENS LJ. 382 (1981)). The Canadian court actually denied extra-
dition because the extradition request failed to use the words "of his malice afore-
thought, and thereby committed murder." Id. at 387.
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insanity or even self-defense, are normally irrelevant in an ex-
tradition hearing and do not bar extradition."'
An "alibi" defense may be admissible if it obliterates prob-
able cause for extradition. If, however, it merely controverts
evidence presented by the requesting state, it is not admissi-
ble142 . The Anderson decision was actually a very early applica-
tion of the double criminality provision functioning as a
"human rights" exception to extradition. I will consider these
permutations on double criminality and human rights below.
This makes the decision by Home Secretary Straw not to extra-
dite Pinochet on grounds of Pinochet's physical and mental in-
competence to stand trial quite interesting. Could this be a
movement toward allowing more defenses to be presented at
the extradition phase? The importance of this aspect of the de-
cision will be indicated below, as I consider more specifically the
impact of human rights and humanitarian law on extradition.
Thus, situations like those of John Anderson, or even of Pino-
chet, call for human rights exceptions to extradition."3 In the
Anderson case, the Queen's Bench actually applied the double
criminality principle as if it were a human rights exemption. It
would be more straightforward simply to adopt a human rights
exception to extradition, although this has not recently been
found viable in the United States. Germany, on the other hand,
as well as other European nations, has moved closer to adopting
such human rights exemptions.'
,'4 See, e.g., Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S.
447, 462 (1913); Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Galanis, 429 F. Supp. 1215, 1224-26 (D. Conn. 1977); Hooker v. Klein, 573
F.2d 1360, 1368 (90' Cir. 1978); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir.
1973); 6 Whiteman, DIGEST OF INT'LLAw, at 1003 (1968).
112 See, e.g., Extradition of Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725, 738-739 (W.D. La. 1999);
Maguna-Celaya v. Haro, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Extradition of Contra-
ras, 800 F. Supp. 1462, 1469 (S.D. Tex. 1992). Sometimes, promises made by gov-
ernmental officials with actual or apparent authority to make them, including a
promise that extradition will not be sought, in exchange for cooperation, %-ill be en-
forced and an attempted extradition denied. See, Extradition of Drayer, 190 F.3d 410,
413 (6th Cir. 1999) (accepting the possibility of refusing extradition, but holding that
the fugitive failed to prove U.S. collusion or apparent authority).
" Again, the irony of applying human rights protections to one who is charged
with having abused them so horrifically, is apparent, as is the comparison of a fugitive
slave killing to escape with a tyrant. Still, it seems to me that if human rights princi-
ples are to apply at all, they must apply to the worst of usjust like anyone else.
"4 See, e.g., the 1999 Portuguese law on International Cooperation, CooperacdoJudz-
cidria Interationa4 Article 6; Italian Codid di Procedura Penale, art. 698, 1j 1, and art
20001
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY
It becomes clear, therefore, that extradition has been im-
pacted by application of human rights law.'45 This has been so
for ages, although disguised as traditional positivistic and statist
exemptions, such as dual criminality. Some human rights con-
ventions to which the United States is a party prohibit extradi-
tion in certain circumstances. For example, the Convention
Against Torture'16 provides that a fugitive should not be extra-
dited if there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture and other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.'47
Many argued that the Convention Against Torture required
England to extradite Pinochet and, indeed, Home Secretary
Straw agreed with the House of Lords that the Torture Conven-
tion required this, but only as incorporated into British Law in
the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, section 134.48 The House of
Lords held that only those acts of torture attributable to Pino-
chet that occurred after the promulgation of this Act were ex-
traditable'49
The 1978 decision of the European Court of Human Rights
Ireland v. United KingdomW' is interesting in this regard. British
interrogation of suspected IRA terrorists in August and October
1971, by methods involving sensory deprivation and noise (in-
cluding a continuous loud and hissing noise from a portable
705, 1 2 (Italy 1988); EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, arts. 2 and 8. La-
godny and Reisner note that Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Luxemburg, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, all inserted a reservation to their adoption of the
European Convention on Extradition that provided for the requested state to refuse
extradition if the surrender would result in severe consequences as far as the fugi-
tive's health is concerned or on account of his or her age. Otto Lagodny & Sigrun
Reisner, Extradition Treaties, Human Rights and 'Emergency-Brake" Judgments - A Com-
parative European Survey, 65 REV. INT'L DR. PENAL 543,546, 547-562 (1994) (including
authority). See also, OTTO LAGODNY, National Report: Germany, in THE INDIVIDUAL IN
FACE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL LAw (Max-Planck Institute 2000)
(manuscript on file with author)
1"5 Christine Van Den Wyngaert, Applying the European Convention on Human Rights
to Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box?, 39 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.757 (1990).
146 The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No.51, U.N.Doc. A/39/51.
Id. at art. 3.
148 CriminalJustice Act § 134 (1), (2) and (3) (1988).
Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate (III) [1999] (U.K.), 2
All E.R. 97, 170 (H.L. 1999), [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827; Michael Birnbaum, Pinochet and
Double Criminality, CRIM. L. REv. 127 (March 2000).
S0 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 35 (1978);
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power generator located next to the interrogation room) was
unanimously held by the European Court of Human Rights to
be "inhuman and degrading treatment" and "torture" contrary
to international law (and in particular contrary to Article 3 of
the European Convention on Human Rights). Judgment was
rendered on January 18, 1978, after the ECHR had received
evidence from the two governments and heard testimony from
119 witnesses. Other disorientation methods regarded as tor-
ture were wall-standing for prolonged periods, hooding, depri-
vation of sleep and deprivation of food and drink. One
paragraph in the court's findings is particularly worthy of note,
at the end of section 240 in the judgment:
a "breach" results from the mere existence of a law which introduces, di-
rects or authorizes measures incompatible with the rights and freedoms
safeguarded; this is confirmed unequivocally by the travaux prparatoires
(Document H (61) 4, pp. 384, 502, 703 and 706). [...] The absence of
a law expressly prohibiting this or that violation does not suffice to estab-
lish a breach since such a prohibition does not represent the sole
method of securing the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaran-
teed.' -5
The United States Senate provided upon ratifying the treaty
that extradition should be denied "if it is more likely than not
that he would be tortured."5 2 On the other hand, the "rule of
non-inquiry" has been held to prevent courts from admitting
evidence about potential torture of the fugitive to be returned
to the requesting state by way of extradition.' It was held that it
is for the Secretary of State, not the judiciary, to decide whether
to deny extradition on such humanitarian grounds. 5 The
,' Id at § 240 (1978). It should be noted, however, that the European Convention
on Human Rights does not by itself provide a cause of action in relation to offenses
committed under color of law in non-signatory states. For analysis of the distinctions
between "inhuman and degrading" treatment and "torture," at the time of the Ireland
v. United Kingdom decision, see R. John Pritchard, Lessons from Britsh Proceedmigs
against Japanese War Criminals, 3:2 HuM. RTs. RE%. 104 (Summer 1978).
15' 136 Cong. Rec. S17,492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990); Multilateral Treaties Deposited
With the Secretary-General Status as of 31 December 1994 177 (1995) (indicating ratifica-
tion by the United States on October 21, 1994). John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquby
and Human Rights Treaties, 45 CATH. U. L RE . 1213, 1217-18 (1996).
" Sandhu v. Burke, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3584 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10. 2000) (citing




Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,5 5 although it has no ex-
press provision on extradition or non-extradition, has been con-
strued by courts in Canada, among other countries, to prohibit
a requested state to extradite, if it appears that the requesting
state will violate any right implicated by the Covenant.-" 6 United
States law, however, has not gone that far. The United States
government has made significant reservations to most human
rights conventions, including those mentioned above, which
make the conventions difficult to apply.5 7 One of the reserva-
tions is often that the treaty will not be self-executing.
1. Classic Double Criminality
The United States Government and courts, for the most
part, have also limited double criminality almost to the disap-
pearing point.'" Thus, in current practice, double criminality
does not work as it should or even as it once did to protect hu-
man rights in the extradition context. The same is true for
other traditional exemptions from extradition (speciality, politi-
cal offense exception, etc.). Before getting into a deeper dis-
cussion of human rights exceptions to extradition, a brief
analysis of double (or dual) criminality is in order because it
seems at first blush that in the Pinochet case and other cases of
the most serious crimes against humanity, the idea of dual
criminality seems almost superfluous,5 9 yet it was at the center
of the House of Lords' decision. The House of Lords held that
there was sufficient evidence to extradite Pinochet for conduct
that was criminal in both Spain and the United Kingdom.
Home Secretary Straw found that the Spanish request for extra-
"' The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. GA. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
' See, e.g., Kindler v. Canada, 14 HUM. RTS. LJ. 307, 308 (1993); Ng. v. Canada, 15
HUM. RTS. LJ. 149 (1994); Cox v. Canada, 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 410 (1994); Quigley, Rule
ofNon-Inquiry, supra note 140, at 1218-1223.
,7 See generally FIRMAGE, ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES &
MATERIALS, ch. 10 (5th ed. 2000); see also, Christopher L Blakesley, The Regionalization
of International Criminal Law & the Protection of Human Rights in International Cooperation
in Criminal Proceedings, 65 REV. INT'L DE DR. PtNAL 493 (1994); David Sloss, The Domes-
tication, supra note 103.
15 See infra at notes 167-170 and 184-190 and accompanying text.
"' Certainly, insofar as certain crimes are universally proscribed, it is superfluous.
Cf, Robert Kushen & KennethJ. Harris, Surrender of Fugitives by the United States to the
War Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 90 AM.J. INT'L L. 510, 514 (1996).
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dition was "well-founded as a matter of Spanish law. ' 60 Dual
criminality is not superfluous, however, if it acts as a repository
for human rights exemptions. It may be important unless one
considers crimes against humanity to have a strict liability char-
acter.1 61 In the past, it did provide such a repository, sometimes
working as a means to promote fairness in the process and to
ensure important individual rights.'6 This is no longer true.
16
0 Editorial, Of Extraditions, 8 N.J. LAw. WKXLY, 550 (March 15, 1999)
161 Strict liability for war crimes and crimes against humaity is not unheard of. For
example, command responsibility for the most serious war crimes or crimes against
humanity has been held to allow conviction upon strict liability. Se, e.g., In re Yama-
shita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (General Tomoyuki Yamashita was
charged with an offense and convicted for having- ".. . unlawfully disregarded and
failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the members
of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and "other high crimes
. ... " Id. at 28. See also, HowARD S. LEViE, DOCUMENTS ON PIUsoNERS OF WAR 294
(1979). The mental element was at least willful blindness, or some argue strict liabil-
ity. Some argue that this is strict liability. See, R.John Pritchard, Canges in Perception:
British and Military Perspectives on War Crimes Trials and their Legal Context (1942-1956),
in TBE M=xrARY DIMENSION, 5 A HISTORY OF ANGLO-JAPANESE Rztnao,\,s (Ian Go%,: &
Hirama Yoichi, eds., Tokyo Univ. Press & Macmillan, 2000). Justice Murphy in his
dissent seems convinced that it was strict liability, as he quoted the above-noted
charge and stated that it was "unworthy of the traditions of our people." Id., at 28.
Others argue, on the other hand, that the findings of the Military Commission (that
convicted Yamashita) do not bear out either a strict liability standard or a presump-
tion of commander knowledge, when such massive atrocities occur. See Greg R. Vet-
ter, Command Responsibility of Non-Militay Superiors in the International Criminal Court
(ICC), 25 YA1.EJ. INT'LL. 89, 121, n.181 (2000) (citing Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-
21-T at para. 384 (ICTY Nov. 16, 1998), available at In the Trial Chamber,
<http//www.un.org/icty/celebici/trial/2/judgment/partl.htm> (Cdebici Tial). The
ICC Statute provides in art. 28(1) that for such a conviction it must be proved that a
military commander "knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have
known," about the actual or impending criminal conduct. Rome Statute of the Int'l
Crim. Ct. art. 28(1) (a), U.N.Doc. A/CONF.183/9, reprinted in 37 I.LM. 999 (1998)
'6 See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 300 (1933); Collins v. Loisel, 259
U.S. 309, 317 (1922); Kelley v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 6 (1915); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S.
205, 217 (1904). See discussion of the link between double criminality and fairness in
an early article by Edward Wise, Some Problems of Extradition, 15 WMNE ST. L REV. 709,
718-19 (1969). Moreover, in 1969, the Association International de Droit Penal held
an important Congress on extradition, wherein the General Rapporteur, Schulz,
raised the connection between exceptions to extradition and human rights. See, e.g.,
Hans Schulz, The Classic Law of Extradition and Contemporary Nceds, in 2 A TREATISE ON
INTERNATioNAL CRiMbNAL LAW 309 (M. Cherif Bassiouni and Ved P. Nanda eds.,
1973). This is mentioned in Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling, supra note 6, at
212, n.70 (stating that the Association International de Droit Pinal Was first to draw atten-
tion to this link, in 41 REV. INT'L DE DRorr PtNAL 12, 15 (1970), and in adopting a
comprehensive resolution in Rio deJaneiro in 1994, this was reinforced).
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Today the protections of double criminality have been limited
to near meaninglessness, at least in the United States.'6 3 Lately,
it has been limited to requiring that the offense (s) for which ex-
tradition is sought be serious crimes in both countries.""
United States courts hold that dual criminality is satisfied if the
offense charged is "substantially similar" or analogous in the law
of the requesting and requested states.'6s This has pretty well
eviscerated the impact of dual criminality as a protection.
The principle of double criminality, riciprociti d'incrimina-
tion, founded on the long-standing international principle of
nulla poena sina lege, requires that a fugitive be extradited only
for conduct that is criminal and punished to the prescribed
By the way, I do not consider the decision in Pinochet (No. 2) that the House of
Lords ought to re-hear the immunity and extradition questions, because of the ap-
pearance of possible bias on the part of Lord Hoffman, due to his relationship with
Amnesty International, had anything to do with the ultimate decision by Jack Straw
not to extradite. While in general terms, such conflict of interest or bias may be a
human rights issue, it may be better to call it a matter of natural justice, as David
Turns suggested to me.
See Kester, supra note 127, at 1462.
' Defendants have argued, for example, that since the offense charged (mail
fraud, for example) may be punished in the United States, even if there is no theft
involved, the accused may not be extradited (or, if extradited, not prosecuted) for
that offense, when the requested country's law requires theft. This argument is re-
jected: "[The defendant's] alleged offense was stealing; the significance of his use of
the mails and of interstate transportation and facilities is 'jurisdictional only' in that it
permits him to be prosecuted under federal law." United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d
888, 893, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
1' See Kester, Myths, supra note 127, at 1462; Ross v. U.S. Marshall for the E.D. of
Oklahoma, 168 F.3d 1190, 1195-1196 (10th Cir. 1999); Murphy v. United States, 199
F.3d 599, 601-602 (2nd Cir. 1999) (dual criminality does not bar extradition when the
statute of limitations has run in the United States, but not in the requesting state.
Dual criminality only bars extradition for conduct that is not criminal in both states);
Clarey v. Gregg, 138 F.3d 764, 765 (9th Cir. 1998); Lo Duca v. United States, 93 F.3d
1100, 1111 (2d Cir.1996) (the Italian offense, "association, mafia type," is analogous
to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-63 (1994) and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). Moreover, it is the con-
duct that one considers, not the denomination); Bozilov v. Seifert, 983 F.2d 140 (9th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1301 (3d Cir. 1991); Theron v.
United States, 832 F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 1987); Brauch v. Raich, 618 F.2d 843, 847
(1st Cir. 1980) ("substantially analogous"); Messina v. United States, 728 F.2d 77, 79-
80 (2d Cir. 1984) ("in nature of extortion" "similar"); Extradition of Valdez-Mainero,
3 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (S.D. Cal. 1998); In re Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp 1058,
1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("substantially similar"); Extradition of Schweidenback, 3 F.
Supp. 2d 118 (D. Mass. 1998).
6 Kester, Myths, supra note 127, at 1462.
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minimum by the law of both parties.'6 Every U.S. extradition
treaty contains a double criminality provision. Historically,
cases in which the principle of double criminality determined
the outcome of the request were abundant. It has been a very
important principle because of the sharp divergences among
the criminal laws of various countries or the vast difference in
punishment meted out for different offenses. Its value is appar-
ent when one considers the varying proscriptions and punish-
ments for offenses such as euthanasia, suicide, adultery,' and
abortion. It becomes even more important if general human
rights protections relating to a fair trial are reposited therein.
The stretching and straining required to do his would not be
necessary if straight-forvard human rights clauses were
adopted. Some doctrinal criticism claims that dual criminality is
too onerous, but it is not onerous at all. The rule is satisfied if
the requesting state submits, along with the rest of its eviden-
tiary documentation, an affidavit of relevant law containing the
statute that makes the action in question criminal. Most recent
treaties have added a general double criminality provision, such
as: "An offense, however denominated, shall be [extraditable]
only if it is punishable under the laws of both parties... by dep-
rivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by a
more severe penalty."69
a) Double Criminality and United States Federalism
International extradition is an exclusively federal preroga-
tive, 70 although states may call on the federal government to
'6 E.g, Ross, 168 F.3d at 1196 (Theft Act of No. Ireland is substantially analogous to
U.S. mail and wire fraud statutes); Murphy, 199 F.3d, at 601-602 (dual criminality only
bars extradition for conduct that is not criminal in both states). Moreover, it is the
conduct that one considers, not the denomination. US v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 845
(9th Cir.1995); United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1993). See gen., BLAESLE, TERRORISM,
supra note 4, at ch. 3; M. CHEMRI BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EX17RADrmON: U.S. LAW &
PRACTICE, at 324 (1987) (looseleaf, discussing the interrelationship of dual criminality
and reciprocity).
'' See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, The Hidden Suffenng of Woen in Afghanistan, Bos.
GLOBE, Dec. 6, 1998, at D7 (showing the value of dual criminality for human rights
protection).
'69 1984 U.S-Italy Extradition Treaty, Art. 2, TIAS 10837 at Art. 11.
70 BLAEESLEy, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 187-190; Bassiouni, INTERNATIO.%NAL




seek extradition for them. The fact that each state maintains its
own substantive criminal law and criminal justice systems, along
with those of the federal system, sometimes has caused prob-
lems interpreting and applying dual criminality provisions. Al-
though there is often a variance among the states' laws for
particular offenses, virtually all common crimes are defined and
enforced by the several states of the Union. The resulting set of
parallel or competing sets of laws and jurisdictional principles
has been the cause of dual criminality problems for the courts
and has prompted some important decisions by the United
States Supreme Court.
In the famous Factor v. Laubenheimer case, 7' for example,
Great Britain had requested the extradition of a fugitive for the
crime of "receiving money knowing the same to have been un-
lawfully obtained." ,72 The fugitive had been apprehended in Il-
linois where the extradition hearing was to be held before a
federal magistrate. For extradition to work, an offense must be
made extraditable by an applicable treaty and the relevant con-
duct must be proscribed and made punishable by both the re-
questing and the requested states to the degree required by the
treaty.173" More recent extradition treaties do not list specific ex-
traditable offenses, but simply require that the conduct charged
be proscribed as a serious offense in each country.'74 Britain
properly made its extradition request, but the fugitive had been
apprehended in Illinois, a state that had not made that particu-
lar conduct criminal. Thus, the question arose as to whether
the rule of double criminality was satisfied. The Supreme Court
was faced with a unique question: should dual criminality be de-
'7' Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 US 276 (1933).
'7' Id. at 303.
'7" See United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1465 (11th Cir. 1989); BLAESLEY,
TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 224-250. Recently, the U.S. Congress promulgated the
Judicial assistance to the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia and to the Interna-
tional Tribunal for Rwanda, Pub. L. 104-106, DivA., Title XIII, § 1342, Feb. 10, 1996,
110 Stat. 486, provided that: "... [18 U.S.C. § 3181, et seq.], relating to the extradition
of persons to a foreign country pursuant to a treaty or convention for extradition ...,
shall apply in the same manner and extent to the surrender of persons, including
United States citizens, to-(A) [the ICTY]; and (B) [the ICTR] ...."
'7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
476(c) (1987). See, e.g., Extradition Treaty Between Switzerland and the United
States, art. 2, 31 Stat. 1928, as amended by 49 Stat. 3192, as amended by 55 Stat. 1140;
Extradition Treaty Between the United States and Germany, 32 U.S.T 1485, T.I.A.S.
9785, 1220 U.N.T.S. 269, Supp. Treaty, March 11, 1993.
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termined by the law of the state in which the fugitive is found,
by the law of the majority of states, by federal law, or on the ba-
sis of some other criterion? The Supreme Court held the fugi-
tive to be extraditable on a different ground,' 7" but stated very
clearly what its solution to the double criminality dilemma
would be: "[t]he conduct with which Factor was charged was a
crime in Great Britain, was within the provisions of the Treaty of
1931, between the two countries, and was a crime under the law
of many states, if not Illinois, punishable either as receiving
money obtained fraudulently or by false pretenses, or as lar-
ceny."
7 6
Even before the Factor decision, courts in the United States
generally held an offense to be extraditable if it was "generally
recognized as criminal" in the United States.'" It is still not fully
clear, however, what "generally recognized as criminal" means.
Factor and subsequent decisions following it appear to hold that
ajudge will determine whether there are a sufficient number of
states that have criminalized the action in question to legitimize
the extradition.'" The currently popular "no-list" approach to
extraditability, which determines extraditability on the basis of
the gravity of the potential penalty rather than on the basis of a
list of specifically enumerated offenses, might appear to help
solve the problem.'9 It does not fully do so, however. For an
'7 The Supreme Court resolved the problem by holding that the offense or the ac-
tions described in the extradition papers need not be denominated criminal in the
same language by the law of the requested state. It is only necessary that the offense
or the actions constituting the offense be enumerated as extraditable in the treaty,
and that those actions constitute some kind of an offense in the requested state, even
though perhaps denominated differently. Thus, it held that receiving money known
to have been obtained unlawfully was equivalent to fraud, which the treaty covers.
Factor, 290 U.S. at 292, 303.
7 Id. at 300, 303.
'7 Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922). More recently, see, e.g., Therion v. U.S.
Marshal, 832 F. 2d 492, 496 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F.
Supp. 1523, 1427 (M.D. Fla. 1987); In re Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. 1058, 1067
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Matter of Extradition of Russell, 789 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1986) (Aus-
tralian offense of conspiracy, which did not require an overt act, satisfied dual crimi-
nality); Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 850-51 (1st Cir. 1980) (rejecting strict
congruity of offenses); United States v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 1975).
"3 Some earlier cases had held that the law of the place of the hearing should be
determinative of the double criminality issue: Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 314-17
(1922); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 456 (1913); Currier v. Vice, 77 F.2d 130 (9th
Cir. 1935).
'7 See IA. SHEARER, EXTRADION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (1971).
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action to be extraditable under the no-list theory, the conduct
still must be a crime of sufficient gravity in both states. The no-
list method merely eliminates dependency on a specific and
quickly dated list of offenses. Its adoption does not alter the ba-
sic problem of determining what is criminal in the U.S. when
certain conduct is criminalized in some states of the Union and
not in others. On the other hand, the growing trend to allow
extradition when the conduct is "similar" or "analogous to"
crimes in the other state does "resolve" the government's prob-
lem by severely limiting the effect and value of the double
criminality principle as a protection at all. Mail and wire fraud'8"
and transportation offenses traditionally caused serious dual
criminality problems because there generally is no direct for-
eign counterpart'81 especially after recent broad construction in
U.S. courts, wherein no fraud is required, just mailing or wiring
a transmission that is in "furtherance of a scheme to defraud."'
RICO presents similar problems. 8 Recent United States extra-
dition treaties, such as that with Switzerland specifically address
some of these problems. Article 2 of the U.S.-Switzerland ex-
tradition treaty provides:
1. An offense shall be ... extraditable only if it is punishable under
the laws of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period
exceeding one year .... 2. For the purpose of this Article, it shall not
matter: (a) whether the laws of the Contracting Parties define the crimi-
nal act as the same offense; or (b) whether the offense is one for which
[U.S. federal law] requires proof of interstate transportation, or use of
the mails or of other facilities affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
0 18 USC. § 1341; 18 USC. § 1343 (1994).
"' Kester, Myths, supra note 127, at 1462. "Transportation offenses" are those acts
made criminal under federal law having as a necessary element, in addition to the
substantive elements of the particular offense (theft, prostitution, etc.), the transpor-
tation, transporting, or transfer across state or foreign borders of persons, articles, or
other items related to the offense. The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution
provides the authority for federal jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction must be estab-
lished in this or some other manner, or we would have a quagmire of competing ju-
risdiction. Furthermore, many of the "transportation offenses" tend to involve
organized crime, thus, making the funding, expertise, and larger investigative and
prosecutorial capabilities of the federal system even more important.
182 d.
... See, Christopher L. Blakesley, General Report: The Criminal Justice System Facing the
Challenge of Organized Crime, 69 REV. INT'L DE DR. PtN. 69, 82, et seq. (1999).
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such matters being merely for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction in
a United States federal court .
In United States v. Sensi,'F" in 1989, the defendant's double
criminality argument was rejected. The D.C. Circuit noted,
"[The defendant's] alleged offense was stealing; the significance
of his use of the mails and of interstate transportation and facili-
ties is jurisdictional only' in that it permits him to be prose-
cuted under federal law."'85 The jurisdictional language is
simply the trigger for federal jurisdiction of federal crimes par-
ticularly important for the federal government, either because
of the difficulty of state prosecution or the importance of the
type of crime or offender.' 7 On the other hand, sometimes in-
terstate transportation of stolen property or such like will not be
extraditable, where it is the transportation that is the gravamen
of the offense. If the foreign state does not have an equivalent
offense and sees this point, it will not be extraditable.
b) Special Application of the Double Criminality Provision
A specialized use of double criminality that generally works
to deny extradition, even when the offense on which the extra-
dition requested is based constitutes a crime in each state and is
listed in the treaty as extraditable, will be labeled the "special
use" of double criminality. Extradition will be denied when the
theory of jurisdiction maintained by the requesting state is not
accepted by the requested state. The Pinochet decision by the
House of Lords held that extradition would be proper, because
the jurisdictional theory for the extraterritorial criminal con-
duct was extant and consistent (regardin , torture, for example)
in both Spain and the United Kingdom.' The extant rule and
one problem it may present are illustrated by the well publicized
Switzerland-United States Extradition Treaty, supra note 174, at art. 2.
18 United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 893, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
u It. at 893, 894. See also, Ross v. U.S. Marshall of Oklahoma, 168 F.3d 1190, 1195
(10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1466 (11th Cir. 1988);
Emami v. United States, 834 F.2d 1444, 1450 (9th Cir. 1987); Extradition of Tan Yee
Chun, 674 F. Supp. 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (the jurisdictional trigger for a federal
crime did not bar crimes from being analogous to Hong Kong crimes so as to bar ex-
tradition.).
7 E.g., Herbage, 850 F.2d at 1463.




Abu Daoud case.'9 In 1974, the government of Israel formally
requested the French government to arrest Abu Daoud pursu-
ant to article 10 of the French-Israeli Extradition Convention '90
and to an arrest warrant issued by Israeli judicial authorities on
charges relating to the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre. The
Paris Court of Appeal decided, in camera, that the continued
provisional detention of Abu Daoud for extradition would not
be proper under French law and under the terms of the extradi-
tion treaty between France and Israel in effect at the time of the
alleged offense.' 91 The point of that decision was that Israel's
request, based on acts against Israeli nationals in Munich by
non-Israeli nationals, asserted the jurisdictional principle of
passive personality, 9 2 to which France did not adhere at the time
of the events in Munich. 93 Although France had promulgated a
law that approved the assertion of jurisdiction in such cases
three years subsequent to the events in Munich and eighteen
months prior to the Abu Daoud decision,'94 the Paris Court of
Appeal held that this law could not be applied retroactively.'9"
"9 Carbonneau, Terrorist Acts-Crimes or Political Infractions? An Appraisal of Recent
French Extradition Case, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv 265, 284, n.108 (1980); Note,
The Abu Daoud Affair, 11J. INT'L L. & ECON. 539 (1977). Although the court of appeal
considered the issue of Abu Daoud's provisional detention pursuant to requests from
both the former Federal Republic of Germany and Israel, only the latter relates to the
rule of double criminality.
,' Convention on Extradition, Nov. 12, 1958, France-Israel, 805 U.N.T.S. No. 251.
Note, The Abu Daoud Affair, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 539, 552 (1977).
9 The passive personality theory or basis ofjurisdiction is based on the nationality
of the victim. The nation whose national was injured or killed has jurisdiction to
prosecute the offense. For analysis of the principle's application in Europe and in
the U.S., see, Blakesley, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 131-137.
'93 The fugitive, Abu Daoud, was released before Israeli officials in France were
contacted. It was reported that Israel would have sought extradition for acts of terror-
ism allegedly committed by Abu Daoud in Israel, thus eliminating this double crimi-
nality problem. See Note, The Provisional Arrest and Subsequent Release of Abu Daoud by
French Authorities, 17 VA.J INT'L L. 495, 501 (1977).
'9' Act of July 11, 1975, Loi No. 75-624, J.O., July 13, 1975, at 7219 (Fr.), 1975
D.S.L. 259. This act amended article 689, of the French Code de Procidure Pinal to be-
come that article's paragraph 1 (discussed in Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in II
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURAL AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS at 33, 67, -
70 (Bassiounti, ed., 2d ed. 1998); BLAIELEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at ch. 3.
9' Note, Abu Daoud, supra note 193. Extradition treaties, of course, do not crimi-
nalize actions; they merely recognize offenses as being extraditable. Thus extradition
agreements generally are applied retroactively without violating the principle of nulla
poena sine lege or traditional protections against ex post facto laws. The US - French Sup-
plemnentary Convention contains a specific declaration of retroactively. U.S. - French
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The decision not to extradite when the requested state's law on
jurisdiction does not accept the jurisdictional theory asserted by
the requesting state seems to be standard in France,'" the
United States, and international extradition practice.' 97
E. NEBIS1NDEM, OR THE PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY IS VIRTUALLY MEANINGLESS IN EXTRADITION'"
The principle of ne bis in iden is broader than the United
States protection against double jeopardy.'99 Moreover, ne bis in
idem is based on the principle that prosecution is prohibited "for
the same 'facts,' and not only for the same or substantially the
same crimes arising out the same facts." "°
A defendant in the United States always faces the possibility
of successive prosecutions for conduct that forms part of the
same transaction. This has been held not to violate the double
jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution.!0' This is partly a func-
Supplementayy Convention to Extradition, art II, Feb. 12, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 407, T.I.A.S. No.
7075. This article was agreed to without discussion during the negotiations. For
background on retroactivity, see WHrmiAN, 6 DiGEsr OF INTERNATOAL LA%. 753
(1968).
' Cf Fornage Case, 84 J. du Palais 229 (1873) (reported in 2 J.B. MOORE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 261 (1906): "But the law cannot give to the French tribu-
nals the power to judge foreigners for crimes or misdemeanors committed outside of
the territory of France; that exorbitant jurisdiction, which would be founded neither
on the personal statute nor the territorial statue, would constitute a violation of in-
ternational law .... " Id.).
" Id. at 259-68 & nn.370-81 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1465 (11th Cir. 1989);
BLAiEsLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4.
'" See, e.g., Elcock v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 2d 70, 81, n. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION; UNIT=D STATES LA%v & PRAcncE 600-
601 (3rd ed. 1996).
See, e.g., GERiAN BASIc LAW (Grundgesetz), art. 103(3) (prohibiting multiple
prosecutions for the same "act"); Peter Wilkitzki, Defences, Exceptons and Exemptons rn
the Extradition Law and Practice and the Criminal Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany,
62 REV. INT'L DR. P N. 280 (1991); CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFvERFAHRENSRECHT 132, 356
(23d ed. 1993); MAUNZ-DURIG, GRUNDGE Z: KohmmENrAR, ART. 103(3) 13-16 (1993)
(noting that ne bis in idem inquires into whether the facts underlying the original
prosecution are the same, rather than whether the elements of the offense are the
same, as in a United States double jeopardy inquiry. This is discussed in ElcocJ4 80 F.
Supp. 2d at 81-82.
2" U.S. CONST., AI. V:"... nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . .." See e.g., Daniel Richman, Barganing
About Future Jeopardy, 49 Vand. L Rev. 1181, 1187 (1996); Elizabeth T. Lear, Contem-
plating the Successive Prosecution Phenomenon in the Federal Systen, 85 J. CRu1t. L &
CR MNOLOGY 625 (1995). Some of the United States do provide protection against
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tion of the United States Government's attempt to counter or-
ganized and complex crime, including, of course, narcotics traf-
ficking and money laundering. It goes beyond that, however.
The concept of "dual sovereignty," for double jeopardy pur-
poses in the United States provides that a prior state prosecu-
tion is no bar to a federal prosecution and vice-versa.' °2
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, the
"dual sovereignty rule" has been held to obtain in the interna-
tional extradition setting, as well.
03
The rules relating to what conduct will be barred from
prosecution on the basis of double jeopardy in the United States
further limits the protection afforded. The 1932 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Blockburger v. United States,0 4 created the so-
called Blockburger test, which provides that the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment will not protect a defendant
from subsequent prosecution, as long as "each offense [charged
in the trial or plea proceeding] contains an element not contained
in the other ... ,205 or "where the same act or transaction consti-
tutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to
be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of fact which the
other does not., 206 This test originated as a device to determine
congressional intent relating to cumulative sentencing but has
been applied in many other contexts. In 1993, the Supreme
Court reiterated this test and enshrined it as the exclusive ana-
lytical method for determining the validity of successive prose-
successive prosecutions beyond the federal Supreme Court limits. See Ronald J. Allen
and John P. Ratnaswamy, Heath v. Alabama: A Case Study of Doctrine and Rationality in
the Supreme Court, 76J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 801, 823-24 (1985); Lear, Contemplat-
ing, supra this note, at 665, n.175 (collecting state citations, including at least twenty-
three states that do this).
"2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw 145, n.82 (3d ed. 2000).
... See, e.g., United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United
States v. Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 826 (1st Cir. 1996) (trial in the Dutch Antilles did not
bar a U.S. trial); United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir.
1994) (Bahamas and U.S.); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th
Cir. 1984).
"' Blockburger v. United States, 284 US 299, 304 (1932).
20' United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 710 (1993) (reiterating and enshrining as
the sole test and exclusive analytical mode for successive prosecutions on the same
transaction) (noted in Richman, Bargaining supra note 201, at 1188); Blockburger, 284
U.S. at 304. 4
Id. at 304 (discussed inWAYNER. LAFAVE, CRImiNAL LAW 689 (3d ed. 2000)).
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cutions" 7 Thus, for illegal importation of narcotics aboard an
airplane, a defendant, convicted for that importation could be
convicted subsequently for unlawfully transporting the narcotics
into the United States and for possession of the same narcotics
aboard a plane without proper documentation. Thus, from this
single transaction, we have illegal importation of narcotics, un-
approved transport of narcotics, and undocumented transport
of the drugs. 8 It does not even make a difference when the
elements of a subsequently prosecuted offense seem to be fully
subsumed within those of a crime prosecuted before, something
that occurs frequently under RICO or CCE. :  In addition, sub-
sequent prosecution is possible, even if otherwise barred, if the
action is brought by a "separate sovereign. "°2IO
F. THE PRINCIPLE OF SPECIALITYAS AN EXAMPLE OF U.S. FAILURE
TO MEET HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS IN EXTRADITION2"
While the principle of double criminality requires a corre-
spondence between a fugitive's alleged acts and the laws of the
requested and requesting countries, the doctrine of speciality
requires a correspondence between the charges contained in
207 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304; Dixon, 509 U.S. at 710.
2"" United States v. Flores-Peraza, 58 F.3d 164, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Franchi-Forlando, 838 F.2d 585, 589-91 (1st Cir.1988). See also, Knapp v. Leonardo,
46 F.3d 170, 178 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that the double jeopardy clause-and Blad:-
burger-were not violated even when defendant was acquitted on intentional murder
charges, but subsequently tried and convicted of reckless murder).
' Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984);
CCE, Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1998); see also,
Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1998) (discussed m Blakesley,
Rapport General Les Syst ms dejustice Criminele Face au Difi du Crime Organtzle: Topic 1I,
La Partie Sp&ciale, 69 REv. INT'L DE DR. PfN. 35 (1999) (English version at 69, Spanish
version at 101); Dorean Koenig, The CriminaLJustice Systen Faring the Challenge of Organ-
ized Crime: U.S. Report. Topic , 44 W, ANE ST. L REV. 1351 (1998); PeterJ. Henning,
Same Title, U.S. Report, Topic I (General Part), 44 WAYNE ST. L REV. 1305 (1998); Bruce
Zagaris, U.S. International Cooperation Against Transnational Organized Crane US Report,
Topic 1, 44 WAYNE ST. L. REV. 1400 (1998); Richman, Bargaining, supra note 205, at
1189; Lear, Contemplating supra note 205, at 629; and Note, Conscrutwe Sentences rn Stn-
gte Prosecutions: Judicial Multiplication of Statutory Penalties, 67 YALE L.J. 916, 928 n.43
(1958) (noting egregious circumstances relating to narcotics trafficking).
21 See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 US 82, 88 (1985) (holding that even each state
of the United States is a separate sovereign for purposes of double jeopardy, proscrib-
ing conduct as criminal and determining punishment, as long as the state conforms
to minimum constitutional standards. It held that a state and a municipality ithin
that state may not prosecute for the same criminal act.)
21 See, e.g., United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1465 (11 th Cir. 1989).
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the indictment and the facts presented to the extraditing
judge.2 2  The universal principle of speciality requires that a
person not be prosecuted or be re-extradited to a third state for
any offense other than that for which he was extradited.2 1 '3  A
typical, traditional statement of the rule of speciality reads:
No person surrendered by either [party] to the other shall be triable or
be punished for any crime or offense committed prior to his extradition,
other than the offense for which he was delivered up, nor shall such per-
son be arrested or detained on civil process for a cause accrued before
extradition, unless he has been at liberty for one month after having
been tried, to leave the country, or, in the case of conviction, for one
month after having suffered his punishment or having been pardoned."'
Article 19 of the 1997 Treaty of Extradition between the
U.S. and France, currently before the Senate for its advice and
consent, reads:
1. A person extradited under this Treaty shall not be detained, tried,
convicted, punished, or subjected to any restriction of his freedom in the
territory of the Requesting State for any act prior to the person's surren-
der, other than the offense for which extradition has been granted, ex-
cept in the following cases:
212 United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 894-95 (D.C. Cir. 1989 ). An example of
the rule is presented in the article XII of The Treaty of Extradition Between the U.S.
and the U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227, 233: "A person extradited shall not be detained or pro-
ceeded against in the territory of the requesting Party for any offense other than an
extraditable offense established by the facts in respect of which his extradition has
been granted ...."
"' The law of most nations provides for the principle of speciality even in the ab-
sence of a treaty stipulation requiring it. See, United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 404
(1886) and its progeny; including United States v. Monsalve, 173 F.3d 847 (2d Cir.
1999), United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 115 (1st Cir.1997) (re-extradition
to third state), Sensi, 879 F.2d, at 894-95. I agree with Professor Shearer that the term
"speciality" is preferable to the more often used "specialty," because it approximates
more closely the French term specialiti which was the original term used for the prin-
ciple. For additional general discussions of the subject, see HSU, Du Principe de la spe-
cialii en Matire d'extradition (1950); I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
146-47, 237-38, 242-43 (1971). There are many cases in which the principle of speci-
ality is pivotal. See, e.g., Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 407; Fiocconi v. Att'y Gen. Of U.S., 339 F.
Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Ditommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir.
1987); United States v. Molina-Chacon, 627 F. Supp. 1253 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); United
States v. Vreeken, 603 F. Supp. 715 (D. Utah 1984).
2" 1909 Extradition Treaty between France and the United States, Jan. 6, 1909, art.
7, 37 Stat. 1526, 1531, 791 U.N.T.S. 237.
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(a) when the Requested State has given its consenL A request for such
purpose may be submitted, together with the documents listed in Article
10, and any statements made by the person extradited concerning the
offense for which any statements made by the person extradited con-
cerning the offense for which the consent of the Requested State is re-
quested;
or
(b) when, having had the opportunity to do so, the person extradited
did not leave the territory of the Requesting State within 30 days of his
final release, or returned to the territory of the Requesting State after
having left it.
2. If the denomination of the offense for which a person has been ex-
tradited is altered during the proceedings under the laws of the Request-
ing State or such a person is charged with a differently denominated
offense, the person shall be prosecuted or sentenced provided the of-
fense under its new legal description is:
(a) based on the same set of facts contained in the extradition request
and its supporting documents; and
(b) punishable by the same maximum penalty as, or lesser maximum
penalty than, the offense for which he was extradited.2*
It is clear from this treaty language, which represents the
current and traditional U.S. position, that the U.S. Departments
of State and Justice will generally be favorable to allowing prose-
cution of an individual for crimes other than those for which he
was extradited if the requested state does not object! In addi-
tion, the material elements of an offense, not its denomination,
determine the crimes for which a person may be prosecuted af-
216ter extradition. The United States' position is that the deter-
mination of what is and is not within the doctrine of speciality
should be based on United States law, while taking into consid-
eration the law of the foreign state.2" The tendency seems to be
to interpret treaty terms, such as "offenses independent from,"
2" Treaty of Extradition Between the United States and France, signed at Paris,
April 23, 1996, presented to the Senate, July 9, 1997, art. 19. This Treaty has not re-
ceived the Senate's Advice and Consent at this writing.
2 6 United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 894-95 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
217 United States v. Garcia, No. 97-3222, 2000 WL 363183 at * l-2 (11 th Cir. 2000).
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in a manner that will be deemed not to violate the doctrine of
speciality; i.e., to allow prosecution as expansively as possible.2 8
1. Application of the Doctrine of Speciality
a) Effect if Violated
If a tribunal finds the doctrine of speciality to have been vio-
lated, the fugitive must be released from custody and allowed to
leave the country, before he may be tried for offenses for which
he was not extradited. If the fugitive does not leave after having
been given notice and adequate time to do so, he may be prose-
cuted.
b) Personal Rights Created? Standing?
Do treaties on international cooperation in criminal mat-
ters, including extradition treaties, create domestically enforce-
able rights in individuals? The traditional answer to the
question is no, although this is a matter of debate. Even though
these treaties are self-executing, only states are considered sub-
jects of international law; so only they have had rights, obliga-
tions, and interests.21 9 Thus, under this view, if a treaty provides
some protection to the individual subject to extradition, the
right to assert this protection or protest a violation is that of the
extraditing state, not the individual himself. Thus, traditionally,
most of the "protections" found in extradition treaties and
other instruments of international cooperation in criminal mat-
ters have been read by U.S. courts to provide "standing" only to
governments.
On the other hand, there has developed a split among the
Circuits over whether a returned fugitive has standing to raise a
violation of the rule of speciality. The classic Supreme Court
decision on standing and the rule of speciality is United States v.
Rauscher.210 Rauscher held that a court cannot refuse to apply a
speciality provision even if it does not explicitly confer the right
to the defendant himself; to so refuse would create "an implica-
tion of fraud upon the rights of the party extradited, and of bad
218 See, e.g., United States v. LeBaron, 156 F.3d 621, 627 (5th Cir. 1998), United
States v. Lazarevich, 147 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1998).
21 See, gen., OLIVER, ETAL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 161, chs. 2, 10,
and 11.
2" Rauscher, 119 U.S 407.
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faith to the country which permitted his extradition."22' Moreo-
ver, Supreme Court dictum in the 1992 Alvarez-Machain deci-
sion2 reinforced the impression that the accused, returned
fugitive should be able to object to prosecution on different
charges, as articulated in Rauscher, at least when the extraditing
country protests.
By the same token, however, it is clear that if the extraditing
state consents to the prosecution, the returned fugitive, except
perhaps in the Tenth Circuit,23 will have no chance to raise the
issue of the violation of his interests. Even if the requested state
simply does not formally protest, some circuits hold that the de-
fendant has no standing to raise the issue. Despite the language
in Rauscher, the rule of speciality has been read by several cir-
cuits to be "[assertable] only by the extraditing state. "22 The
federal circuits are split on whether an individual has standing
to raise it.2
2' Id. at 422.; cf., United States v. Biilman, No. 94-5526, 1996 WL 267329, at *2, n.5
(4th Cir. 1996); United States ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1934).
222 United States v. Alvarez Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659-60 (1992) (providing that if
the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty were applicable, defendant would have standing
to raise rights and protections under it).
United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328, n.1 (10th Cir.1990) (returned fugitive
has standing to object to prosecution).
2" The principle of speciality requires that a person not be prosecuted for any of-
fense other than that for which he was extradited, or be re-extradited to a third state.
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 and its progeny. The remedy is that the fugi-
tive must be released and allowed to leave. See, e.g., In re Dilasser, 9 I.LR. 377 (Cour
de Cassation 1952). Cases holding defendant not to have standing to raise the princi-
ple include United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir. 1989). But see,
Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1989) ("an extradited fugitive may
raise whatever objections... that [the surrendering state] may have").
2" See gen., BL.KELxE, T RORISM, supra note 4 , at 250; Note. Internatinal Extradi-
tion, the Principle of Specialty, and Effective Treat" Enforcement, 76 MINN. L REV. 1017,
1029-30, n. 56 (1992); MitchellJ. Matorin, Undianung the Law: The Legality of Extraterm-
torial Abduction in Lieu of Extradition, 41 DUKE LJ. 907, 924, n. 83 (1992). Compare
United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 243, 243 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (denying
petition for rehearing, stating that only a nation-party to a treaty may complain of a
breach of the treaty); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 (6th Cir. 1985) (not-
ing that, "[tihe right to insist on application of the principle of speciality belongs to
the requested state, not to the individual whose extradition is requested . . ."); Sha-
piro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir. 1973) ("the principle of specialty has
been viewed as a privilege of the asylum state ... rather than a right accruing to the
accused..."); with United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721 (11th Cir. 1989) ("(t]he
extradited individual.., can raise only those objections to the extradition process
that the surrendering country might consider a breach of the extradition treaty .. .);
United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1426 (9th Cir. 1988); Leighnor v. Turner, 884
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The term "standing" to raise an objection is not well-used
in this context. It really is more related to whether the speciality
principle is considered "self-executing." If it is "self-executing,"
a returned fugitive may object without protest from the extradit-
ing country. If it is not self-executing, the defendant is de-
pendent -on the extraditing state's protest.226  The circuits
holding that the returned fugitive does not have standing in-
clude the First, 27 Third, 228 Fifth,2 2 Sixth,30 Seventh,23 ' and often
the Second232 and D.C. Circuits.233 On the other hand, if the na-
tion that extradited the fugitive protests, all of these circuits al-
low the defendant to object to the prosecution. He is again
entirely dependent on the requested state's protest.23 The Sec-
ond and Fifth Circuits have held that it will be assumed that no
protest will be forthcoming from the sending state, when the
prosecution is for charges "not totally unrelated" or "of the
same character" as those for which defendant was extradited.235
Those courts providing that the fugitive has standing under
some circumstances include the Second, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth
F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1989) (The notion that the accused has no standing to chal-
lenge a violation of an extradition treaty is "without merit." "[A] n extradited individ-
ual may raise whatever objections to his prosecution that [the surrendering country]
might have."); United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir. 1987).
2'Jacques Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the Federal Courts: Making Sense of
United States v. Rauscher, 34 VA.J. INT'L L. 71, 138-140 (1993).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981).
2' United States ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.3d 165, 168 (3rd Cir. 1997).
22 United States v. Kaufman 874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
2"30 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that, "[t]he
right to insist on application of the principle of speciality belongs to the requested
state, not to the individual whose extradition is requested ...."), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1956).
" Matta-Ballestteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990).
22 See, e.g., Cabrera v. Warden, 629 F. Supp 699, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); United States
v. Molina-Chacon, 627 F. Supp. 1253, 1264 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Courts have recognized
that the doctrine is a privilege of the asylum state, not the individual right of one ac-
cused.").
2" Kaiser v. Rutherford, 827 F. Supp. 832, 835 (D. D.C. 1993) ("'the rule of specialty
is not a right of the accused but is a privilege of the asylum state' and therefore [de-
fendant] has no standing to raise this issue.").
"' Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty, supra note 227.
23 Id. at 138 (citingFiocconi v. Atty. Gen of U.S., 462 F.2d 475, 481 (2d Cir. 1972)
(refers to French-U.S. treaty as conferring the right, only if requested nation "for-
mally protested" when it is for an offense "of the same character."); United States v.
Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir.1962) (only when not "totally unrelated").
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and Eleventh Circuits.2 Most of these decisions consider the
defendant's right to be strictly derivative. s  The sending state
may nullify any defendant's attempt to raise an issue by consent-
ing to the additional charges being prosecuted. 2 1 A few circuits
hold that a defendant has standing to raise what might have
been raised by the asylum state.2 9 Some circuits have held that
the proper view is to consider the rule of speciality to be prima
facie self-executing; a defendant's rights under the rule may
only be overridden by express consent of the extraditing na-
240tion.
The Tenth Circuit holds that the defendant has standing to
assert violations under an extradition treaty, whether or not the
requested state protests.24' The Fifth Circuit is undecided on the
issue.242 Overall, there is no doubt that danger exists that a re-
turned fugitive may be prosecuted in several circuits for addi-
2'6 See, e.g., United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995) (defen-
dant may raise rights under treaty, but only if treaty allows sending state to do so);
United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328, n.1 (10th Cir. 1990) (extradited person has
standing to claim a violation of the rule of speciality); United States v. Diwan, 864
F.2d 715, 721 (11th Cir. 1989) (individual has standing to allege any violation that the
extraditing state might consider a breach); United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146,
151 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.) (per cu-
riam); United States v. Khan,. 993 F.2d 1368, 1373-75 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Marconi, 899 F. Supp. 458, 463 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("[s]pecialty is based on interna-
tional comity, and therefore 'exists only to the extent that the surrendering state
wishes.'")
237 See, e.g., Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385. 389 (8th Cir. 1989);JohnJ. Barrett
HI, Note, The Doctrine of Specially: A Traditional Approad to the Issue of Standing 29 CAsE
W. RE. J. INT'L L 299, 302, & nn.17-19 (1997);Jacques Semmelman, Doctrine of Spe-
cialty, supra note 227, at 138.
2" Semmelman, Doctrine of Specialty, supra note 226, at 138; Barrett, Note, Specialty:
A Traditional Approach, supra note 237, at 302.
29 See, e.g., United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Marconi, 899 F. Supp. 458, 463 (C.D. Cal. 1995); United States v. Cue%-as, 847
F.2d 1417, 1426-27, n.23 (9th Cir. 1988) (defendant can raise the rule of speciality
claims "which might have been raised by the asylum state").
2o Semmelman, Doctrine of Speciality, supra note 226, at 138 (cztmg former position
in the 2nd Circuit: United States v. Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1934)).
241 Levy, 905 F.3d at 328, n.2; Barrett, Note, Specialty, note 237, at 302.
212 United States v. LeBaron, 156 F.3d 621, 627 (5th Cir. 1998) (whether a defen-
dant has standing to raise the doctrine of speciality is undecided in the 5th Circuit);
United States v. Kaufman, 858 F2d. 994, 1009, n.5 (5th. Cir. 1988) (declining to ad-
dress the standing issue); United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 205, n.3 (1st Cir. 1998)
("We do not suggest that defendant cannot raise the issue of specialty. The govern-
ment has not raised the issue of standing and we do not reach it. We only note that
the doctrine does not extend any independent protection to the defendant").
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tional offenses to those for which he was extradited.243 A trend
is developing to allow the defendant standing to raise issues re-
lated to specialty, at least under one of the above-noted circum-
stances. The danger to the protective value of the rule of
speciality rests as much in judicial interpretation of the term
"same offense" as in the issue of standing to raise the issue. This
is manifest in United States v. Kaufman, where the Fifth Circuit
held, similarly to the Second Circuit, that so long as the offenses
prosecuted after extradition are "of the same character" or not
"totally unrelated" to the offenses for which defendant was ex-
tradited, the defendant is not allowed to object unless the ex-
traditing nation has formally objected.245 The Fifth Circuit stated
the following when it denied rehearing: "only an offended na-
tion can complain about the purported violation of an extradi-
tion treaty .. ,246 In the prior judgment on the merits of the
case, the Kaufman court held: ".... viewed in the light of the un-
derlying purpose of the Rauscher rule, the trial of the extraditees
for a separate but similar offense in another jurisdiction would
not be an act of bad faith against the requested country such as
would constitute a violation of the rule of specialty." If an ex-
traditing country protests the receiving state's prosecution of
charges different from those for which the accused was extra-
dited, all circuits would be hard put not to follow the rule.
The overall weakness of the speciality protection, however,
is predominant. The accused fugitive may be prosecuted inap-
propriately, first because the extraditing nation may fail to pro-
test, and second because the term "different charges" is usually
read in a manner significantly favorable to allowing prosecution
for additional offenses. For, example, in Kaufman, the Fifth
Circuit held, trying to distinguish Rauscher
213 See, e.g, United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962) (allowing prosecution for receipt and con-
cealment of heroin, even though the extradition was only for trafficking);J. Soma, T.
Muther, & H. Brissette, Transnational Extradition for Computer Crimes: Are New Treaties
and Laws Needed , 34 HARV.J. ON LEGiS. 317, 328, n.61 (1997).
244 See supra, notes 223-248 and accompanying text.
.4 United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994, 1007-09 (5th Cir. 1988). See also Kaiser
v. Rutherford, 827 F. Supp. 832, 835 (D. D.C.1993) ("the rule of specialty is not a
right of the accused but ... a privilege of the asylum state and therefore [defendant]
has no standing to raise the issue").
2"6 Kaufman, 874 F.2d at 243.
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Just as correcting a technical variance in the indictment should not be
considered as charging 'a separate offense' for purposes of the rule of
specialty, [U.S. v. Proustian, 299 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir.1962)], neither
should a separate indictment for a crime of the same character as the crime for
which the extraditees were initially extradited.... (emphasis added)247 .. . Thus
viewed, in light of the underlying purposes of the Rauscher rule, the trial
of the extraditees for a separate but similar offense in anotherjurisdic-
tion would not be an act of bad faith against the requested country such
as would constitute a violation of the rule of specialty. . 2,
Some of the language in Kaufnan makes it appear that even
if the extraditing country protested prosecuting the extraditee
on offenses other than those for which he was extradited, if
these offenses were "of a similar nature" or "of the same charac-
ter," even a protest by the extraditing nation would be to no
avail.
249
The essential point is that judicial analysis of the rule of
speciality has been inconsistent, perfunctory, even incoherent.2 0
Finally, for any fugitive to be protected a right must be incorpo-
rated into U.S. law by self-executing treaty, by legislation, or the
Constitution itself.25t . Recall that the rule of speciality will not
bar prosecution of the returned fugitive for any extraditable of-
fense established by the facts of the extradition documentation,
even though the denomination of the offense may not be within
the extradition request.
2
2. Scope of the Doctrine of Speciality
a) Parole or Probation
The rule of speciality has been held not to bar a parole
board from considering pre-extradition charges, for which the
accused had not been extradited, to increase the parole guide-
217 KaufMan, 858 F.2d at 1008.
24 Id.219 Id. at 1008-1009.
25 See Note, International Extradition, the Princaple of Specnalhy, and Effedtwe Treaty En-
forcement, 76 MINN. L REv. 1017,1031 (1992).
2' See infra discussion on the Incorporation Doctrine and Self-Executing Treaties.
" See, Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); Br)ant v. United States, 167 U.S. 104
(1897); 4J. MooRE, DIGEsT oF INTERNATIONAL LAW 316 (1906). The law of most na-
tions provides for the principle of speciality even in the absence of a treaty stipulation
requiring it, as in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
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line range.- 3 It has been held not to apply to probation revoca-
tion or to an imposition of a four-year concurrent sentence for
a probation violation2 4
b) Procedural or Evidentiary Rules
The rule of speciality has been held not to apply to the evi-
dentiary or procedural rules applicable in a United States trial. 25
For example, it was even held that in the face of an extradition
order from the extraditing country that forbade prosecution for
aiding and abetting or conspiracy in a drug case, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. section 2, the rule of speciality did not preclude an in-
struction to the jury on the theory of vicarious liability, as ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in Pinkerton v. United States.255
c) Sentencing
The doctrine of speciality has been held not to apply to sen-
tencing z7 The scope of proof relating to other offenses that
may be considered in the sentencing hearing, may not be lim-
ited by the extraditing nation.28 In United States v. Lazarevich, for
example, the Ninth Circuit held that enhancement of the de-
fendant's sentence upon evidence of offenses for which he was
not extradited did not violate the rule of speciality.5 9 In Lazare-
vich, the evidence used to enhance the defendant's sentence re-
lated to child abduction, for which the Dutch Government had
expressly refused to extradite. Defendant was convicted for
making a false statement on the child's passport application.
Even though the false statements were found to have been
made to facilitate the abduction, use of the evidence of abduc-
tion to enhance the sentence was held not to violate the rule of
2" Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385, 390 (8th Cir. 1989).
2' United States v. Lazerman, No. 98-50339 U.S. App. LEXIS 17837 (9th Cir.
1999).
2" United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 1413-14 (11th Cir. 1989) (evi-
dence of money laundering, for which extradition was specifically refused, could be
used to prove a drug conspiracy, for which extradition was granted); United States v.
Gallo-Chamorro, 233 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11 ' Cir. 2000).
' United States v. Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d 502 (11th Cir. 1995); Gallo-Chaoarro,
233 F.3d at 1304. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
257 United States v. Garcia, No. 97-3222, 2000 WL 363183, at *1-2 (11 th Cir. 2000).
2" Id. at *2-3.
2'9 United States v. Lazarevich, 147 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1998).
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speciality.260 The Ninth Circuit cited the 1995 Supreme Court
decision Witte v. United States to the effect that "use of evidence
of related criminal conduct to enhance a defendant's sentence
for a separate crime ...does not constitute punishment."2f"
The Lazarevich decision followed the Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Watts,262 which had overturned two Ninth Circuit
decisions holding that a sentencing court could not consider
underlying charges upon which defendant had been acquit-
ted.26 Thus, it has been unavailing to argue that no "'technical
gloss from the [Sentencing Guideline's] principle of relevant
conduct' should overcome the plain meaning of 'punish-
ment."'
264
In United States v. Keeseej a sentencing judge considered for
sentencing purposes conduct other than that for which defen-
dant had been extradited from Germany. The Ninth Circuit
held that this did not violate the rule of speciality in the U.S.-
Germany Extradition Treaty. A person is not "punished" for
non-charged conduct simply because the court considers that
conduct at sentencing.2r Other federal circuits have done the
same in the extradition context.27 This logic is strained when
the sentence may be and often is enhanced on the basis of such
conduct considered by the judge. Nevertheless, it is the reality
of sentencing and the rule of speciality in the United States.
3. Speciality and "Waiver" of Extradition
Some U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal have held that the prin-
ciple of speciality has no application for cases where the fugitive
has "waived" extradition (i.e., has agreed to be returned without
formally being extradited) or to cases of deportation.? On the
m Id.
261 Id.
2 United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
m Id.
Lazarevich, 147 F.3d at 1064.
2" United States v. Keesee, No. 96-50388, U.S. App. LEXIS 16366 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id.; McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
m See, e.g., United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
Davis, 94F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1992); Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1989).
m United States v. Ditommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1987) ("subsequent de-
cisions have narrowly construed the doctrine of speciality by limiting Rauscie's hold-
ing to cases involving a formal extradition"); United States v. Molina-Chacon, 627 F.
Supp. 1253 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (where defendant waived extradition and %as deported
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other hand, where the fugitive was handed over as a matter of
comity, rather than pursuant to a treaty, some Circuits have held
that the rule of speciality obtains.269 Also, the rule of speciality,
even if otherwise applicable, will not make any difference in the
sentencing context. As noted above, even in cases of extradition
pursuant to treaty, decisions in many Circuits permit prosecu-
tion for offenses other than those for which extradition was
granted if the assent of the requested state is obtained. Once
new information is obtained, sometimes a new extradition re-
quest, including the new evidence, is made of the requested
state, even though the fugitive has already been rendered.270
In sum, when a fugitive has been extradited to the United
States, treaty language should not only be interpreted on the
basis of the relevant extradition treaty, but also on the basis of
the judgment to extradite and the surrender document. If the
surrendering nation has forbidden prosecution for certain of-
fenses or simply not extradited for certain offenses, this ap-
proach makes it clear on the basis of sovereignty and
international law that the requested state may insist that the
U.S. Government follow the rendering state's conditions and
limitations. This is true pursuant to general international law,
including treaty law, custom, and general principles.27' To
prosecute anyway violates all of these principles. Neve.rtheless,
such practice occurs.272
instead, speciality does not apply); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir.,
1980). Dep't of State of Am. Embassy, Ottawa, telegram, Oct. 16, 1962, MS Dep't
State file 242.1115, Surratt, Lonnie Rayvon/9-2562, (cited in WHrrMAN, 6 DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1107 (1968); Letter from Assistant Legal Adviser Whiteman to Theo-
dore C. Brown, Office of Attorney General of N.C., Nov. 5, 1962, MS Dep't State file
242.1115, Surratt, Lonnie Rayvon/10-2462, (cited in WHmMAN, DIGEST, supra note
269, at 1106).
2" United States v. Evans, 667 F. Supp. 974, 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("... this case ap-
propriately falls among that class of cases in this Circuit holding the specialty doctrinc
applicable when extradition is obtained through acts of comity by the surrendering
government instead of by treaty.").
2 0 Fioccini v. Att'y General, 462 U.S. F2d 475 (2d Cir. 1972).
27' See, e.g., United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1571-1572 (11th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328, n.1 (10th Cir. 1990). See gen. BLARESELY,
TERRORISM, supra note 4 ch. 3.
2 See, e.g., United States v. LeBaron, 156 F.3d 621, 627 (5th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
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V. HUMAN RIGHTS BARS TO EXTRADITION
A. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEATH PENALTY
"If I can prove that this punishment is neither useful nor
necessary, I will have furthered the cause of humanity." Cesare
Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene (1764).
Most "developed" countries have abolished the death pen-
alty, considering it to be a cruel, absurd form of vengeful retri-
bution. The United States, on the other hand, continues to
expand the numbers of those sitting on death row (already in
the several hundreds), where they sit for decades awaiting their
execution. The United States is alone among the G7 nations to
continue this, for which it has been criticized by Amnesty Inter-
national, among many other groups. On this point, the U.S. is
in the company of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Iran, Iraq, the
People's Republic of China, Korea and few other rogue states.
Several European nations and the European Union itself
have protested the United States' use of the death penalty. For
example, the European Union announced that it is going to
submit a resolution to the Human Rights Commission calling
for an end to capital punishment. It does not mention the
United States by name, but clearly the report is strong criti-
cism. 273 Also, the French have been fully aware of the execution
of American Betty Lou Beets, among others. Several articles in
France have brought attention to her execution and that of
Odell Barnes, also of Texas, for example.24 The French news
media have asserted that Barnes may have been framed, and
French politicians are getting great political mileage from it.
For example, a French mayoral candidate notoriously traveled
to Texas to visit with Barnes.275 Political grandstanding notwith-
standing, the criticism strikes a chord, as several U.S. states are
facing embarrassing police corruption scandals, and are being
forced to release scores of innocent prisoners from death row






and hundreds from long prison terms, due to planted evidence,
trumped-up charges, and other abuses 76
An increased emphasis on protecting individual rights cre-
277ates impediments to extradition. Another very important
human right protection that impacts extradition is the rule that
individuals not be subjected to torture, to cruel, degrading, or
unusual punishment. Also, the right to life has been recognized
as a basic human right.278 It could be argued that the right to
life includes the right not to have that life terminated as pun-
ishment for crime.27 This section will consider issues relating to
the death penalty, extradition, and human rights.
European opposition to the death penalty has led to a rule
prohibiting extradition to death penalty nations, unless agree-
ments are reached that the death penalty will not be sought or
imposed. The European position has had an impact on U.S.
practice. The landmark Soering case, decided by the European
Court of Human Rights, 20 caused much discussion in Europe
and America and has had a significant impact.2 ' The decision
noted the difficult tension between law enforcement interests
and the protection of human rights, discussed in our introduc-
tion. The European Court stated:
[I]nherent in the whole of the [European] Convention [on Human
Rights] is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general
2" Matt Lait, Scott Glover, & Tina Daunt, Scandal Could Taint Hundreds of Conic-
tions, LA. Times, Feb. 17, 2000, at Al.
2" C. Van Den Wyngaert, Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extra-
dition: Opening Pandora's Box?, 39 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 757 (1990).
7 For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217A, U.N.
Doc. A/810, at Art. 3 (1948), and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR],
999 U.N.T.S. (1976), begin their listing of individual human rights with the right to
life. Article 6 of the ICCPR and the Human Rights Committee's General Comment 6,
expand upon the right to life. See Universal Declaration, at art. 3; ICCPR, at art. 6;
and Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6, U.N. Doc HRI/GEN/l, at 5.
Discussed inHENUN, ETAL., HUMAN RIGHTs 886, etseq. (1999).
' See HEN KN, ET AL. HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 279, at 886-922. See also, David
Rieff, The Killing Fields, LA. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2000, at Book Review 1.
*' Soering v. United Kingdom,161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1989) (reprinted in, 11
EUR. HUM. RTS. REP. 439 (1989)); Breitenmoser & Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition:
The Soering Case, 11 MICH.J. INT'LL. 845 (1990).
'"' Van Den Wyngaert, Applying the European Convention, supra note 278; Malvina
Halberstam, The Constitutional Authority of the Federal Government in State Criminal Pro-
ceedings that Involve U.S. Treaty Obligations or Affect U.S. Foreign Relations, 10 IND. INT'L &
CoMp. L. REv. 1 (1999); Breitenmoser & Wilms, Human Rights, supra note 281.
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interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the
individual's fundamental rights. As movement about the world becomes
easier and crime takes on a larger international dimension, it is increas-
ingly in the interests of all nations that suspected offenders who flee
abroad should be brought to justice. Conversely, the establishment of
safe havens for fugitives would not only result in danger for the State
obliged to harbour the protected person but also tend to undermine the
foundations of extradition. These considerations must also be included
among the factors to be taken into account in the interpretation and
application of the notions of inhuman and degrading treatment or pun-
ishment in extradition cases.2"&
1. The Soering Facts
The Commonwealth of Virginia charged Jens Soering with
murdering his girlfriend's parents. He was found and arrested
in England, pursuant to a U.S. extradition request. The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, in its judgment issued July 7,
1989, held that extradition to the United States would constitute
"inhuman treatment" in violation of Article 3 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms,us because he may be sentenced to death and
have to face the "death row phenomenon," i.e., languishing on
death row for years.2 4 The most important feature of the deci-
sion is that a requested state, as a party to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, is responsible for what happens to
the person they extradite. The responsibility results from the
obligations under the Convention, which must be interpreted in
a manner that promotes the protection of the individual; where
Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling; supra note 6, at 187. The Dugard and
Van den Wyngaert thesis is that analysis and clearer knowledge about this tension and
a coherent theory of the role of human rights in the extradition arena serves the in-
terests of both the individual, the international criminal law enforcement community,
and the various states. Id. at 188.
2s The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Article 3 reads: "No one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
8 The Court did not consider the dilemma it would face if courts in the United
States were to decide that the death penalty would be imposed quickly. The Court
did reject the argument that the long delay on death row is caused by the accused
himself, due to all the appeals taken: "[n]evertheless, just as some lapse of time be-
tween sentence and execution is inevitable if appeal safeguards are to be provided to
the condemned person, so it is equally part of human nature that the person will
cling to life by exploiting those safeguards to the full." Soering v. United Kingdom,
161 Eur. Ct. H.R., at para. 106.
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ambiguity exists, it must be read so as to promote human rights,
rather than some other value. The European Court did point
out that not every right, under the Convention would necessar-
ily bar extradition. It decided that Article 3 would bar extradi-
tion, but left open the issue of whether other protections, such
as the "fair trial" guarantees of Article 6, would also be a bar.8
Soering was eventually extradited to Virginia, after a prom-
ise was obtained from the Virginia Attorney General that the
death penalty would not be sought. United States prosecutorial
authorities, in reaction, are finding ways to accommodate na-
tions that insist on a promise that a capital sentence will not be
imposed. I have advised prosecutors who have warrants out-
standing for fugitives alleged to have committed murder about
how best to word a document to be signed by the governor of
their state or any other appropriate official that will satisfy a
European government to which the fugitive has fled. The Jus-
tice and State Departments insist that state officials prove that
the document is signed by the official holding the authority to
bind the state to the commitment. Thus, the European decision
in Soering is having an impact on U.S. domestic criminal proce-
dure at a very basic level.
The Soeringjudgment also had a direct impact on the inter-
pretation of national law in Europe. For example, the German
Federal Constitutional Court held that, in interpreting the
German Basic Law, the contents and development of the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights must be affirmed. This
means that the German Constitutional Court considers the
practice of the European Court of Human Rights to be a per-
suasive source of law. It serves as an essential means of inter-
preting the contents of the German Basic Rights. 86
285 Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are binding on the parties to
the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court has applied article
three to other cases, including Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831,
23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1996) (where it was applied to a Sikh militant who was sus-
pected by India of terrorism and would have faced danger of serious ill-treatment if
returned to India); Ahmed v. Austria, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 2195, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep.
278 (1996) (fugitive would face danger of execution or mistreatment by another clan,
if returned); D. v. United Kingdom, 1997- III Eur. Ct. H.R. 777, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 423
(1997) (fugitive dying of AIDS would face degrading treatment if returned to St.
Kitts). But see, Kindler v. Canada, UN. Doc. CCPR/48/D/470/1991 (1993); Ng. v.
Canada, U.N. Doc. A/49/40, vol.II, at 189 (1993). These cases and others are dis-
cussed in HENKIN, ETAL., HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 279, at 912-914.
28 See 74 Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, 358, 370 (1987).
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Thus, the Soeringjudgment strengthened the trend in Ger-
many to promote human rights by broadening the scope of
human rights deemed to be reposited within the German Basic
Law. Human rights norms are incorporated by reference. In
the past, the dominant argument had been that only those Basic
Rights under Article 16, namely the constitutional obligation
not to extradite nationals and the right of asylum, could be legal
obstacles to extradition.287 The recent trend, strengthened by
Soering; is that the Basic Law (and all its individual rights) is to
be interpreted expansively to be a bar to extradition." The
question now is not whether Basic Rights have any function at
all in extradition, but how broad or how narrow will be the
range of Basic Human Rights protections in extradition. In-
deed, Article 25, Sentence 2, of the German Basic Law includes
customary international law.m This trend in Germany is also
occurring in other European nations.2
Some of the human rights that may be considered to be of a
constitutional nature, sufficient to require refusal to extradite,
may include: the death penalty prohibition; the prohibition
against torture; inhuman treatment or punishment ' the pro-
tection against prosecution or aggravation of the accused's cir-
cumstances based on race, religion, nationality, political
opinion;2 the right to a fair trial;23 possibly even the risk of be-
ing sentenced to life imprisonment, without possibility of pa-
role;2 and even when there is danger to the fugitive's health,
family life or even privacy.25 Sometimes these and other protec-
See H. Gruetzner, P.G. Poetz, Internationaler Redatshifevediehr, in Sm scHEN § 8.
note 308 (2d. ed. 1980).
2" See Otto Lagodny, Grundrechte als Auslieferungs-Gegenredate, 41 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 2146-2150 (1988).
' See Otto Lagodny & Sigrun Reisner, Extraditwn Treaties, Human Rights and "Emer-
gency-Brake"Judgments-A Comparative European Surve, 65 RIv. I\T'L DR- pE,. 543, 546.
547-562 (1994).
2' Id. at 562-572.
2" Id. at 551-552.
m Id. at 552-554.
2" Id. at 559-560.
' Lagodny & Reisner, Extradition Treaties, supra note 290, at 551.
29I d., at 554-556. See European Convention on Human Rights, at arts. 2 and 8; S
Breitenmoser, Der Schutz der Privatsphare genass Art. S EMRK, 39 Sehftenrrah des Insti-
tuts fur Internationales Recht und Internationale Beziehungen (Basel 1986). Lagodny and
Reisner note that Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands,
Nonvay, and Sweden, all inserted a reservation to their adoption of the European
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tions reside behind the "ordre publid' clauses in extradition trea-
ties. 26 These sorts of human rights and humanitarian protec-
tions may or may not have been what motivated Home Secretary
Straw in his decision not to extradite Pinochet.
Some national extradition laws or articles in criminal pro-
cedure codes relating to extradition have contained specific
"fundamental rights clauses" as early as the 1970s and 1980s.
For example, the 1988 Italian Codice di Procedura Penale provided
that extradition would be refused if the fundamental rights of
the fugitive are at risk of violation. The 1975 Portuguese Ex-
tradition Act did the same. 8 These would include all those
rights that are required for a fair trial. The consequence of this
is that extradition treaties, in the future, should contain a clause
that reads something like this: "Extradition will not be granted if
it is contrary to international and constitutional basic rights..
.." Thus, European nations have promulgated their laws on ju-
dicial assistance in criminal matters to be consistent with this
protection. For example, the 1999 Portuguese law on Interna-
tional Cooperation, Coopera~doJudicidria International, Article 6
reads:
Art. 6 General negative requirements of international co-operation
1- The request of assistance is refused when:
a) The procedure does not comply with or respect the requirements set
forth by the ECHR, or other relevant international instruments in the
field, ratified by Portugal;
b) There are serious grounds to believe that the assistance is required
with the purpose to prosecute or punish a person because of race, relig-
ion, sex, nationality, language, political or ideological beliefs, or his or
her belonging to a certain social group;
Convention on Extradition that provided for the requested state to refuse extradition
if the surrender would result in severe consequences as far as the fugitive's health is
concerned or on account of his or her age. Lagodny & Reisner, Extradition Treaties,
supra note 290, at 554.
Id. at 561-562.
" Codici di Procedura Penale, art. 698, 1, and art 705, 2 (Italy 1988); Lagodny &
Reisner, Extradition Treaties, supra note 290 at 547-548, nn.19-20.
' "Provar-se que a pessoa reclamada ser-, sujeita a processo que n~o oferepa ga-
rantiasjurfdicas de urn procedimento penal que respeite as condi 6es internacional-
mente reconhecidas como indispens~veis A salvaguarda dos direitos do Homem, ou
cumprird a pena em condic6es desumanas." Extradition Act (Portugal), art. 3, lh
(1.Alt.) (Aug. 16, 1975); Lagodny & Reisner, Extradition Treaties, supra note 290, at
548, n.21.
[Vol. 91
EXTRADITION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
c) There is a risk of worsening the procedural position of a person be-
cause of any of the grounds mentioned in the previous sub-paragraph;
d) It may lead to trial by an exceptional court or if it is related to the
execution of a decision of a court of that nature;
e) If the fact to which it refers is punishable with the death penalty or
other penalty which may cause an irreversible injury to the integrity of
the person;
f) If it relates to an offense punishable with imprisonment or a safety
measure which are perpetual or with an undetermined duration.
2 - The above-mentioned in sub-paragraphs e) to f) is not [to be] an ob-
stacle to co-operation:
a) If the requesting State has previously commuted the death penalty or
other penalty which may cause an irreversible injury to the integrity of
the person, by means of an irrevocable act, binding to its Courts or other
entities with power for the execution of the penalty,
b) If, regarding extradition for offenses punishable, according to the law
of the requesting State, with imprisonment or a safety measure which are
perpetual or with an undetermined duration, the requesting State pro-
vides guarantees that such penalty or safety measure will not be applied
or executed;
c) If the requesting State accepts the conversion of the same penalties or
measures by a Portuguese court according to the provisions of the Por-
tuguese law applicable to the crime which generated the sentencing;
d) If the request relates to the assistance mentioned in sub-paragraph 0
of paragraph n. 1 of article 1 [general MLA], requested on the basis of
the relevance of the act for the intended non-application of such penal-
ties or measures.
3 - [How to decide if the guarantees mentioned in 2-b are sound]
4- The request is also refused if reciprocity is not guaranteed [with one
exception]
5-When assistance is denied on the basis of paragraphs l-d), e) and 0,
art 32-5 applies. [aut dedere, autjudicare]3
The constitutional character of the Basic Rights functions as
a set of mandatory norms, which must inform every interpreta-
tion of any relevant clause in an extradition treaty and extradi-
tion law. Ambiguity must be read to promote the Basic Rights.
B. UNITED STATES PRACTICE-CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
DEATH ROW PHENOMENON AS TORTURE, CRUEL, UNUSUAL AND
DEGRADING PUNISHMENT
Behind you swiftly the figure comes softly,
Law No. 144/99, August 13, 1999, on International Judicial Cooperation. The




The spot on your skin is a shocking disease.
Clutching a little case,
He walks briskly to infect a city
Whose terrible future may have just arrived...
W.H. Auden, Gare du Midi.
Nobody has the right to take away man's life, because no-
body has given it to him.
Fyodor Dostoevski
Public opinion in the United States has always favored the
death penalty, although in the summer of 2000 there was a bit
of slippage. Efforts of scholars, students, and the participants in
the "Innocence Project" have used DNA testing another evi-
dence or means to establish the innocence of tens of individuals
who had been on death row. The large number of people lan-
guishing there strongly suggests that some innocent people
must be part of that population and that some innocents cer-
tainly must have been executed.'0° The fact that many death row
inhabitants have been found innocent makes this state sup-
ported murder (what else can one call it when the state kills an
innocent person?). Still, former Governor George W. Bush of
Texas, now President (amazingly and pathetically in my view)
stated that no such errors have occurred in Texas. 01
The recognition that innocent people have been and are on
death row gives even more credence to the position taken by the
European Court of Human Rights in the Soering case and to the
' See, e.g., Fatal Flaws: Innocence and Death Penalty in the USA, Amnesty Int'l, at
<http:ww.amnestysa.org/rightsforall/dp/innocence/innocent-6litml>; JIM DWYER,
PETER NEUFELD, & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); Rights for All: Death Penalty
in the U.S.A., Amnesty Int'l., at <http:www.amnestyusa.org/rightsforall/dp.html>.; .
Steve Mills, Ken Armstrong & Douglas Holt, Flawed Trials Lead to Death Chamber-Bush
Confident in System Rife with Problems, CI. TRIB., June 11, 2000, available at 2000 WL
3674831; Gay Alcorn, Death Penalty Flaws Exposed, THE AGE,June 13, 2000, at 2.
'0' See, Kris Axtman, After the Execution, A DNA Test Death Penalty Debate, CHRISTIAN
Sa. MONITOR, Aug. 8, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4430060; DirkJohnson, Shoddy De-
fense by Lawyers Puts Innocents on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000, at Al; Alcorn, su-
pra note 301; James Gill, Executioner's Song in Texas, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Dec. 12, 1999 at 7B; Editorial, THE CALGARY SUN, December 14, 1999, at A15; Damian
Whitworth, Death Row Haunts 'Merciless' Bush, TIMES OF LONDON, Jan. 4, 2000, at A12;
Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Grim. App. 1992).
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European Union's general policy opposing the death penalty in
the United States. The right to life is recognized as a basic hu-
man right in many human rights instruments and in most con-
stitutions. I would argue that the right to life includes the right
not to have that life taken away as punishment for crime.
1. Background on the Death Penalty in the United States
In 1925, Texas Governor "Ma" Ferguson granted a five-day
stay in the execution to two African-American men who were to
be hanged for their conviction of "criminal assault on a white
woman." Ferguson granted the stay, saying that such an execu-
tion would be "barbarous." One might have thought that this
sensibility was based on the barbarity of a death sentence, which
was often the fate of an African-American having trivial eye
contact with a white woman, or based on the horror of hanging
a person by the neck, or on the evil of its generally racist appli-
cation. In reality, however, what Ferguson considered to be
barbarous was the fact that the hanging was scheduled to be
carried out on a Sunday. Five days later, on a Friday, the hang-
ing was acceptable to Ferguson and was duly carried out. 'g
The U.S. Supreme Court occasionally has found a given im-
position of the death penalty to be cruel and unusual punish-
ment.0 3  On the other hand, the Court has never held any
particular form of execution to be unconstitutional. On Febru-
ary 24, 2000, in fact, the Court rejected, in a 5-4 decision, a
death row inmate's claim that electrocution in Alabama's elec-
tric chair was cruel and unusual punishment3 O
In the 1960s, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund and the American Civil Liberties Union began a program
of massive resistance to the application of the death penalty.
This ultimately resulted in a moratorium on the execution of
' 1925: Death & Texas, in Our Pages 100, 75, and 50 Year Ago, INT'L HER.ALD TRIB.,
June 8, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4122433.
See Coker v. Georgia, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (1977) (death penalty unconstitutional for
rape of an adult). But see 1995 Louisiana law that provides the option for the death
penalty for the rape of victims younger than the age of twelve years. In 1996, the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court upheld LA. RE%. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(C) (1995), which provides
for the death penalty for rape of a child under the age of twelve years, even if the vic-
tim is not killed. State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1073 (La. 1996).
s' But if anyone has ever witnessed an electrocution, they know how barbarous it
is, as the "client's" head is hooded, so that folks will not have to watch his eyes pop
out or the blood gush out of every orifice.
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capital prisoners that lasted a decade, from 1967 until 1977.
Not until 1984 did execution become fairly common again in
the United States. Since that time, capital punishment has be-
come commonplace, if not epidemic. Amnesty International re-
iterated the condemnation of United States practice with
renewed vigor.305 Many argue that the death penalty is still ap-
plied in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion.
The death penalty is considered by many to be a human
rights violation. Over the past two decades, executions have
risen nearly exponentially. ByJune 15, 2000, there had already
been 136 prisoners put to death in Texas during the five-and-
one-half years George W. Bush was governor.3°" Texas also ac-
counted for eleven executions between the turn of the 20"1 cen-
tury and February 23, 2000, and for 227 since 1982.307 That is
one-third of the executions in the United States during that pe-
riod. It is reported that Texas executes on average a convict308
every two weeks. Florida executed its first prisoner by lethal
injection on February 23, 2000, under a "stronger" death pen-
alty bill signed into law in January 2000, by Governor Jeb Bush.
This while the State of Florida leads the country in the number
of wrongfully convicted death row prisoners released since 1973.,09
In June 2000, it seemed that a slight change in momentum
was developing.-a weakening in "pro-death penalty" public
opinion. The New Hampshire Legislature voted to abolish the
death penalty in May 2000, but the New Hampshire Governor
vetoed the act and the state legislature failed to override the
veto.10 Perhaps most importantly, Republican Governor of Illi-
nois George Ryan, who personally is in favor of the death pen-
alty, imposed a moratorium on executions in his state because
305 Rights for All: Death Penalty in the USA, Amnesty Int'l, at
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/rightsforall/dp.html>.
'6 Alan C. Miller &Judy Pasternak, Records Show Bush's Focus on Big Picture, Jan. 2,
2000, L.A. TIMES, at Al.
"' Michael Ellison, Bush to Decide on Execution Today of Man With IQ of 70, THE
GuARDiAN (London), Aug. 9, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25044997.
308 David A. Vise, Clinton Delays Execution Under New Clemency Rules, WASH. POST,
Aug. 3, 2000, at A-2.
Comment, Execution Moritorium, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, Feb. 15, 2000, at 10A;
Opinion, High Wrongful Conviction Rate Calls for Execution Moratorium, PALM BEACH
POST, Feb. 24, 2000, at 19A; Editorial, Governor Ryan's Brave Example, N.Y. TIMES, July
3, 2000.
"0 See News in Brief, CHI. SuN-TIMEs,June 28, 2000, available in 2000 WL 6683081.
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of its "shameful" record of sentencing innocent people to death.
Illinois courts have released thirteen former death row in-
mates.31' Other states are contemplating similar moratoria.
Florida's courts have released eighteen from death row over the
past few years, but Florida Governor Jeb Bush has stated that
Florida will have no moratorium.
The debate over the death penalty has been marked by con-
sideration of several major questions and issues:
1) is the imposition of the death penalty inherently cruel
and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment?
2) what procedural protections are necessary to prevent the
arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of capital punishment?
3) even given the procedural protections afforded in the3129e
post-Greg1 era, is the death penalty imposed in a discrimina-
tory manner? and
4) under what circumstances is the nature of the defendant
such that it would be cruel and unusual to impose a sentence of
death?
Beyond these philosophical and moral questions, the issue of a
faulty system executing individuals that are innocent of the
crimes with which they have been charged has taken the fore-
front in U.S. discussion.
2. Flaws in the System
a) To Execute Or Liberate the Innocent
3 13
- * 311
Given our human solidarity in imperfection, it is certain
that all legal systems are flawed. This being so, Governor Ryan
of Illinois, one of 38 states that has the death penalty, has placed
sn Govenor Ryan s Brave Example, supra note 310.
s, Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976) (holding that the death penalty was not
per se in violation of the Eighth Amendment and providing guidelines for avoiding
capricious or discriminatory application).
3'3 See, gen., JIM DWYER, PErER NEUFELD, & BARRY ScHEMc, ACTUAL INNOcENCL. FWE
DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICrED (2000).
" See Albert Camus, Rejlections sur la Guillotine, in Reflections sur la Peine Capitale
(Symposium by Arthur Koestler & Albert Camus 1957).
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a moratorium on executions.3 "5 The thirteen Illinois men found
innocent after sitting on death row include Anthony Porter,
who suffered there for fifteen years, coming within two days of
his execution before being found innocent.3s 6 Students, faculty,
and journalists chronicled enough new evidence, trial errors,
incompetence of defense counsel, and prosecutorial miscon-
duct to prompt legal action that ultimately exonerated him and
many others. Another one of the thirteen, Dennis Williams,
spent eighteen years on death row before DNA evidence al-
lowed him finally to be exonerated and released . 7 Perhaps the
most well-known of those death row inmates found to have
been innocent are Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez,
who were sentenced to death in 1985 for the 1998 rape and
murder of ten-year-old Jeanine Nicarico. Alleged police and
prosecutorial misconduct ultimately led to their convictions, but
DNA evidence led to the 1995 exoneration and release of Cruz
and Hernandez.si These events and others were sufficient to
prompt a change in momentum in the United States from pro
to anti-death penalty and even a moratorium in several states.31
9
Texas, like most states, maintains appallingly low standards
of legal representation for capital defendants. In Texas, of the
134 death sentences issued during George W. Bush's tenure as
Texas governor up to July 1, 2000, there were forty whose de-
fense counsel presented no evidence at all nor even one witness
at the sentencing phase. Several of them failed to introduce
evidence of defendants' cognitive disabilities or low IQs. Psy-
chiatrist James Grigson, called "Dr. Death," testified for the
prosecution in twenty-nine cases about the dangerousness of
3'5 NACDL, News, Illinois Halts Executions, THE CHAMPION, March 2000, at 12; Mar-
tha Irvine, Death Penalty Suspended in Illinois, AP ONLINE, Feb. 1, 2000, available at 2000
WL 12386692; Martha Irvine, Illinois Suspends Death Penalty, AP ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 12386400.
316 This was due in large part to the courage, ingenuity and perseverance of some
Northwestern University law and journalism students under the tutelage of Professors
David Protess and Lawrence Marshall, and a most important series of articles in the
Chicago Tribune by Ken Armstrong and Maurice Poseley among others.
117 NACDL, News, supra note 316; Irvine, Illinois Suspends, supra note 316.
"18 Amnesty Int'l, People Released From Death Row, Part of the A.I. Report on Innocence
and the Death Penalty, available at <www.amnestyusa.org/rightsforall/dp
/innocence/innocent-6.html>.
"9 Id.; see also Dirk Johnson, Shoddy Defense by Lawyers Puts Innocents on Death Row,
Feb. 5, 2000, N.Y. Times, at Al.
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the defendant.320 This stopped when Grigson was expelled from
the American Psychiatric Association for his untrustworthy tes-
timony32 ' Forty-three defense counsel in Texas have been dis-
barred or sanctioned. Yet former Governor Bush has boasted
that no innocent person could ever have been given the death
penalty in Texas.2
However, the facts belie the accuracy of this statement.
Generally, court-appointed counsel are paid very little. There
has been disclosure of police and prosecutorial corruption,
planting of evidence, framing defendants, suppression of excul-
patory evidence, coerced confessions, perjury, judicial accep-
tance of questionable evidence, race playing a role in
committing defendants to death, among others in the awful lit-
any of serious violations of the law that accompany capital sen-
tencing and execution.2 These flaws were disclosed in a report
issued in June 2000 by Columbia Law Professor James Leib-
man 24 and others, making it clear that innocent people have
been executed, therefore murdered, in the United States. This
horrific recognition has prompted renewed debate over the
death penalty in the United States and created some momen-
tum against the death penalty.
b) The Death of David Martin Longs'
The surreal and perverse atmosphere surrounding the
death penalty in the United States was shockingly portrayed by
the Texas execution of murderer David Martin Long. Long had
slaughtered three women with a hatchet in 1986. Shortly before
Long was to be executed, he attempted suicide with a drug
overdose. Texas' perverse and liberal use of taxpayer money to
-2 See, Steve Mills, Ken Armstrong & Douglas Holt, Flawed Tnals Lead to Death
Chamber-Bush Confident in System Rofe with Problems, Ci-m. TRI.,June 11, 2000, available
in 2000 WL 3674831; Gay Alcorn, Death Penalty Flaws Exposed, THE AGE.,June 13. 2000,
at 2, available in 2000 WL 2165273.
321 Id
" Gay Alcorn, Death Penalty Flaws Exposed, The Age, at 10, 2000 WL 2165273 (June
13, 2000).
3 See, e.g., JAmEs LfiBMAN, A BROIEN SYsTEM: ERROR RAT IN CAMITAL CAsEs. 1973-
1995 (2000); Douglas Holt, Study: Most Death Cases have Significant Flaws, Cii. TRIB.,
June 12, 2000, at A7; Study Cites 68% Error Rate in Capital Appeals, REUTERJune 13,
2000, in <http/://news.findlaw.com/ne% s//20000612/crimecapitaldc.htmi>.
'LiEm,, supra note 323.
' See, gen., supra note 301.
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thwart Long's attempt to cheat the executioner is emblematic of
our pathology. First, the state refused to provide his lawyers
with funding to hire a psychiatrist to assist at trial. Yet when it
came time to kill him, Texas paid for an emergency air-evacua-
tion trip from Huntsville, Texas, (where death row is located) to
Galveston, Texas, for life-saving intervention. The next day,
and before his attending physician thought he should have
been released, Texas brought a plane to Galveston for a char-
tered flight back to Huntsville, where Long was executed as
scheduled with another drug overdose (his lethal injection).
c) Betty-Lou Beets
On February 24, 2000, the State of Texas executed 62-year-
old, mentally impaired great-grandmother Betty-Lou Beets.
The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles denied clemency and
Governor Bush refused to intervene, saying that he had seen the
evidence and felt that she was guilty.326 The U.S. Supreme Court
refused to stay the execution around thirty minutes before it
began. The jury that sentenced her to death never heard evi-
dence indicating the murderer's history of physical, sexual, and
emotional abuse (and the battered woman's syndrome), which
could have been a mitigating circumstance, eliminating the
death penalty for her. Beets, dubbed the "Black Widow" by
prosecutors and the press, committed horrific crimes and was
convicted in 1983 for killing her fifth husband, Dallas firefighter
Jimmy Don Beets, whose body was found on her property. She
was also convicted of shooting her second husband, Mr. Bill
Lane.327 Also, Beets was charged, but never prosecuted, for the
murder of her fourth husband, Doyle Wayne Barker, whose
body was also found on her property.
d) Executing the "Insane"
The Supreme Court has held that a state may not execute a
person who is insane at the time of the proposed execution. 8
6 John Williams & Kathy Walt, Bush Denies Stay: Beets Put to Death, Houston Chron.,
Feb. 25, 2000, at Al.
327 see id.
" Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (1986); cf., Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct 2934,
2954 (1989) (dictum to the effect that, "it may indeed be cruel and usual punishment
to execute persons who are profoundly or severely retarded and wholly lacking the
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions.")
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The Court noted that in such a case, the condemned is unable
to assist his or her counsel in trying to stay or avoid the execu-
tion and is unable to understand the sanction to be imposed, so
here there is no doubt that execution is clearly mere vengeance.
It is illegal, therefore, in all fifty states, to execute insane indi-
viduals.3  The Louisiana Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether to drug a psychotic death row inmate to give him a
brief episode of synthetic sanity, so that he may be executed,
The Louisiana trial court, over objection of counsel, ordered
the forcible and continuous administration of psychotropic
drugs, until defendant's execution is carried out.3 The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court denied defendant's appeal 2 and rehear-
ing.s The U.S. Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari "
and eventually remanded the case back to Louisiana. On re-
mand, the trial court again approved forcible medication, but
the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State
can not credibly claim, under the Louisiana Constitution, that it
is in the death row inmate's interest to be forced to take anti-
psychotic drugs to get him into shape to be executed.3
The Arkansas Supreme Court held in 1999 that prison offi-
cials may medicate an inmate forcibly with anti-psychotic drugs
to keep him from harming others or himself, even if the collat-
eral effect of this is to restore his competence to be executed.3
'2 See, e.g., State v. Allen, 15 So.2d 870 (La. 1943) (it is not lawful to execute a
murderer who became insane while on death row); WAwE LAFAE & AUSTIN ScoTr,
Cm fNmAL LAW § 4.4(c) (2d ed. 1986); Comment, Mentally IU Murderer: An Orwelhan
Solution from a Southern State, 9 N.Y.L. ScH.J. HUM. RTs. 541, 547-48, n.55 (1992). Pro-
fessor Alfred P. Rubin reminded me that Harold J. Berman's book, Lw AND
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE VESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983) sheds light on
the Western practice of refusing to execute condemned murderers who are insane,
until they regain their sanity. Apparently, the Church insisted that no one be con-
signed to eternal damnation and suffering, until he or she receives the opportunity to
confess and take communion. These sacraments would have no spiritual effect, un-
less the party has a "sound mind." See; BEsutaN, LAw AND REvOLUTnoN, supra this note,
at 166; Alfred P. Rubin, Book Review, 80 A.J. INT'LL 222, n.1 (1986).
Perry v. Louisiana,610 So.2d 746 (La. 1992)
"' See discussion in Comment, Mentally Ill Murderers, supra note 330.
'32 State v. Perry, 543 So.2d 487 (La. 1989) (threejustices dissenting).
3" State v. Perry, 545 So.2d 1049 (La. 1989), vacated and rmnanded 111 S.Ct. 449
(1990).
Perry v. Louisiana, 111 S.Ct. 449 (1990).
State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 754 (La. 1992).
Singleton v. Norris, 992 S.W.2d 768 (Ark. 1999). &eeJohn W. Parry, Trend: The
Year in Review-Part I, 23 MENTAL& PHSICAL DiSABILrr L REP. 781,786 (1999).
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The state of Arizona enacted a law in 1999 authorizing the use
of anti-psychotic medication and other treatment of mentally-
ill death row inmates who otherwise would be incompetent for
execution. 37 The Kentucky Supreme Court held that it is not
error to accept a guilty but mentally ill plea but that such a plea
could not bar the death penalty for the defendant, based on his
mental illness.33 8
e) Executing Minors & Incompetents
The United States has ratified the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. It insisted, however, on including
reservations, including one providing that Article 6(5) (relating
to the execution of juveniles), would not apply to the United
States. The U.N. Human Rights Committee has found that this
reservation is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the
Covenant, hence void.33 9 The U.S. Supreme Court did actually
set aside the death sentence of a murderer who was 15 years old
when he committed his horrible crime.30 No majority of jus-
tices, however, was willing to agree to a bright line that would
prohibit the execution of persons who commit murder at age 15
or below.34' In fact, in 1989, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
poses no bar to the execution of persons who commit a capital
offense at the age of 16 or 17. 2 It also held that it is not cruel
and unusual punishment to execute a person who is mentally
retarded, having the reasoning capacity of a 7-year-old.3 13 It is
reported that, as of autumn 1999, there were seventy individuals
on death row who committed their offenses when they were un-
der the age of eighteen. 4
'37 Ariz. H.B. 2478 (1999) (noted in Parry, Trend, supra note 336, at 786).
" Kentucky v. Ryan, 5 S.W.3d 113, 114-117 (Ky. 1999). SeeParry, Trend, supra note
336, at 788.
3s9 PAUST, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 44, at 76 and authority therein
cited.
... Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (1988).
"' id., at 2706 (O'Connor, concurring, objected to the establishment of the 15
years of age bright line).
342 Standford v. Kentucky, 109 S.Ct. 2969 (1989).
... Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct 2934, 2956 (1989).
.. Robert E. Shepherd, The Juvenile Court in the 21st Century, 14 CRIM. JUST. 48, 50-
51 (1999).
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3. The Supreme Court Continues to Make it More Difficult to Obtain Redress
Despite all of the unfairness, inequality of application, er-
rors, and police or prosecutorial corruption, legislation and Su-
preme Court jurisprudence have continued to make it even
more difficult for death row inmates to have their claims heard.
The opportunity for a habeas corpus action in a federal court
was severely limited by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, which limits the right to petition for habeas
corpus to one year from the final disposition of the defendant's
case.34 5 In Herrera v. Collins, the United States Supreme Court
had already made it much more difficult for a convicted person
to raise a claim of innocence.4 6
The deck was stacked further by a sharply divided Supreme
Court (in a 5-4 plurality), when it held in June 2000, that con-
victed killers are barred from telling jurors that they would be
ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison. 7 Virginia kil-
ler Bobby Lee Ramdass' death sentence was held valid even
though he was not allowed to give jurors this information which
might have made a difference in the decision to kill. Four jus-
tices dissented, arguing that the decision condones "acute un-
fairness." The Ramdass ruling clarified the Court's 1994
decision in Simmons, which held that defendants have the right
to tell jurors about their ineligibility for parole when prosecu-
tors urge jurors to impose a death sentence based on a claim of
the defendant's "future dangerousness." Ramdass was sen-
tenced to death for the extremely cold-blooded murder of con-
venience store clerk Mohammed Kayani, which he committed
during a week-long crime spree. The state court jury based its
28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d) (1) (A); see, e.g.. Nidols v. Bowersox, 172 F.3d 1068, 1071 (8th
Cir. 1999).
" Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). Thus, although the prosecution and
police authorities in Texas, along with Governor Bush claimed that Gary Graham,
who was executed onJune 22, 2000, had received several opportunities to present his
evidence of innocence of the murder for which he vras executed, in reality, he was
functionally prevented from doing so, first by incompetent counsel, and then by the
law which disallowed any revisitation of the case, from having a full hearing of his
claim. Even if he was guilty, the process was a travesty. See, Johathan Alter, A Redon-
ing On Death Row: You Don't have to be soft on crime to see we're killing people upthout being
sure they're guilty, NEWESWEK,July 3, 2000, available in 2999 WL 21083490.
14 Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S.Ct. 2113 (June 12, 2000) (plurality opinion refus-
ing to apply Simmons v. United States, 512 U.S. 154 (1994)).
20001
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY
death sentence on their finding that he was "a continuing threat
to society."
Ramdass brought a habeas corpus action in federal court after
all of his appeals were rejected in state courts. He argued that
he was wrongly barred from tellingjurors about his ineligibility
for parole under Virginia's three-strikes law. Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy, in his opinion for the plurality, said federal courts
could not help Ramdass because "the Virginia Supreme Court's
decision to deny (him) relief was neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application, of' the Court's 1994 decision in
Simons. Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined in the result, writing a
concurring opinion.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the dissent forJustices David
H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, stat-
ing:
[t]here is an acute unfairness in permitting a state to rely on a recent
conviction to establish a defendant's future dangerousness while simul-
taneously permitting the state to deny that there was such a conviction
when the defendant attempts to argue that he is parole ineligible and
therefore not a future danger .... Even the most miserly reading of the
opinions in [the 1994 decision] supports the conclusion that [Ramdass]
was denied one of the hallmarks of due process ... 48
4. Death Penalty and Violation of the Vienna Consular Convention
In Breard v. Greene,39 the Commonwealth of Virginia con-
victed Paraguyan national Angel Breard and condemned him to
' Id. at 2128 (StevensJ, dissenting).
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). See, e.g. Gerald L. Neuman, The Nation-
alization of Civil Liberties, Revisited, 99 COLUM. L REv. 1630 (1999); Molora Vadnais, A
Diplomatic Morass: An Argument Against Judicial Involvement in Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, 47 UC.A L. REV. 307 (1999); Malvina Halberstam,
The Constitutional Authority of the Federal Government in State Criminal Proceedings that In-
volve U.S. Treaty Obligations or Affect U.S. Foreign Relations, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. Riv.
1 (1999); Roger Alford & Peter Bekker, International Legal Developments: International
Courts & Tribunals, 33 INT'L LAw. 537 (1999); Curtis Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Con-
stitution and the International Conception, 51 STAN. L. REv. 529 (1999); David Bederman,
Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1439
(1999); Michael Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Under-
standing of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 341 (1999); Frederic L.
Kirgis, Agora: Zschernig v. Miller & the Breard Matter, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 704 (1998); Car-
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death. Upon his arrest, Breard had not been notified of his
right to consult a Paraguayan consular officer, as required by
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations." The U.S. Su-
preme Court held that the defendant's failure to assert his Vi-
enna Consular Convention right in the Virginia courts
procedurally defaulted any claim he might have had. It also
held that the state authorities' violation of the Vienna Conven-
tion had no continuing consequences of a nature that would al-
low Paraguay to sue under the Eleventh Amendment immunity
exception. Paraguay protested and the Department of State re-
quested Virginia's governor to stay Breard's execution. The
Governor denied the request for a stay. Paraguay filed an action
with the International Court of Justice under Article 36(1) of
the ICJ Statute and the Optional Protocol Concerning Compul-
sory Settlement of Disputes, requesting the ICJ to hold that the
United States had violated Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
and sought an order to require Virginia to vacate Breard's con-
viction. These efforts failed and Breard was executed. Not
clarifying the issue of the impact of self-executing treaties sig-
nificantly, the United States Supreme Court in Breard reasoned
that, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the
procedural rules of the forum state govern implementation of
the treaty in that state, but noted that the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations arguably confers a right to consular assis-
tance following arrest.s' The United States government cer-
tainly invokes the Vienna Convention to protest other nations'
los M. Vazquez, Agora: Breard & the Federal Power to Requre Compliance uith ICJ Orders of
Provisional Measures, 92 AMJ. IN'L L 683 (1998).
'0 The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36(1). 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, at Art. 36, provides in relevant part:
"1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relaung to nationals of the
sending state: ... (b) if [the defendant] so requests, the competent authonties of the recewi-
ing State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, vithin its
consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody
pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communicauon addressed to the
consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be for-
warded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph."
Breard claimed that his rights under the Convention (under Article VI) were violated
and the Paraguayan Government also protested.
's' Breard, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1354-55 (1998).
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failure to provide United States nationals with proper notice or
access to consular officials. 52
Similarly, following the Supreme Court's lead, lower courts
have held that a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consu-
lar Relations ' 3 notice requirement does not require exclusion of
evidence obtained as a result of post-arrest custodial interroga-
tion.354 The Ninth Circuit noted:
[W]e need not decide whether to accept the government's argument
that Article 36 creates no individually enforceable rights. . .. We agree
with the government's alternative position that assuming that some judi-
cial remedies are available for the violation of Article 36, the exclusion in
a criminal prosecution of evidence obtained as the result of post-arrest
interrogation is not among them.35 "
The court noted that the Ninth and other Circuits have
held in recent years that an exclusionary rule is not available for
treaty violations.3 6 The Vienna Convention itself does not indi-
cate expressly whether it provides a private right of action for its
enforcement. On the other hand, it does state in its Preamble
that "the purpose of such privileges and immunities [as set forth
in the Vienna Convention] is not to benefit individuals, but to
ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular posts
on behalf of their respective States. 3 57 The courts in the United
States are split over whether this preambular language, as well as
similar language found in various parts of the Convention itself,
foreclose a private riht of action for enforcement of rights un-
der the Convention. Even if the Vienna Convention were
52 See supra note 107 and authority cited therein.
... Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 351, at Art. 36.
... United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2000).
355 Id.
356 Id.
... Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 351 at Preamble (discussed in
United States v. Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d 236, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
... Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 279. Compare Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57,
64 (Va. App. 1998) ("[tjhere is no reported authority for the idea that a violation of
the [Vienna Convention] creates any legally enforceable individual rights"), and Re-
public of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1996) (suggesting in
dictum that a private party may not seek redress for treaty violations, unless the treaty
is self-executing). On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit, in Paraguay v. Allen, 134
F.3d 622, 629 (1998), while affirming the District Court, did not affirm the dictum
noted above, either to the effect that the Convention is not self-executing or that it is
not enforceable by individuals, because it provides no rights of action on private indi-
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considered to be self-executing, and to confer private rights, it
has been held that it does not follow that this includes the right to
suppress evidence obtained in an interrogation conducted after
failure to notify the accused of his right to consular assistance."9
Not all courts have taken this view. A Delaware court, for
example, held the opposite, noting that,
[t]he text of the Vienna Convention, the intention of the drafters, and
the prevailing view among this nation's courts lead this Court to con-
clude that Defendant's motion to suppress should be granted for the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) the Vienna Convention is the Law of the Land under
Article VI, Section 2 of the United States Constitution; (2) the police
conduct in this case violated Article 36 of the Convention; (3) Defen-
dant, a Guatemalan citizen, has asserted a Vienna Convention violation
in a timely manner [by raising it in a motion at the pre-trial, suppression
motion stage]; (4) Defendant has shown adequate prejudice to exist;
and; (5) a violation of Article 36 is ground for suppressing incriminating
statements made by foreign nationals while in police or government cus-
tody.%
Pacta sunt servanda is a jus cogens principl " requiring that
treaties be enforced. S62 A minor, claiming Salvadoran national-
viduals. See also, Melendez v. State, 4 S.W.3d 437. 441 (Tex. 1999); United States v.
$69,530.00 in U.S. Currency, 22 F. Supp. 2d 593, 594 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (denying mo-
tion to suppress evidence for violation of the Vienna Convention, but stating that "it
appears to this court that Claimant does indeed have a right to be informed that he
could communicate with the Nigerian Consulate and that this right was violated.").
Cf., Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that, even if
the Vienna Convention were held to create individual rights, it certainly does not cre-
ate constitutional rights nor does it convert violations of treaty provisions into consti-
tutional rights); United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1095 (S.D. Cal.
1998) (discussing the "murky" inquiry and muddled issue of whether the Vienna
Convention confers individual rights, but holding that a violation of notice provisions
in the Vienna Convention does not rise to the level of a Miranda violation, so as to re-
quire suppression of evidence). Not clarifying the issue very much is Breard v.
Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 1354-55 (1998) (reasoning that, absent a clear and express
statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern implemen-
tation of the treaty in that State, but noting that the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations arguably confers a right to consular assistance following arrest).
39 Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886; Salamehi, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 279.
State v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7, 14 (Del. 1999).
' Ajus cogens norm is a peremptory norm that nullifies treaties, legislation, and
case-law that is inconsistent with it. See; The Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, Arts. 53 and 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (May 23, 1969). These norms function much
like essential constitutional principles.
20001
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY
ity, charged with murder, had his case "transferred" from the ju-
venile court system to the regular, criminal district court for
trial on the charges. 5 The juvenile claimed that Article 36(b) of
the Vienna Convention entitled him to have his consular offi-
cials notified and that he should have been informed that he
had the right to speak to a consular official. He also claimed
that failure to do this constituted a jurisdictional error, equiva-
lent to that caused by failure to meet the mandatory notice re-
quirements to make a transfer from juvenile to adult criminal
court, under the Texas Family Code.3' The defendant then
urged that the notice requirements in Vienna Convention, Arti-
cle 36, had the same status and effect.3 s The Texas Court of
Appeals declined to so hold, noting that it is not settled that an
individual has standing to assert a violation of the Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations.?
VI. EXPLICIT HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS IN EXTRADITION
TREATIES- 7
Increasingly, United States Government requests for extra-
dition and even handovers under Status of Forces Agreements
have been overridden by international (European) and foreign
courts that have ruled international human rights provisions
take precedence. I will mention two cases in which concerns
over potential U.S. capital punishment resulted in litigation in
which courts were reticent to approve extradition to the United
" United States v. Superville, 40 F.Supp.2d 672, 676, n. 2 (V.I. 1999) (citing Wil-
liam J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs,
and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 293 (1998)).
's Melendez v. State, 4 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. 1999).
Texas Family Code, Section 54.02, authorizes ajuvenile court to waive its exclu-
sive original jurisdiction in some circumstances and, thus, to transfer a minor to the
appropriate district court for criminal proceedings. To do this, notice is required
and, if not satisfied, jurisdiction in the district court is improper. See §§ 53.04, 53.05,
53.06, and 53.07. Discussed in Melendez v. State, 4 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex.App. 1999).
m'Melendez, 4 S.W.3d at 440-41.
-IL (citing inter alia, Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct 1352, 1354-55 (1998)); In re
Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th 295 (Cal. 1994) (holding that failure to satisfy the the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations notice requirements does not deprive a juvenile
court ofjurisdiction to hear a custody and parental termination proceeding).
!7 See gen., BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 281.; Blakesley & Lagodny, Net-
work or Jungle, in PRINCIPLES & PROCEDURES FOR A NEW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(Albin Eser & Otto Lagodny, eds. 1992).
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States, where the death row syndrome was seen to violate provi-
sions of international human rights conventions. s
International human rights provisions and customary inter-
national law may apply to certain applications of money laun-
dering and asset forfeiture so Untied States law and provisions
of various international law enforcement conventions enable
prosecutors to seize, freeze, and retain custody of property that
is claimed to be an instrumentality or part of the proceeds of il-
legal activity. These laws and conventions allow the prosecutors
to shift the burden of going forward and the burden of proof to
the property owners or possessors, who are required to establish
that the property was not used in or based on the proceeds of il-
legal activities. In some instances this may violate human rights
law.3'
In 1989, the Supreme Court narrowly held that prosecutors
could include defense attorneys' fees as forfeitable assets under
prevailing federal law .3 1 In a 5-4 decision, the Court concluded
that the clear statutory language, as well as compelling govern-
mental purposes in adopting the legislation, justified forfei-
ture.372 It held that neither the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel nor the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause were vio-
lated by fee forfeiture.m Forfeiture of instrumentalities used in
committing drug-related crimes and the illegal proceeds of
For background on the cases, see, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 28 I.LM. 1063 (1989); see also, Socring v. United
Kingdom, 11 HuM. RTs. LJ. 3-35 (1990); Breitenmoser & Wilms, Human Rights v. Ex-
tradition: The Siering Cas4 11 MIcH.J. INT'L L 845 (1990); Steinhardt, Recent Develop-
ments in the Sdering Litigation, 11 HuM. RTS. LJ. (1990).
' For background on the application of international human rights provisions to
the forfeiture of attorneys' fees, see Richard J. W, ilson, Human Rights and Money Laun-
dering. The Prospect of International Seizure of Defense Attoney's Fees, 3 CTU.%. LF. 85
(1991).
370 See Bruce Zagaris, A Brave New World: Recent Developments in Anti-Money Launder-
ing and Related Litigation: Traps for the Unwar, in International Trust Matters, in S)'mpo-
sium: The International Trust Part II, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 1023, 1102-1108:
Michael Abbell and Mark Sherman, The Bill of Rights in Transnational Crnnnal Litiga-
tion, THE CHAMPION 22-29 (1992); Berta E. Hernandez, RIP to IRP-Mone Laundering
and Drug Trafficking Controls Score a Knockout Victo, Over Bank Seree). 18 N.C.J. INr'L L
& Coii. Reg. 235 (1993).
-"Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600.372 id.
Monsanto, 491 US 600 (1989) (citing Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. United
States, 491 US 617 (1989)).
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crimes is required by the signatories of the U.N. Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics. 7'
Unsettled questions arise, however, under both Conventions
as to whether attorneys' fees were contemplated by the drafters
as seizable assets, and whether attempts to seize attorneys' fees
as "proceeds" will survive scrutiny in the European Court of
Human Rights. One scholar concludes that the exemption lan-
guage of the Conventions implies the inclusion of defense at-
torneys.375 He further concludes that, even if attorneys are not
included, a series of human rights provisions, enforceable by
the European Court, would defeat any attempt to seize attor-
neys' fees, regardless of the source. Among the most likely
sources of protection will be the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, the same source of protection against efforts by the
United States to obtain persons wanted for murder. In particu-
lar, the provisions guaranteeing the right to fair trial, "equality
of arms" and access to court,
3 77 the presumption of innocence,
and the right to counsel of choice.7 These rights are eroding
within the United States, as I just noted, so any influence from
the European or other regime of human rights will be most
beneficial. For instance, the Deweer case 38 may enable a defen-
dant under investigation for money laundering to avoid being
forced to face the unconscionable dilemma presented by cur-
rent United States jurisprudence: requiring him to choose be-
tween paying a lawyer to represent him, thereby subjecting
himself and the lawyer to criminal charges if the money with
which payment is made is determined to be proceeds, or to go
unrepresented by counsel of choice in the proceedings.
Moreover, the Supreme Court decision in Verdugo-Urquidez,3 in
addition to raising questions about the viability of human rights
protections for non-U.S. nationals or residents when abroad,
also raises questions as to Fourth Amendment protections for
17' 28 I.L.M. 493, 504-07 (1989).
"' Wilson, supra note 369, at 87.
376 id
'7 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter "European Conven-
tion on Human Rights].
37' Id. art. 6(2)
's"Id. art. 6(3).
Deweer, 1980 Y.B. Eur. Cony. On H.R. (Eur. Ct. H.R.) 464.
" See, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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aliens both abroad and in the United States. The decision may
also raise questions as to rights of United States citizens in some
circumstances when they are abroad. The Alvarez-Machain
holdinge that official abduction of a foreign national does not
prohibit his trial in the United States raises questions that have
been quite fully addressed.
Increasingly, to the dismay of United States law enforce-
ment officials and legislators, international human rights con-
ventions are influencing and taking precedence over the
implementation of many international criminal cooperation
conventions. For example, Canada is insisting that the partici-
pants in the Inter-American Enterprise for Initiative and Re-
gionalization upgrade their human rights protection and
mechanisms for ensuring the protection. As various portions
of the Western Hemisphere organize into economic and politi-
cal systems,s they will further develop mechanisms to promote
human rights along with cooperation in criminal matters. As
these issues are linked, the United States may be motivated to
increase its protection of human rights. The international
trend is important because, as both United States statutes and
judicial decisions take a more "conservative" tack, foreign and
international legislators, policymakers, and courts are taking
more liberal positions on the application of international hu-
man rights provisions. This may eventually require the United
States to either decide to "go it alone" in extraterritorial crimi-
nal matters or to step on board the train of human rights in this
arena.
2 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
3-3 See Central American Deuelopments, in 7 INT'L EN'F. L. RPTR (Issue 11) at '141 (No-
vember 1991).
" See, e.g., EmilioJ. Cardenas, The Treaty of Asuncihn: A Southern Cone Common Mar-
ket (Mercosur) Begins to Take Shape WORLD COMPrSTION,June 1992, at 65.
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VII. A RELEVANT ASIDE: POTENTIAL REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS BY WAY OF EXTRADITION OR OTHER ABUSES OF
MUTUAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERs-ALVAREZ-
MACHAINAND CoUMoU: ABDUCTION AND TORTIOUS, DE-FACTO
EXTRADITION (OR, A COMMON LAW TORT) sJ
The Supreme Court has held that abduction of a foreign
national by United States agents is not a violation of an extradi-
tion treaty, unless the treaty explicitly provides that it is.386 Al-
though the Alvarez-Machain abduction was criticized as a
violation of customary international law, and this was all but
recognized by the Supreme Court, to date no criminal action
has been taken against the United States agents and it has been
held that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not
protect an alien who is not within United States territory. 7 On
the other hand, the Ninth Circuit refused to foreclose the pos-
sibility that an abducted person could receive damages pursuant
to the Torture Victim Protection Act38 and the Alien Tort
Claims Act of 178939 if it were proved that Drug Enforcement
Agency agents threatened Alvarez-Machain during interroga-
tion, withheld food throughout the interrogation, incarcerated
him under a false name so that it was impossible for the United
States Government to respond to inquiries about his where-
abouts from his family and the Mexican Government, and de-
nied him adequate medical treatment.390  Each of these
allegations was made and, if proven, would serve to create an
atmosphere of fear and isolation, imposing "gratuitous suffer-
ing" in violation of Due Process.39' One would certainly hope
that egregious violations of a person's human rights under in-
ternational law would give rise to tort damages. We ought to be
concerned about power being allowed to reside in agencies and
agents that will increase abuse if they have impunity.
" Coumou v. United States, 107 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 1997); Coumou v. United
States, 1995 WL 2292 (E.D. La. 1995); Coumou v. United States, 1995 WL 294158
(E.D. La. 1995).
" United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 668-69 (1992).
M7 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1996) (reviewing
civil claims relating to abduction).
" Torture Victim Protection Act, § 2(a), codified in the statutory notes to 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
'Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
'90 Alvarez-Machain, 107 F.3d 696, 701-702 (9th Cir. 1996).
"g, Id. at 702.
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One hopeful sign was that tort damages were, in fact,
awarded in relation to what amounted to a de-facto extradition
of Louisiana-based ship Captain Coumou, a United States citi-
zen and resident of New Orleans. He was the owner and master
of the M/V Nordic, a coastal freighter of Honduran registry.
The Nordic departed port in Colombia on June 2, 1992, with a
load of cement bound for St. Marc, Haiti. Shortly after leaving
port, Coumou began to suspect that a member of his crew
might have concealed narcotics in the containers of cement on
the ship. Coumou made radio contact with the United States
Coast Guard station in Miami, advising them of his suspicions.
He asked them to board and search his vessel. The Coast Guard
acknowledged the transmission but made no definitive response
to Coumou's request. Later, a Coast Guard Law Enforcement
Detachment (Ledet) operating off a naval warship intercepted
the Nordic on the high seas. Ledet's commander had radio dis-
cussions with Coumou about boarding.2
As the Elrod tracked the Nordic in anticipation of the Ledet
boarding, its commander communicated the situation to Com-
caribron. Finally, the State Department obtained permission
from both Honduras and Haiti to board the Nordic. By the
time it was boarded, the Nordic had sailed into Haitian territo-
rial waters. The United States Government was aware by this
time that Coumou was a United States citizen. Coumou re-
peated his suspicions that drugs were aboard. The armed Ledet
boarding party searched the vessel but found no contraband.
Coumou then told them how to search the vessel and where to
look for the drugs. The Coast Guard had taken control of the
vessel by this time. The Nordic exited Haitian territorial waters
and returned to international waters, but it became clear that an
exhaustive search of the Nordic's cargo of bags and pallets of
cement would not be possible at sea. While a decision was
pending from headquarters on what to do, Coumou was or-
dered to steer a northerly course, so that the vessel would re-
main in international waters. Coumou initially refused. He
acquiesced only after Lieutenant Kondratowicz told him that if
" At the time the ELROD made its initial contact with the NORDIc, Coumou in-
formed Lieutenant Kondratowicz about his previous radio transmission to the Coast
Guard and repeated his suspicions directly to the LEDET commander. Kondratowicz
received confirmation that Coumou previously had contacted the Coast Guard on
June 2, but was not told the content of the prior communications.
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he did not comply, the Ledet would take command of the helm.
Thus forced to comply, Coumou was arrested on the High
Seas.93
Finally, Comcaribron issued instructions for the Nordic to
proceed to St. Marc, where its cargo would be searched more
thoroughly as it was off-loaded. This directive was given be-
cause the Coast Guard had secured the Haitian government's
permission to undertake a United States law enforcement op-
eration within Haiti's sovereign territory. The Ledet was or-
dered to remain on board the Nordic during the remainder of
the voyage, and the Elrod was instructed to escort the vessel into
St. Marc. When the Nordic arrived at St. Marc, several Haitian
officials boarded to meet with Coumou. After this initial en-
counter the Haitian presence at the dock was token; only a
handful of policemen merely observed the transfer of cargo.
Soon after arrival, the Nordic began off-loading its cargo under
the direct supervision of the Ledet.
For the duration of the off-loading, the Ledet maintained a
secure perimeter around the Nordic. On the third day of the
off-loading this Coast Guard crew discovered cocaine hidden in
the cement. Haitian police officials watched the field-testing of
the cocaine but made no move to take charge of the situation .
Coumou and his crew were held in the captain's cabin under
armed guard pending their disposition. Once the cocaine was
discovered, the Haitian government "decided" to assert its juris-
diction and "requested" custody of Coumou, his crew, and his
vessel. There was evidence that United States officials had sug-
gested that this might be a good thing for the Haitians to do.
Officials in the United States had apparently decided prosecu-
tion would not be worth the effort and cost. The situation re-
ports and related memoranda before the decision-makers at
this level were grossly deficient and inaccurate. In particular,
there was no indication that Coumou had been the one who
had requested a boarding, nor that the Nordic was in interna-
tional waters during the boarding. False reports were made that
the Nordic was a "mother ship," about Coumou's demeanor and
... WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ETAL., CRIM1NAL PROCEDURE § 3.5(1), at 178 (2d. ed. 2000).
... The cocaine was ultimately delivered into the custody and control of Com-
mander Mizell, the Coast Guard attache at the United States embassy in Port-au-
Prince.
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conduct during the boarding,S3 and a significant exaggeration
of the Haitian government's negligible role in the seizure of co-
caine.
After considering this misinformation, the Washington de-
cision-makers decided to "defer" to Haiti's "request." Accord-
ingly, the order was issued to turn the Nordic and her crew over
to Haitian authorities.
Coumou was incarcerated in a Hatian dungeon for six
months. The experience was a nightmare. During this time, he
suffered from malnutrition, infections, and diseases, including
bronchitis, pneumonia, kidney infection, chronic back pain,
nerve disorder, fungal and eye infection, chronic diarrhea, de-
hydration, and marasmus, and he witnessed numerous atroci-
ties, perpetrated both by Haitian officials and other prisoners,
including beatings and torture, some of which ended in the
death of the victim. He lost well over 100 pounds. Coumou was
finally tried and acquitted on November 22, 1991. Despite his
acquittal, the Haitian government refused to return his ship,
money, or passport. Coumou left the country the day after his
acquittal, having been informed by his attorney that the Haitian
government was appealing the acquittal and that he might be
thrown back into prison. " After Coumou returned to New Or-
leans, he continued to suffer from physical ailments caused by
his incarceration in Haiti as well as anxiety and alcoholism, and
was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Coumou
filed suit naming the United States as defendant and alleging
that his injuries had been caused by the government's tortious
conduct. After a trial in New Orleans limited to the issue of li-
ability, the court entered a memorandum opinion finding the
United States liable for Coumou's injuriesS97
" The situation reports ultimately reaching the higher echelons of Coast Guard
command regarding the initial contact between the LEDET and the NoRDic indicated
that Coumou was "belligerent" and "uncooperative" and that his prior radio transmis-
sion appeared to be a "ploy" to draw suspicion from his vessel. At trial, however.
Lieutenant Kondratowicz contradicted these reports, testifying that Coumou vas co-
operative and that he never considered his prior transmission to be a "ploy." The
United States did not account for the discrepancy between these reports and Kondra-
towiczs trial testimony.
" Coumou was also forced to sign over to his attorney a power-of-attorney giving
her control of the NORDic and pay her fee of $45,000 or face the same risk of return-
ing to prison in Haiti.
" Coumou v. United States, 107 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1992).
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A. A TORTIOUS, DE-FACTO EXTRADITION
The District Court for the Southern District of Louisiana
held that a tortuous de-facto or functional extradition had been
executed by the Coast Guard, without any of the protections re-
quired by the extradition process. The idea seemed to be that
to hand over an American citizen to a foreign government un-
der these circumstances was tortious. The Government ap-
pealed.
1. Agents of the U.S. Government do not have the legal authority to take
action against U.S. citizens that would be illegal, just because they happen to
be abroad
The Fifth Circuit held that liability might obtain on the ba-
sis of common law tort principles.98 It would appear clear that
the conduct that United States officials committed against a
United States citizen through the auspices of foreign officials
was egregious and at least tortious. If the Coast Guard or any
United States agency can "transfer" U.S. nationals to foreign po-
lice by forcing the citizen from international waters to the terri-
tory of the "accepting" state, U.S. nationals are clearly at risk
and their rights are eroded. Thus, the Fifth Circuit was not at
all persuaded by the Government's argument that its entire de-
cision to hand over Captain Coumou to the Haitian authorities
and its entire method of doing so was a matter of policy and,
therefore a "discretionary function" not subject to suit because
of sovereign immunity.
39
2. Even if Haiti independently had requested to have the captain delivered to
its jurisdiction and control, this would have to be done with reasonable car'o°
Courts have generally drawn a line between planning or
policy level decisions and decisions or conduct at the opera-
tional level, merely incident to carrying out governmental pol-
icy.4 ' The Fifth Circuit also held that the United States has no
policy interest in treating informants in the same way that it
treats suspected criminals. The Government had a duty to use
reasonable care to inform Haiti that Captain Coumou had co-
' Id. at 294-96.
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operated; failure to do this may have been a breach of its duty.
It is one thing to have a policy to accommodate foreign sover-
eignty when a United States national commits a crime in that
territory, by handing him over to the foreign officials who re-
quest it. It is quite another to take a citizen who is perceived by
some officials to be involved on the high seas to a nation willing
to take him, to abscond with his property and to jail him. This
was a de-facto extradition done without reasonable care. The
Fifth Circuit remanded Coumou's suit for the district court to
determine whether the government's failure to convey informa-
tion to Haitian authorities constituted a breach of its duty of
reasonable care. Although the outcome was favorable, it would
have been better if the court had recognized the human rights
protections. It is clear that human rights protections were vio-
lated. Even the courts ignored them, as they are not seen as
self-executing.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Perhaps we can find some hope in the Pinochet scenario, in
the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda,
and in the Statute for the International Criminal Court. Even
with the serious deficiencies that each of these incidents and in-
stitutions have, perhaps one day we might rise to the standard
articulated by the Nuremberg Principles. Nuremberg Principle
No. I provides the basis for the creation of the ad hoc tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as for the Perma-
nent International Criminal Court. It reads: "[a]ny person who
commits an act which constitutes a crime under international
law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment." Beccaria
understood that impunity impeded both peace and justice: "the
conviction of finding nowhere a span of earth where real crimes
were pardoned might be the most efficacious way of preventing
their occurrence. Individual criminal responsibility and pro-
tection of individual human rights must merge to become the
cornerstone of any international criminal prosecution or of any
extradition. These are concomitant requirements of any prose-
cution of international crime.
Moral society seems always to have developed or perceived,
for good or for ill, the relationship between the authority to




punish and expiation; between the need to punish and to be
4034
punished.4 3 Anciently, lex talionis called for an eye for an eye,
for the "benefit" of the punished as much as the punishers. °5
When murder, theft, or assault were committed, society and the
perpetrator had to have their "taint" purged."°6 If the perpetra-
tor became a fugitive, it was necessary to obtain his person or a
proxy to purge the taint. 0 7 The Code of Manu provided that
there could be no possibility of happiness for the criminal or for
society without punishment; rest, and happiness for the sinner
and for society had to be obtained through a soul-purging pun-
ishment of the wrongdoer.4"8 The Cheyenne required purging
through punishment and the "breaking of the arrows" cere-
mony for the crime of tainting the food or water supply4 9 In-
tra-tribal murder "required the keeper of the arrows to cleanse
the tribe of the spectre of death.. ." through punishment of the
perpetrator. 410 "Cleansing qualities" of fire made it a favored
method of capital punishment. Nero used burning at the stake
to propitiate Vulcan, the god of fire.41 Punishment has been
the mechanism to rid the society of crime's destructive plague. 1'
Although ancient punishment is repugnant to us today, the mys-
tical need to use it to make society whole-for reconciliation-
has been understood. Dostoyefsky makes this clear in his book
Crime and Punishment, as do many great authors.
403 See discussion in Blakesley, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at chs. 1, 4.
404 Exodus 21:24; Yoram Dinstein, International Law as a Primitive Legal System, 19
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L.& POL. 1, 11 (1986).
40. See, e.g., I Kings 2: 28-34 (blood atonement).
406 Id.
407 See, e.g., Judges Chs. 15; 19 and 20. When the perpetrator was not obtainable,
sometimes the village believed to be where the perpetrator was hiding or at least was
from had to be utterly destroyed. See id. This caused many blood feuds. BLAKESLEY,
TERRORISM, supra note 4, at ch. 1.
... CODE OF MANU, Bk. VII, 18, 23-24; Bk. VIII, 17.
'0 See ROBERT FAIRBANKS, A DISCUSSION OF THE NATION STATE STATUS OF AMERICAN
INDIAN TRIBES: A CASE STUDY OF THE CHEYENNE NATION 31 (1976) (unpublished LL.M
Thesis, available in the Columbia University Law Library).
4,0 M. FOUSTEL DE COULANGES, LA CITt ANTIQUE, Liv. III, Ch. XIII (1864); KARL
LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE
JURISPRUDENCE (1941).
." GRAEME NEWMAN, THE PUNISHMENT RESPONSE 43 (1985).
1,2 See STROM, ON THE SACRAL ORIGIN OF THE GERMANIC DEATH PENALTIES 14, 208
(1942); see also VON HENTIG, PUNISHMENT, ITS ORIGIN, PURPOSES & PSYCHOLOGY 83, 84
(1973).
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Perhaps we have evolved beyond the extremes of this need
to propitiate the gods. Perhaps not. There is no doubt, how-
ever, that justice is required for real peace. But justice to be truly
just must be fair and tempered with mercy. This is why the
claim that to allow trials for the violation of international hu-
manitarian law endangers peace is ultimately spurious. Those
who have suffered the pain of terror, torture, rape, and slaugh-
ter of loved-ones will hold that pain within themselves. They
and humanity need catharsis, which prosecution may help pro-
vide. Whether a "peace" is imposed or not, someday, unless
there is justice, rage will fester and we will face the same prob-
lem again. Mercy is also necessary in certain cases, but, as
Hanna Arendt noted, mercy is not possible if there is no possi-
bility of punishment 413 It is not true and it is dangerous to sug-
gest that somehow not punishing those who commit atrocities
lends itself to peace. By the same token, prosecuting or punish-
ing without being scrupulous in ensuring fairness and justice is
just about as dangerous.
This article has analyzed how certain aspects of human
rights law and protection for the individual may impact extradi-
tion. We have considered two approaches to the application of
individual rights in the field of extradition. The traditional
positivist approach is still the one that most nations follow, and
it is one that still sees the state as the essential subject of extradi-
tion. Statist barriers to extradition, therefore, obtain for what is
seen as the protection of the state and as the means for the state
to insist on the protection of its nationals. It is possible, how-
ever, that headway is being made toward abolishing the negative
side of this positivist approach to include one that contemplates
new bars to extradition. These arise from treaty, customary in-
ternational law, and legislation, and involve rights of a constitu-
tional order and character. The consequence of recognizing
these rights would be that ambiguity in any treaty would be read
to promote the Basic Human Rights; and that gaps would be
filled so as to promote these rights.
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Senator Pinochet has a complex medical history, but the
main medical problems at present are peripheral diabetic neu-
ropathy and a recent progressive cerebrovascular lesion.
The diabetic neuropathy adds to his difficulties in walking
and a noted tendency to postural hypotension.
The diabetes, along with his smoking in the past, will also
have made damage to the arteries likely.
The cerebrovascular process has manifested itself in minor
brain hemorrhages and temporary ischemic periods, but they
are also the cause of progressive damage without acute symp-
toms.
There is clinical evidence of extensive brain damage, in-
cluding bilateral lesions to the pyramidal tracts, which cause
spasms and affect the base ganglions, producing periods of
Parkinson's Disease.
The presence of primary reflexes indicates that lesions have
occurred to the frontal lobes, and the lack of memory is com-
patible with bilateral damage to the structures of the temporal
lobes.
The difficulties in the ability to comprehend are the result
of the lack of memory. While many of the lesions can be attrib-
uted to areas of the brain irrigated by the basilar artery (which,
as the brain scanner shows, is calcified), the damage to the fron-
tal lobes indicates a more generalized arterial lesion.
Physically:
Senator Pinochet would at the moment be able to attend a
trial, but as the periods of cerebrovascular lesions have pro-
gressed despite the excellent treatment (with correct controls of
diabetes and arterial pressure and with anti-coagulant agents) a
progressive deterioration of both his physical and mental condi-
tion is likely.
... Signed byJohn Grimley Evans, Michel J Denham and AndrewJ Lees on Jan. 6,
2000. Document reported by THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 16, 2000, at 1. The full
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Mentally:
In our opinion, Senator Pinochet is not at the moment
mentally capable of taking part in a trial with full knowledge of
the facts. We base this opinion on:
Lack of memory both of recent and distant events. Limited
ability to understand sentences and questions, due to loss
memory and, consequently, inability adequately process verbal
information. Loss of his ability to express himself in audible,
succinct and relevant way. Periods of fatigue.
With these impediments he would be incapable of suffi-
ciently following the process of a trial so as to instruct his law-
yers.
He would have difficulty responding to the content and the
implications of the questions asked of him, and he would not be
aware of this difficulty.
His memory of distant events is diminished. He would have
difficulty making himself heard and understood in his answers
to questions.
We are convinced that the inabilities diagnosed are due to
brain damage, as they are in their nature compatible with, and
correspond to that phenomenon, and the formal neuropsy-
chological tests did not show any of the signs of deliberate ex-
aggeration of damage.
To be precise, those neuropsychological tests indicative of
original intelligence and of level of education (like the WAIS
vocabulary scale) indicate above-average ability.
No depression
At the moment, Senator Pinochet does not show any signs
of clinical depression.
Situational stress, as a trial is likely to produce, causes psy-
chological responses which could accelerate the development of
vascular lesions.
We are told, however, that in the past Senator Pinochet has
shown a notable ability to contain stress.
We are therefore unable to give any useful opinion on the
possible effects on his health if he faces a trial. Most of the cases
of lesions seem to have occurred in a series of tromboembolic
episodes during September and October 1999.
Sufficient time has passed for most of the spontaneous re-
covery which might be expected after these episodes to have oc-
curred.
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Although it is characteristic of lesions due to cerebrovascu-
lar processes for daily fluctuations in functional capacities to oc-
cur, we consider a sustained and significant improvement of the
latter to be unlikely.
